Modality and anti-metaphysics by McLeod, Stephen K
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
Stephen K, McLeod 1997
M odality and Anti-M etaphysics 
Stephen K, McLeod
Ph.D. 
Faculty of Arts
University of Glasgow 
October 1997
g
i î
""t
II
%
: , i f î
ProQuest Number: 10391230
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10391230
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
GLASGOW 
UNïVERSlIY 
LiBRARY
- T v \A k ^  i l o / /
S L
seeks to establish anti-essentialism .
A b s tr a c t
My principal aims are: to defend m etaphysics, chiefly against the 
logical positivists; to defend objective non-logical m odality against 
em piricist views which hold that the very notion is unintelligible and 
which reject the view that there is ontologically grounded modality. 
(As an adjunct, I defend a conception of the tasks of ontology against 
the objectual conception adopted in some contemporary discussions.)
Chapter 1 concerns philosophies which have been thought to seek the 
elim ination of metaphysics. I argue that the common view that Hume 
considered all metaphysics m eaningless and sought its elim ination is 
the misguided result of the positivist appropriation of Hume. I suggest 
that Carnap's revisionary view of meaning, in accordance with his 
notion of logical syntax, poses no serious threat to metaphysics. I set 
out the logical problem s associated with A yer’s notion of indirect 
verifiab ility  and the w ell-beaten dispute about the status of the
Iverification principle itself. I indicate my intention to study the m odality involved in verifiability and my view that, setting aside the 
aforem entioned logical problem s, the c lassifica tion  of cognitively  
meaningful statements as either analytic or empirical is inadequate. I 
discuss a modal argument against metaphysics offered by N.R. Hanson, 
my criticism  of which serves to illustrate a broad form  of essentialist 
argument, common to much essentialist work, which m ight justifiably 
be attributed to W ittgenstein's T r a c t a t u s , Given the case for saying 
that the T r a c t a t u s  is in fact committed to realism  about a (very 
restricted) class of modality de re, it should not be regarded as anti­
m etaphysical in the m anner of the positiv is ts . I suggest that; 
W ittgenstein 's attitude to m etaphysics was m ore subtle and more 
tolerant than that of the positivists; contrary to the views of some
comm entators, his Philosophical  Investigations  neither establishes nor
In Chapter 2, informed by developments in contemporary anti-realism  
(with which I am not allied), I set out my argument so that the initial 
issue is not that of realism /anti-realism  about m odality, but that of 
p rim itiv ism /an ti-p rim itiv ism . I argue tha t m odal d isco u rse  is 
primitive: i.e., neither eliminable nor reducible to non-modal discourse. 
I endorse a strict distinction between elim inativism  and reductionism. 
After McGinn, I outline epistemological motivations behind such anti-
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rea list positions. In order to assuage these I provide some modal 
epistem ology. I adopt a broadly Kripkean account of de re modal 
knowledge while disputing the famous Kiipkean tenet that there are 
necessary truths typically  discoverable a posteriori .  I take it, after 
W iggins, that it rests upon a m isconception about the form  of 
e sse n tia lis tic  a ttrib u tio n s . I illu s tra te  the d is tin c tio n  betw een 
necessary truths and true statements of de re necessity using the 
necessity of identity as a key example. I try to im prove on the 
epistemology offered by Kripke and largely subscribed to by McGinn. 
Taking Quinean empiricism as a paradigm, I argue, after Pap, W right 
and M cFetridge, that the modal elim inativist’s position is untenable 
due to its own incoherence. I argue that the modal does not reduce to 
the non-m odal. This is evidenced by the failu re  of purportedly 
reductionist accounts (the most prominent being those of D.K. Lewis 
and D M. Armstrong) entirely to purge appeal to prim itive modality 
from  their own theses. I discuss the recent anti-reductionist cases 
presented by Lycan, Shalkowski and Divers.
In Chapter 3 I illustrate how modal projectiv ism  is ill-p laced to 
account for de re modality. I expand upon the distinction between 
log ical and m etaphysical m odality . H aving d istingu ished , under 
Hacking's influence, between de re and de dicto modality, I argue for 
realism  about a class of de re modality on the basis of work done by 
W iggins. I charge that anti-realist conceptualism  about m odality and 
essence  resu lts  in an un tenable  and ep is tem o lo g ica lly  barren 
m etaphysic . In addition, when the conceptualist rea lis t d ialectic  
developed by W iggins is duly recognized, anti-realist conceptualism  
fails to get off the ground. That dialectic is ignored by Sidelle, yet it 
undercuts his attack on real essentialism.
In Chapter 4 I expand upon the de relde dicto distinction. I discuss the 
conceptions of the modality involved in the notion of verifiability in 
princip le  which can be extracted from the works of the logical 
positiv ists them selves. I claim  that the logical positiv ists conflated 
lo g ic a l p o ss ib ility  and su b stan tiv e  p o ss ib ility  d esp ite  th e ir 
predom inant intention to characterize verifiability in terms of logical 
possibility of verification. I argue, further to the discussion of modal 
epistem ology in Chapter 2, that the classification  of cognitively 
meaningful statements as either analytic or empirical is inadequate. I 
defend the allocation of de dicto status to constructions employing the
.. .l:
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logical modalities. I discuss the issue in relation to some revisionary 
accounts of log ical possib ility  offered under the in fluence  of 
essentialist thought. I reject these, seeking to m aintain the distinction 
between logical and metaphysical modalities. My views are influenced 
by the writings of McFetridge and Wiggins. I conclude with a brief 
comment on empiricism and essentialism  in relation to the conflation 
of logical possibility and substantive possibility de re.
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CHAPTER 1: THE ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS
1.1 Anti-Metaphysics and the Critique of Metaphysics
1.2 Em piricist Anti-metaphysics 
The Humean Background
This chapter surveys philosophies which have been thought to 
advocate the elim ination of m etaphysics. A critique of m etaphysics
should not be confused with an anti-metaphysical philosophy, where 
the latter is understood to involve the advocacy of the elimination of 
metaphysics. Failure to recognize this results in a skewed vision of the 
history  of philosophy. Zealous advocates of the e lim ination  of 
m etaphysics have tended to read any critique of m etaphysics (and, 
worse, any critique of a species of metaphysics) as broadly participant
in a common cause.
This study is not concerned with philosophies such as that of Kant, 
who criticized a species of metaphysics and whose project was to 
reform, rather than to eradicate, m etaphysics,i and that of Heidegger, 
who criticized the history of metaphysics (i.e. the actual practice of 
metaphysicians since classical times) as a history of forgetting and as 
ontical', rather than ontological'. For H eidegger w hat had been 
forgotten was what he took to be the true crux of ontology, the 
question of the meaning of being. He regarded ontological inquiry as 
concerned with the meaning of being, in contrast to that which he 
accused metaphysicians through history of concentrating upon, namely 
the ontical, that is, concern with the existence of entities. Heidegger 
sought to reorient m etaphysics to what he regarded as its primary 
task, not to bring about its death.^
■Æ
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any 
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?  No. 
Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning
1 Cf. Strawson (1966, 16-18); Walsh (1975, 4); A.R. W hite (1987, 85, 
87); Korner (1991, 99).
 ^That Heidegger sought not to eliminate, but to reorient, metaphysics 
is manifested in [1927](1962a, esp. 28-35) and [1929](1962b, pass im ) .
matter o f  fac t  and existence? No. Commit it then to the 
flam es: for it can contain nothing but sophistry  and
illusion. Hume (closing remarks of An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding [1748] (1975, 165))
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An explicit rejection of m etaphysics, as distinct from  a 
m ere ab sten tio n  from  m etap h y sica l u tte ra n c e s , is 
characteristic of the type of empiricism which is known as 
positivism. Ayer (1946, 135)
1
Hume is commonly regarded as a philosopher who espoused anti­
metaphysical views, especially given the Humean lineage of the classic 
an ti-m etaphysica l ph ilosophy  of the tw en tie th  cen tu ry , log ical 
positivism . As Stroud (1977, 220) states, some writers belonging to 
that m ovem ent erroneously took Hume, on the basis of the closing 
paragraphs of the E n q u i r y ,  to be an earlier proponent of their own 
anti-m etaphysical thesis that the claims of m etaphysics are literally 
m ean ing less .^  Hume questions the intelligibility of some metaphysical 
doctrines and questions, such as Spinoza's doctrine of substance, the 
question of personal identity, and the question of the m ateriality or 
im m ateria lity  of the soul,4 but nowhere does he claim  that all 
metaphysics is meaningless. In fact, the attribution of any such view 
to Hume is very far from accurate. Stroud does not make a clean break 
from  the positivistic reading himself, in that he adds that 'no doubt 
[Hume] was not d isposed  to w hat he w ould call "abstruse" 
m etaphysics'. Stroud's comment is unhelpful, and it subverts Hume's 
taxonom y, since Hume regards 'abstruse', in con trast w ith 'easy ', 
philosophy, as the profound and truly insightful form of philosophical 
inquiry. It is within this category that he distinguishes the 'false and 
adulterate ' and the true' m etaphysics; he regards the form er as 
obscure and sophistical.5 Stroud then describes Hume, unfortunately, 
as displaying an 'anti-m etaphysical bent' which endeared him  to 
tw en tie th -cen tu ry  philosophers. Stroud recounts how Hum e was 
viewed as 'the best early exponent of a view' which sought to 'put 
m etaphysics...beyond the sphere of human cognitive concern’. Contrary
3 Examples of positivistic readings of Hume follow shortly: it will be 
apparent that they are not offered exclusively by positivists.
4 Hume [1739-40](1978, 234, 240, 243, 246, 250, 251).
5 [1739-40], Introduction, (1978, xiii-xix); [1748], Section 1, 'O f the 
Different Species of Philosophy', (1975, 5-16). I
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to that interpretation, from which Stroud does not sufficiently distance
himself, Hume sought to restrict metaphysics to that which was within
the scope of human understanding. The positiv ists read their own
anti-m etaphysical views into Hume, and accordingly  appropriated
Hume, casting him as the forebear of their own anti-m etaphysical *p ro jec t.
M embers of the positivist movement stated their reading of Hume's 
views on m etaphysics in a quite unambiguous manner. Referring to 
the aforementioned passage in Hume's Enquiry ,  Carnap [1934](1992a, 
55) writes, '[o]ur antim etaphysical position has been form ulated by 
Hume in the classical manner ' . 6  The anti-m etaphysical position Carnap 
has in mind is quite clearly the view that all m etaphysical discourse is 
meaningless. Directly after quoting Hume he describes an objection to 
the position that all metaphysics is meaningless, using the phrase 'as 
against this', that is, as against what Carnap takes to be Hume's view. 
Carnap reads the thesis that all metaphysics is m eaningless into the 
passage from Hume, despite the fact that Hume writes nothing of the 
k ind .
Ayer (1946, 54) claims that 'we may say not merely that [Hume] was 
not in p ractice a m etaphysician, but that he exp lic itly  rejected  
m etaphysics'. He then produces the aforem entioned passage from  
Hume as evidence for this claim. In a careful moment, Ayer does not 
com m it C arnap 's m istake of reading Hum e as declaring  the 
propositions of m etaphysics meaningless:
Hume does not, so far as I know, actually put forward any 
view concerning the nature of philosophical propositions 
themselves, but those of his works which are commonly 
accounted philosophical are, apart from  certain  passages 
which deal with questions of psychology, works of 
an a ly sis .7
I
6  Cf. Carnap [1934](1937a, 280). The claim of W einberg (1936, 2) that 
'[i]n his critical work Hume is the first great positiv ist' is merely 
asserted rather than shown to be the product of scholarship.
7 Contrast the less careful Ayer's claim (1959a, 10) that the closing 
paragraph  of Hum e's E n q u i r y  is an excellent statem ent of the 
p o s i t iv is t 's  p o s itio n ';  cf. A yer (1969 , 173), the L o g ica l 
P ositiv ists...re jected  m etaphysics on the ground that m etaphysical 
doctrines were not even false but literally nonsensical. This is indeed a
   .
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N evertheless, A yer does ask, rhetorically , w hether the Hum ean 
passage can be interpreted in any way other than as 'a  rhetorical 
version of our own thesis that a sentence which does not express 
either a formally true proposition or an empirical hypothesis is devoid 
of all literal significance’.
It is a measure of the strong grip on philosophy gained by the logical 
positiv ist m ovem ent that the positivistic reading of Hume became 
w idespread and enduring, very much in spite of Hum e's actual 
writings. The actual impact of the positivist reading is all the more 
formidable when one considers that Stroud, who sought to build upon 
the naturalistic reading of Hume initiated by N.K. Smith (1905; 1941),8 
does not escape its clutches. The strong influence of the positivist 
reading is evidenced in writers other than Stroud, whose lapses into it 
are m erely occasional. For example, Passmore (1952, e.g., 12, 15) 
frequently refers to Hume as a positivist.^ According to Urmson (1956, 
102), 'in a high-flown, but not untypical, passage Hume had consigned 
all m etaphysics to the flam es as worthless': note the erroneously 
em ployed  qu an tifie r. U rm son then echoes the ca re fu l Ayer: 
'H u m e... a n tic ip a te d  [the] p o s itio n  [th a t a ll m e tap h y s ic s  is 
unintelligible], but only in obiter dicta, and as a rhetorical flourish, not 
as a fully worked-out thesis'. Boeselager (1975, 7) comments that 'For 
Hume, there could be no ontology or metaphysics.'lo Poser (1988, 311- 
312) writes that Hume rejected theology and school m etaphysics, but 
then goes on to describe Hume's philosophy as 'a form of positivism ' 
which 'rejected m etaphysics as im possible and m eaningless'. Post
view that goes back to Hume'. On the nature of philosophy, cf. (1973, 
22) where Ayer views the end of Hume's E nqu iry  as implying that the 
true task of philosophy is analysis: this is in apparent contrast with 
Ayer (1980, 25).
8  There are interpretations of Hume other than the two I mention. 
Smith argued against earlier commentators who interpreted Hume as a 
subjective idealist.
9 Nevertheless, Chapter 4, 'The Positivist', is more subtle than its title 
suggests.
He adds (1975, 7-8): The im possibility of any ontology or
m etaphysics is a consequence of Hume's sensualism  and nominalism. 
W hat he him self called the "true metaphysics" is epistem ology and 
psychology, to be carried out along the lines of Newtonian physics.' 
(One wonders what nominalism is if not a metaphysical point of view.) 
On 'true m etaphysics’ see main text.
i
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(1991, 16), a fte r describ ing  the p o s itiv is ts ' an ti-m e tap h y sica l
application of their version of Hume's fork, does not distinguish their 
views on metaphysics from those of Hume himself, depicting Hume as 
describing all m etaphysics as containing nothing but sophistry and 
illusion and being worthy of conunittal to the flam es4 1 Flew (1991, 
169) perpetuates the m yth which even the carefu l A yer denied, 
namely that Hume described any statem ent concerned neither with 
reasoning about matters of fact nor reasoning about relations of ideas 
as unintelligible. After quoting the opening paragraphs from Section 4, 
Pt 1 of Hume's E n q u iry  [1748](1975, 25-26), Flew states that Hume 
is...claim ing to have noticed, what is m anifestly not the case, that 
every assertive utterance which is to any extent in te llig ib le  falls 
unequivocally into one or other of these two m utually exclusive and 
together exhaustive categories’. R a t h e r ,  what is m anifestly not the 
case is that Hume makes any such claim.
It is plain that Hume was, and regarded himself as, a practitioner of 
m etaphysics. Hume sought to criticize the prevailing m etaphysics of 
his day, rather than to eliminate metaphysics tout court. Straight off.
11 Part of Hume's famous passage is quoted, where, significantly, the 
phrase 'school metaphysics' is omitted.
12 Cf. Hanfling (1981, 9). Meikle (1995, 182) claims that:
E n ligh tenm en t w riters usually  understood  the term  
'metaphysics' to mean a science which purported to prove 
the existence of things in the supernatural world, and that 
was prim arily  how their opponents in the declin ing  
scho lastic  trad ition  understood it too. N either side 
distinguished between this sense of the term , and the 
primary sense in which metaphysics, together with logic, is 
the m ost fundam ental area of philosophical inquiry, and 
one which informs all other areas of thought, since thought 
of any kind works to one metaphysics or another. When 
Hume and others 'eliminated' m etaphysics, they elim inated 
it in both senses at once.
In fact, Hume was neither guilty of this conflation nor desirous of the 
extirpation of the sort of metaphysics designated by the latter sense of 
the term. Hume was no doubt opposed to A ristotelian (and other 
substance-based) m etaphysical views committed, for example, to real 
necessity and possibility. In Chapter 3 I will defend non-objectual 
m odal realism  against em piricist critics who have inherited  the 
Humean m antle.
13 Cf. Foster (1985, 40).
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we can see that the claims made about Hume's attitude to metaphysics 
by the aforementioned logical empiricists (and those others who fell 
under the spell of the positivistic reading) were radically m isguided, 
ju s t by looking at Hume's actual writings in a quite m atter-of-fact 
manner. In the opening paragraph of the introduction to his Trea t ise ,  
Hume attacks the lack of rigour often displayed in philosophy and in 
the sciences. He proceeds to com plain about the triv ia lity  and 
fragm entation he finds in these disciplines. He describes the common 
prejudice against metaphysical reasoning and gives an account of its
source. He makes it quite clear, in an unapologetic fashion, that his 
own project is of a kind which would be the object of this common 
pre jud ice :
if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis 
certain it must lie very deep and abstruse; and to hope we 
shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses 
have failed  with the utm ost pains, m ust certain ly  be 
esteem ed vain and presum ptuous. I pretend to no such
advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and 
would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so 
very easy and obvious. [1739-40](1978, xiv-xv)
The crucial science for Hume, as he repeatedly makes clear, is the 
science of human nature: when conducted properly, it constitutes the 
true  m etaphysics. 14 True m etaphysics, in contrast to the false and
adulterate metaphysics of the schools, is confined to concern with that
which is within the limits of the human understanding. In this respect 
Hume can be said to distinguish between transcendent and immanent 
m etap h y sics .
That Hume is in no doubt that he is a practitioner of m etaphysics is 
clear from  his discussions of the species of philosophy in both the 
Treatise  and the Enquiry.  An accurate exposition of Hume's discussions
14 The first sentence of the E nqu iry  identifies 'moral philosophy' with 
the science of human nature'. Hume proceeds to state, as I will 
illustrate, that the species of moral philosophy are the easy and the 
abstruse philosophy. The abstruse philosophy is constituted by the 
false and adulterate and the true metaphysics. One of the objections 
against the false and adulterate m etaphysics is that they are not 
properly a science. The true metaphysics is identical with the science 
of human nature properly conducted.
. . .
14
of the species of philosophy is given by Zabeeh (1973, 6-9), who does 
not shrink from recognizing that Hume regards his own m ethod of 
philosophy as the true m etaphysics. However, Zabeeh then retreats 
in to  a position  w hereby Hume is characterized  as c lassify ing  
metaphysics along with religion, with the conunittal to the flames of 
both firmly in mind. After quoting the end of the E n q u i r y ,  Zabeeh 
com m ents:
it seems that metaphysics and theology for Hume, being 
subjects which fall under neither the experimental sciences 
nor the m athem atical sciences, are w orthless subjects. 
H ow ever, for Hume philosophy is not iden tical with 
metaphysics, and hence it does not seem that he wants to 
commit his own books to the flames. (1973, 10-11)
This is despite Zabeeh's earlier recognition (1973, 9) that Hume 
identifies true philosophy with true m etaphysics: c learly , Zabeeh
cannot have it both w a y s .  5^ Hume regards him self as practising the 
true m etaphysics and (presumably) Hume’s fork poses no threat to 
that true m etaphysics, especially when we bear in mind that it is 
s c h o o l  m etaphysics (i.e. a branch of the false  and adulterate 
metaphysics) towards which Hume is eager to direct the fire. Zabeeh 
goes on to mention "T he airy sciences" such as m etaphysics' which 
Hume thinks should be replaced by the science of human nature' 
(1973, 13). Zabeeh claims (1973, 18) that Hume calls undecidable 
philosophical issues 'False Philosophy or simply M etaphysics', but 
Hume does not  use the word metaphysics' in this way. He frequently 
indicates which species of philosophy he is talking about when he uses 
that word. Zabeeh proceeds to claim  (1973, 19) that 'the m ost 
im portant objection against m etaphysics is that it is not a science. 
M oreover, m etaphysics is often used in support of religion’. Zabeeh's 
retreat is emphasized by his description (1973, 46) of Hume as waging 
war on metaphysics, with no attempt to state that it was some but not 
all metaphysics which Hume sought to extirpate.
In his modal philosophy, Hume writes that:
Zabeeh fails to notice that he makes inconsistent claim s about 
Hum e's attitude to m etaphysics. Unacknowledged vacillation is also 
exhibited by Passmore (1952).
'Tis an establish'd maxim in m etaphysics, That whatever  
the mind clearly conceives includes the idea o f  possible  
e x i s t e n c e ,  or in other words, that nothing we imagine is 
absolutely impossible. [1739-40](1978, 32)
Rather than arguing for this view, he regards it as well-founded on the 
basis of work done by other metaphysicians. Hume is perhaps taking 
this 'establish'd maxim’ upon trust, a practice upon which he frowns 
elsewhere [1739-40](1978, xiii). If Hume shared the anti-m etaphysical 
view of the logical positivists he would surely not have accepted 
anyth ing  on the basis of its being 'an estab lish 'd  m axim  in 
m etaphysics’. That he does is again illustrative of the point that it is 
unrigorous, false and adulterate, school m etaphysics to which he is 
opposed, not all m etaphysics. In their anti-m etaphysical polem ics the 
positivists were prone to identify all m etaphysics as 'transcendent', 
affecting to go beyond experience; Hume is not guilty of characterising 
metaphysics in terms of such a caricature.
:
According to Hume [1748](1975, 6-7), the easy philosophy, according 
well with common sense, will always be the more popular. The serious 
w ork is done, how ever, by the profound ph ilo sopher. Hume 
[1748](1975, 9) describes how nature ordains that the profound 
philosopher must live, outwith his study, according to the dictates of 
nature and common sense. He describes how the preference for easy 
over profound philosophy 'is often carried  farther, even to the 
absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings, or what is commonly 
called m e t a p h y s i c s ' .  Far from seeking to elim inate m etaphysics or 
declare it m eaningless, Hume seeks to defend it against those who 
would jettison profound reasonings altogether.
Î
Although, in contrast to easy philosophy, metaphysics is obscure, that 
in itself does not constitute a worthy objection, in Hume's opinion, to 
all m etaphysics. Hume [1748](1975, 11) claims that 'the ju stest and 
m ost plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics' is 
'that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless 
efforts of human vanity...or from the craft of popular superstitions'.i ^
------------------------------------------
The considerable part of metaphysics' referred to is the false and 
adulterate m etaphysics. In viewing m etaphysics and science as so 
related  Hum e's view has affinities with those of philosophers as 
diverse as Aristotle, Hegel and Quine. All these philosophers can be
I
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He adds [1748](1975, 12), 'We must...cultivate true m etaphysics with 
some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate.' The false and 
adulterate metaphysics is obscure to the extent that no light will be 
gleaned by means of its operations. In contrast, true m etaphysics is 
absti’use but it is not futile. 17
At the outset of our inquiry we have noted how anti-m etaphysical 
ph ilo sophers are apt to lapse into regard ing  any c ritiq u e  of 
metaphysics as grist to their mill. It is reasonable to conclude that, in 
his attitude to metaphysics, Hume, unlike his positivist progeny, was a 
reform er, rather than a would-be revolutionary. 18
Our thesis...is that logical analysis reveals the alleged 
statements of metaphysics to be pseudo-statem ents....there 
are two kinds of pseudo-statements: either they contain a 
word which is erroneously believed to have m eaning, or 
the constituent words are meaningful, yet are put together 
in a counter-syntactical way, so that they do not yield a 
meaningful statement. Carnap [1932](1959a, 61)^ ^
Empiricism, in so far as it constitutes the epistemological thesis that all 
non-analytic knowledge is arrived at empirically, is consistent with a 
denial of the lite ra l m eaninglessness of m etaphysical c la im s . 2  0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------said to have a wider notion of science than that employed by the 
positivists. (Positivism  involves the advocacy of the elim ination of 
metaphysics, not just the notion of a unified science.)
1 2  Hum e [17481(1975, 16) expresses the desire  to 'un ite  the
boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling 
profound enquiry with clearness'.
18 Hume presum ably regarded true m etaphysics as being contained 
w ithin the rubric of his distinction between reasoning concerning 
m atters of fact and real existence and reasoning concerning relations 
of ideas. It is the false and adulterate metaphysics which falls foul of 
the fork. How true m etaphysics relates, more specifically , to the 
distinction, is another question. Again, it is a measure of the grip of the 
p ositiv is tic  reading that in terpretative issues concern ing  Hum e's 
conception of true metaphysics have been neglected.
19 Cf. Carnap [1934](1937a, 7-8, 284).
20 Cf.: Hempel [1950](1959, 108), after Stace, (1944, esp. section 11); 
Romanos (1983, 2).
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G ram m atical w ell-fo rm edness is a m atter o f d e g re e , 2 1  and a 
construction may be ill-formed and yet retain some intelligibility (e.g., 
'D ogs eats m eat'). So, the m eaninglessness of m etaphysics is 
established neither by appeal merely to em piricist epistem ology nor 
by appeal to norm al standards of gram m atical w ell-form edness. In 
order to argue for the literal m eaninglessness of m etaphysics, the 
logical positivists had to provide supplementary theoretical apparatus. 
W here C arnap m entions co u n te r-sy n tac tica l fo rm atio n s he is 
concerned not with the grammatical rules of actual language, but with 
logical syntax. Carnap maintains that the rules of grammatical syntax 
allow the formation of meaningless constructions, while those of logical 
syntax do not. Grammatical syntax relates to what Carnap calls the 
'm aterial' or 'connotative' mode of speech as logical syntax relates to 
the formal' mode of s p e e c h . 2 2  The notion of logical, as opposed to 
grammatical, syntax, is introduced by Carnap in his discussion of what 
he takes to be the meaninglessness of certain constructions which are 
admitted by grammatical syntax. Carnap claims that 'Caesar is a prime 
num ber' is m eaningless and that the fact that it is an adm issible 
construction from the point of view of grammatical syntax illustrates 
the need for logical syntax, according to which it is an inadmissible 
construction. The only sentences in the m aterial m ode which are 
deemed meaningful by Carnap are those which admit of expression in 
the formal mode. He writes,
------------------------------------------
2 1  As Chomsky (1965, 11, 148-153) illustrates.
2 2  Cf. Romanos (1983, 13-14):
The occurrence of universal words in the material mode of 
speech abounds, according to Carnap, in philosophical 
contexts, where it causes the m istaken im pression that 
what is under investigation is the nature or existence of 
fundamental categories or features of reality, when it is in 
fact only a question of the basic types of expressions 
em ployed by a language. This confusion...can best be 
dispelled, in Carnap's view, by translation out of the 
material mode of speech into the formal mode of speech.
Carnap's view is embodied in [1934](1992a, 58-61); cf. [1934](1937a, 
281-315, e.g ., 285), 'pseudo-object-sen tences are sim ply q u a s i -
syntactical sentences o f  the material mode o f  speech'. As the material 
mode 'readily lends itself to wrong use' [1934](1937a, 312), so the 
ru les o f gram m atical syntax allow the fo rm ation  of lite ra lly  
m eaningless constructions.
  . -   . . . .  A
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'a is a prime number’ is false if and only if a is divisible by 
a natural number different from a and from 1 ; evidently it 
is illicit to put here 'Caesar' for 'a'. [1932](1959a, 6 8 , italics 
a d d ed )
Î
But why accept this? Carnap's claim that the construction Caesar is a 
prim e num ber', although grammatically admissible, is m eaningless in 
virtue of the fact that it violates logical syntax appears to be merely 
stipu la tive . A ccording to our actual g ram m atical standards, we 
consider 'Caesar is a prime number’ not meaningless, but false. What 
need have we to have the role of our actual standards for 
m eaningfulness usurped by artificial, and perhaps arbitrary, standards 
of cognitive significance? Carnap's suggestion is that the fact that 
gram m atical syntax allows 'm eaningless' constructions necessitates 
logical syntax. But Carnap seems to want to use logical syntax to 
explain the m eaninglessness of these constructions. Surely, it is at 
least equally open to us to stipulate that 'a is a prime number' is false, 
not meaningless, where a is not a number.23
Carnap's comment suggests that It is false that a is a prime number' 
entails that a is a number. Carnap's tenet thus commits him to a rule of 
inference which is no rule of inference according to our ordinary 
logical practice. Given that we have no independent reason to sanction 
such a rule of inference, the position adopted by Carnap will be 
deem ed less acceptable than the intuitive position whereby 'a is a 
prime number' is false where a is not a number. Carnap's insistence 
upon the m eaninglessness of such constructions indicates that he
'
i
23 Examples such as 'Caesar is a prime number', known to students of 
linguistics as 'selection errors', should not be considered to be 
gram m atically ill-form ed, nor should they be precluded from  being 
regarded as logically possible statements. In so far as they involve 
m istakes the m istakes are sem antical and/or m etaphysica l, not 
gram m atical. Russell (1940, 170) writes: It is d ifficult to give any
indisputable instance of a logical possibility which is not syntactically 
possible...perhaps "the sound of a trombone is blue " is an instance.' I 
contend, consistent with the account of logical possibility to be adopted 
in Chapter 4, that examples such as Russell's which, setting aside 
m etaphorical usage, clearly involves a selection error, are neither 
syntactically inadmissible nor logically impossible. Selection errors are 
category mistakes; categories cannot be established on the basis of 
gram m ar alone, but invo lve (at least) sem antic  and (o ften) 
m etaphysical facts.
■ 'È:
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believes that there are facts of the m atter about m eaninglessness 
which escape the attention of grammatical syntax. If our intuition and 
our actual practice are at odds with Carnap's stipulation then the onus 
is on him to show us what is wrong with our approach. As it stands we 
have not been shown that the introduction of logical syntax is 
necessary or desirable.
CÎ.
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Carnap uses the notion of 'syntactical type' (or 'syntactical category') in 
designating 'C aesar is a prime number' m eaningless. Carnap lists 
exam ples of syntactical categories, 'e.g. thing, property of things, 
re la tion  betw een things, num ber, property  of num bers, rela tion  
between numbers, and so forth' [1932](1959a, 6 8 ). Since 'Caesar' is not \of the category number' it cannot occupy the place of 'a ' in 'a is a 
prime number' to form a meaningful statement. But it cannot be on 
m erely syntactical grounds that Carnap takes 'C aesar is a prime 
number' to be meaningless. Category distinctions can be constructed 
on the basis of the intensions of terms, or on m etaphysical grounds 
stem m ing from  their ex tensions, but not from  purely  form al 
considerations. It is unclear as to what exactly the logical  element is in 
logical syntax: after all, the statement that Caesar is a prime number is 
perfectly capable of participation in valid arguments. Carnap's claim  
that it is neither true nor false has to rest upon the antecedent claim
that 'Caesar' is not a number word, which is surely a fact about the
intension of 'Caesar'.
D e sp ite  C a rn ap 's  fre q u e n t em phasis  on lo g ic a l /s y n ta c t ic a l  
considera tions in his an ti-m etaphysical p ro jec t, he also (e.g ., 
[1932](1959a, 62-63)) incorpora ted  the ep is tem o log ica l/sem an tic
aspect which Ayer placed in the foreground, namely verificationism . 
C onsistent with his increasingly favourable attitude to sem antics, 
C arnap becam e dissatisfied  with the im plausible  and puritan ical
appeal to logical syntax as a weapon against m etaphysics. The 
verification principle became the predominant weapon in the armoury 
of the em piricist anti-m etaphysician . 2  4
V erifica tion ism
The criterion  for assessing the m eaningfulness of non-analy tic
discourse evolved through various formulations. The logical positivists
‘p
%
------------------------------------------
24 On the history of the logical positivists' approach to language and 
metaphysics, cf. Romanos (1983, 4).
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did not specify the criterion of meaningfulness in terms of actual, or
even present possibility of, verification, but in terms of 'verifiability ',. . .'confirm ability ' and 'verification in p r i n c i p l e ' .25 Their accounts were
explicitly modal, although the nature of the modality involved was an
issue which tended not to be dwelt upon. I will discuss this issue at
some length in Chapter 4 . 2  6
"I,:25 The view that the criterion of meaningfulness is actual verification 
is attributed to Comte by E.C. Moore (1951, 473).
26 Hanfling (1981, 33-34) suggests that the verification principle and 
the em piricist criterion of meaning ('the criterion of verifiability ') be 
distinguished, on the grounds that the former purports to answer the 
question 'what is m eaning?', whereas the latter is 'more m odest' in 
that it involves testing for m eaningfulness and does not entail a
general theory of meaning. Hanfling claims that Ayer was committed 
to a criterion of meaning but not to the verification principle (contrast 
A yer's own rem arks quoted below ). As against H anfling , the
verification principle came to be understood by some of its exponents 
as a criterion for m eaningfulness, rather than an answ er to the 
question 'w hat is m eaning?'. This is clear from  rem arks, made by 
Schlick [1938](1979, 311) and quoted by Hanfling (1981, 143), that 
the verification principle (Schlick: The Meaning of a Proposition is the 
Method of its V erification) does not furnish a theory of meaning (cf. 
Schlick [19381(1979, 366) and Rynin (1957, 47-48)). W riters such as
Schlick regarded the term 'theory' as applicable only to discourse 
which sets out hypotheses which admit of truth and falsity. Since they 
did not regard the verification principle as a hypothesis they were 
hostile to accounts which construed it as providing a theory of 
m eaning. Hanfling (1981, 143) regards this as 'yet another way in
which the verification principle m ight be regarded': in so doing he 
commits him self to a view which is inconsistent with the distinction 
advocated earlier in his book. In contrast to Hanfling, Dummett (1992, 
140-143) d istinguishes betw een two versions of the 'verifica tion  
p rincip le ': (V I) The m eaning of a statem ent is its m ethod of
verification, and (V2) A statement is meaningful if  and only if it is 
verifiable. Although some positivists were disinclined to em phasize 
(V I), 'the core of a theory of meaning', Dummett indicates that (V I) 
provides a rationale for (V2) which 'h isto rica lly , the positiv ists 
accepted '. (Dum m ett proposes an alternative rationale: (Y3) The
m ethod of verifying a statem ent is an essential com ponent in its 
meaning.) Dummett's description of (V I) and (V2) as two versions of 
the verifica tion  p rincip le  is w arranted by the p o sitiv is ts ' own 
descrip tions of their view s. It m ust be granted, how ever, that 
considerable confusion is fostered by the tendency in some logical 
p o s itiv is t w ritings to confla te  talk  of m eaning  and ta lk  of 
m eaningfulness. Rynin (1957, 52) criticizes Schlick precisely in this 
reg a rd .
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One form of criticism of the logical positivists' strategy for getting rid 
of metaphysics related to logical problems associated with attempts to 
form ulate a criterion of verifiability which could have the required 
restric tive force. Since, for example, scientific laws and discourse 
pertaining to certain entities postulated in scientific theories do not 
admit of direct verification ,^? the logical positivists, seeking not only to 
p re se rv e , bu t to v enera te  sc ience, sough t a m ore lib e ra l 
verificationism. A balancing act had to be performed: a verificationism 
both liberal (in the sense that it included the favoured non-directly- 
verifiable discourses) and restrictive (in that it excluded metaphysics) 
was sought. A ccordingly, the notion of ind irect verifiab ility  was 
introduced. In order to make room  for scientific discourse, Ayer 
distinguished between 'strong' and 'weak' verifiability , favouring the 
la tte r:
A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of 
the term, if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively 
established in experience. But it is verifiable, in the weak 
sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable. 
(1946, 37)
...we fall back on the weaker sense of verification. We say 
that the question that must be asked about any putative 
statement of fact is not. Would any observations make its 
truth or falsehood logically certain? but simply. Would any 
observations be relevant to the determination of its truth 
or falsehood? (1946, 38)
Ayer reform ulated this as:
a statem ent is verifiab le ...if some observation-statem ent 
can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other 
p rem ises, w ithout being deducib le  from  those other 
premises alone. (1946, 11)
27 The point is made nicely by Hempel [1950](1959, 111-112); cf. 
Stace (1944, 217) who also indicates that the requirem ent of d i r e c t  
verifiability ('complete verifiability in principle) is both too restrictive 
(in that it excludes scientific discourse) and too liberal (in that it 
grants m eaningfulness to any disjunction in w hich at least one 
m eaningful statement is contained).
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The trouble with this, as Berlin (1939, 234) indicated and Ayer (1946, 
1 1 ) acknowledged, was that it allowed empirical significance, in Ayer's 
words, to any statem ent whatever*, since for any two statem ents S 
and O , where O is an observation-statem ent and S  is any statement 
w hatever, O is entailed by the premisses If S then O ' and '5 ', whilst 
being entailed by neither prem iss in isolation. Ayer attem pted to
provide a formulation which would avoid this problem:
a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an 
observation-statem ent, or is such that in conjunction with 
one or more observation-statements it entails at least one 
observation-statem ent which is not deducible from  these 
other prem ises alone; and I propose to say that a 
statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following 
conditions: first, that in conjunction with certain  other 
p rem ises it en ta ils  one or m ore d irec tly  verifiab le  
statem ents which are not deducible from  these other
a
premises alone; and, secondly, that these other premises do 
not include any statement that is not either analytic, or 
d irectly  verifiab le, or capable of being independently  
estab lished  as ind irectly  verifiab le. And I can now 
reform ulate the principle of verification as requiring of a 
literally meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it 
should be either directly or indirectly verifiable, in the 
foregoing sense. (1946, 13)
Church (1949, 53) indicated that this response also fell prey to the 
critic ism  that it adm itted any statem ent w hatever as m eaningful. 
Where Oi,  O 2 and O 3  are logically independent observation-statem ents, 
and S  is any statement whatever, the complex formula ( -O 1 & O 2 ) v (O 3  
& -5) conjoined with O i  entails O 3 . Since neither statem ent alone 
entails O 3 , the form er statem ent is directly verifiab le, on Ayer's 
definition. Church charged that S in turn will be indirectly verifiable 
since it entails O 2  when conjoined with the complex formula, O 2 being 
entailed by neither statem ent alone. Hempel [1950](1959, 115-116) 
critic ized  Ayer on the ground that where S is an em pirically  
m ean ingfu l sta tem ent, w hatever can be deduced from  S  and 
permissible additional premisses can also be deduced from S conjoined 
with N  and the same additional premisses, where N  is any statement
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whatever (e.g. 'The absolute is perfect').
Rynin (1957, 57-58) attempted to circum vent such logical problems 
by claim ing that a so-called m eaningless sentence, such as 'The 
absolute is perfect' is not a statement, since 'a statement [is] a sentence 
possessed of truth value’, and only statem ents enter into logical 
relations. He then claim ed, for example, that 'if  "The absolute is 
perfect" is not a m eaningful statem ent neither is [any purported] 
disjunction' in which it is held to p a r t i c ip a te .H e m p e l  (1959, 127- 
128; 1965, 120) came to accept Rynin's point. He did so too easily, 
since Rynin provides no account of what it is for a discourse to be 
possessive of truth conditions and how we are to determine whether a 
d iscourse m eets the conditions which an answer to that question 
would lay down. For Rynin, the possession of truth conditions is 
presum ably not sufficient for m eaningfulness, since he com m ents 
(1957, 50) that our knowledge of those truth conditions (as distinct 
from  know ledge of the tru th-values of statem ents) is v ita l to 
'cognition '. A discourse m ust possess truth conditions which are 
'ascertainable' (1957, 53) if it is to be deemed meaningful. It is unclear 
as to how his account could constitute an attempted defence of 'a kind 
of verifiability principle of meaning' (1957, 46) unless he takes it that 
only v e rifiab le  sta tem ents and analy tic  sta tem en ts have the 
appropriate truth conditions, in which case his discussion provides no 
real account of how the original logical problems associated with the 
verification principle are to be circumvented. If indirect verifiability is 
still required in order to avoid debarring a great deal of scientific 
discourse — and Rynin provides no evidence that it is not— then Rynin's 
account achieves no p r o g r e s s . ^ ^
28 The taxonomy employed by Rynin differs from that of those such as 
Ayer, who, when careful, distinguished between meaningful and non­
meaningful statements and held that all propositions were meaningful. 
2  9 Ayer (1973, 27) noted that none of the attem pts to save the 
verification principle from Church's objection had succeeded. L.J. Cohen 
(1980) offers a ct'iterion o f  observational  ver i f iab i l i ty  w hich 
accom m odates the criticism s of Church and H em pel against the 
criterion o f  literal meaningfulness offered by Ayer (1946, 13). Cohen 
does not set out to delimit the realm of literal meaningfulness, and his 
account does not en ta il that there are any non-observational 
discourses which cannot partake in logical relations. His concern is 
with the delineation of purely phenomenal language in science: he 
does not claim  that scientific realism is literally m eaningless, nor does 
he so deem ethics or metaphysics.
« I
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Another form of criticism of the verificationist strategy for getting rid 
of metaphysics concerned the status of the verification principle itself.
It was held, for example, that the principle, being neither analytic nor 
verifiable, is self-exclusive and 'm etaphysical' by its own ligh ts.3 0  
There was an awareness of this criticism from an early date.31 Two 
sorts of answer were commonly made to the question of the status of 
the princip le  by its defenders, although the firs t was generally  
mooted, rather than endorsed. According to the first, the principle was 
held to fall within the rubric of the positivists' version of Hume's fork.
T hat is, it was held to be analytic of the concept of literal 
meaningfulness, or, it was taken to hold as a matter of fact; the former 
being the clearly  preferred  option. Given the p o sitiv is ts ' own 
conception of the task of philosophy as the logical analysis of language 
it was consistent for them to regard the principle as analytic. However, 
the supposed analyticity of the principle was far from  obvious.3 2  
O bviousness is not a necessary condition upon analy tic ity ,33 but 
analytic prem isses from  which the verification principle could be 
derived were not forthcoming. This led to the adoption of the second 
sort of answer, which was to m aintain that the principle  was a 
prescription which ought to be followed, in the absence of any more 
convincing alternative. Ayer attempted to side-step criticism  focusing 
on the status of the principle:
i.'SV'
in the preface to the second edition of Language, Truth and  
L o g ic ,  I treated the verification principle as a prescriptive 
definition. But why should the prescription be obeyed? I 
evaded this awkward question by defying my critics to 
come up with anything better. Ayer (1992, 149)
Such a response leads to an impasse in the debate between the anti­
m etaphysician and the defender of metaphysics. M etaphysicians were 
justifiably undisposed to relinquish their projects in the light of such a 
reply. If the criterion of meaningfulness offered is the best available 
that need not mean that it is adequate. The fact that it is purported to I
____________________________
30 E.g., W einberg, although desirous of the elim ination of metaphysics 
(1936, 193) accuses verificationism itself of being m etaphysical (1936 
174). The issue is more recently raised by Kdrner (1979, 264) and M 
W illiams (1986, 11).
31 E.g., Carnap [1934](1992a, 55).
32 Cf. Dummett (1992, 130).
33 As Carnap [1930](1959b, 143) and Hempel [1945](1949. 222) noted
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undermine metaphysics can be taken as a reductio ad absurdum,  at 
least of the principle, if not of the search for such a criterion. W hat is 
better' w ill no doubt depend, in this case, upon the interests of the 
judges. From the point of view of some of Ayer's opponents this will 
be the abandonment of his project rather than theirs.
A third sort of answer to the question of the status of the verification 
principle, which considerably weakens its links with positivism , is 
suggested by Dummett,
T arski...charged natural languages with inconsistency on the 
score that they contained their own sem antics, w hich no 
c o n s is te n t language  could  do. T he a rg u m en t appears 
incontestable: it follows that no semantic theory governing a 
language can be formulated in that language itself, on pain of 
inconsistency. Any attempt to state such a theory must therefore 
lead to contradiction. (1992, 130-131)
Sim ilarly, suggests Dum m ett (1992, 132-133), a general theory of 
meaning will fail to satisfy the criteria of meaningfulness which it lays 
down; it cannot be expected to be self-applicable. In the light of 
Dummett's discussion Ayer admits.
I should have dismissed the objection that the verification 
principle does not satisfy itself as an ignoratio elenchi. The 
verification  principle  encapsulates a general theory of 
meaning and a general theory of meaning should not be 
expected to satisfy itself.
I have also to concede to Dum m ett that when the 
verification principle is viewed in this way its cutting edge 
is b lunted , at least as an instrum ent fo r executing 
m etaphysics. I agree that in so far as m etaphysics 
constitu tes a set of sem antic theories, the verification 
principle passes it by. (1992, 149-150)
The question of the status of the verification principle may lead to the 
recognition that it is indeed metaphysical, although this is established 
via a less obvious route (the details of which cannot occupy us here) 
than that followed by earlier critics of verificationism. 1  will attempt 
to show that the verificationism espoused by the logical positivists is
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i tse lf  m etaphysical by a route which is m ore concerned with 
'trad itio n a l' m etaphysics.34 in other words, my concern is primarily 
with being, the concepts we employ and the relations between the 
two, rather than with the issues in the philosophy of logic and 
language, such as the principle of bivalence, which predom inate in 
Dum m ett's discussions. In contrast to the more common attem pts to 
defend m etaphysics against the verificationist attack, I will take a 
m odal rou te.35 l will lay the ground for my views on the substantive 
ontology of m odality by arguing that m odal d iscourse is neither 
eliminable nor reducible: thereafter I will argue for a realist view of 
de re modality. In the light of these views I will suggest that the 
logical positivists conflated logical and m etaphysical m odalities; an 
e rror which, I w ill argue, persists in contem porary philosophy, 
som etim es in prima fa c ie  unlikely quarters. In the course of my 
inquiry I will outline what I take to be the unfortunate results arising 
from  this conflation. In addition, I will argue, contra the positivists, 
that there is a class of cognitively m eaningful statem ents which are 
neither analytic nor empirical but which include both em pirical and 
non-em pirical content.
A Modal Argument Against Metaphvsics
In the light of my programmatic concerns, it is interesting to note an 
explicitly modal anti-metaphysical argument. N.R. Hanson (1960, 8 6 - 
87) argues that m etaphysics is im possible on the grounds that 
"Hume's dictum": that from a necessary proposition nothing contingent 
follows — and vice versa' is correct and that m etaphysical arguments.
I
34 Since the positiv ist attack on metaphysics fails, those, such as 
C ollingw ood, L azerow itz and W isdom, who afforded m etaphysics 
various sorts of consolation prize status (respectively: as encapsulating 
the h isto ry  of ideas; as a fru itfu l sta lk ing  ground for the 
psychoanalyst; as a co llection  of in teresting  paradoxes) did so 
gratuitously. The views of these three figures are discussed at length 
by A.R. White (1987, 143-173).
35 I do not claim  originality in following a modal route per  se. The 
attempt has been made by E.G. Moore (1951) and Hans Poser (1988). I 
do not claim originality in that I do it, but in how I do it. In Chapter 4, 
I examine the nature of the modality involved in verificationism ; an 
issue which is neglected in the existing literature (including the works 
ju st mentioned). Although logical positivism is dead, there is value in 
no ting  p rev iously  neg lected  reasons for its d e fic iency . A lso, 
verificationism  is far from dead and there m ight be results arising 
from my inquiry which would pertain to contemporary views.
.:i3
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since they 'usually  purport to be both in fo rm ative , i.e ., non- 
tautological, and also apodeictically true, i.e., non-falsifiable...m w.y? 
purport* to be 'trans-type inferences', i.e. inferences 'from  necessary 
propositions to contingent propositions — or vice versa '.36 Hanson's 
argum ent incorporates the vital presum ptions that all necessity is 
expressible by means of necessary propositions and that the only 
acceptable notion of objective necessity is that of logical necessity. 3?
I dispute Hanson's characterization of m etaphysics, and the related 
presum ptions, commonly adhered to by em piricists, that all necessity 
is de dicto and that the only objective necessity is logical necessity.3 8 
H anson 's argum ent asserts that, at a fundam en ta l leve l, all 
m etaphysica l argum ents purpo rt to be trans-type . C ontrary  to 
Hanson's assertion, there are many m etaphysical argum ents which, 
w hen properly  construed , cannot purport to be trans-type . In 
introducing his argument, Hanson equated arguments from what must 
be the case to what is the case (and vice versa) with arguments from 
the necessary  to the con tingen t (and vice versa). For the 
m etaphysician who makes use of the de re modal notions, however, 
there is a 'must' other than the 'must' which attaches to necessary 
statem ents (which m ust be true).39 For example, from the logically 
contingent premiss that it is necessary for water to be H 2 O 4 0  it follows 
that it is truly predicable of water that it is H^O. There is a clear sense 
in which this is an argument from what must be the case to what is 
the case, although it is not an argument from the necessarily to the 
contingently true.
:î
.36 This reasoning from usually' to must' is invalid. Furthermore, I will 
contend that it is not the case that m ost m etaphysics consists of 
inferences which purport to be trans-type.
37 Hanson (1960, 90) recognizes a kind of epistemic necessity, relating, 
for example, to 'conceptual paralysis' which, as he intends it, is clearly 
a subjective notion.
38 Other criticism s of Hanson's article are offered by Lehrer (1962) 
and Cole (1963).
3 9 In order to avoid the im plication that logical m odalities are 
precluded  from  having de re status, I should point out that the 
philosopher alluded to here is one who makes use of de re m odalities 
which are neither reducible to nor explicable in terms of the de dicto 
m odalities. W hatever else they may be, the logical m odalities are d e  
d i c t o .  I will substantiate these claims in the course of this thesis, 
especially in Chapters 3 and 4.
40 Contrast the premiss that it is necessarily true that water is H 2 O .
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A common type of metaphysical argument proceeds from  a statement 
of what is the case and/or what is really possible, to a statement of 
what must be the case in order for the former to be actual or really 
possible. Arguments of this sort attem pt to illustrate the natures of 
real existents. They do not concern themselves with the necessary', in 
Hanson's sense, at all. For Hanson, 'the necessary' relates to 'necessary 
propositions'; for philosophers who advance arguments of the kind just 
described, a sort of necessity relating to the essences of real existents 
is admitted. The recognition of this non-logical necessity is perfectly 
consistent with the contingent existence of the world and the entities 
therein. In so far as a notion of necessity distinct from that recognized 
by H anson is leg itim ate  his argum ent against m etaphysics is 
underm ined, since metaphysical arguments can employ that sense of 
necessity without purporting to be trans-type at all: such arguments 
m ove from  the logically  contingent to the log ically  contingent. 
Although they are concerned with metaphysical necessity, they do not 
seek to establish necessary propositions. In later chapters I will argue 
that m etaphysical necessity  constitu tes an in te llig ib le  notion of 
objective necessity distinct from logical necessity. Subsequently, I will 
defend realism  about m etaphysical necessity where it relates, for 
exam ple, to the objects subsumed under natural kind concepts. The 
tendency, manifested by Hanson, to recognize only paradigmatically de  
d ic to  modalities has had a significance so great that the projects of 
some philosophers who have sought to rehab ilita te  paradigm atic 
m odality de re, and realism  about that m odality (i.e., essentialism ), 
have been tainted by the failure to be consistently observant of the 
proper form  of essentialist claims. This will be illustrated in the 
proceeding chapters.
1.3 W ittgenstein, M etaphysics and Essentialism
- I
W ittgenstein has been construed as an anti-essentialist and an anti­
m etaphysician. I w ill suggest that, contrary to such opinions, the 
T ra c ta tu s  can be viewed as putting forth an essentialist argument of 
the kind ju st indicated,41 although the essentialism  of the T r a c ta tu s
------------------------------------------41 A characteristic which it shares with many other philosophical 
works, including, amusingly, Hegel's Science o f  Logic. Illum inating 
comment on the latter is provided by Houlgate (1995, 38):
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should be recognized as of a very restricted kind com pared to the 
essentialist views which became prevalent in the decades subsequent
to the demise of logical positivism. The T r a c ta tu s  purports to s h o w  
how reality must be given the possibility of language, rather than to 
s ta te  what reality must be.42 if  the essentialism to which I will point
is indeed present then it is a m istake to view the T r a c t a t u s  as
advocating the elim ination of m e t a p h y s i c s . 4 3 , 4 4  Having offered an
Necessity, for Hegel, is not an immediately evident feature 
of the world, but is what there turns out in essence  to be.
We do not begin with necessity, therefore, but rather c o m e  
to the thought of necessity through considering what there 
a c tu a l l y  is. Hegel's analysis of necessity thus begins not 
with necessity itself, but with actuality.
W hat there actually is (and what actually goes on) reveals what is 
genuinely possible, i.e. what is in accordance with the nature of reality. 
'Actuality* here just means reality, and it is not m eant to have any 
non-modal connotation: the conception at work is of an actuality which 
is naturally modal. Just as, for Hegel, actuality reveals necessity, so for 
W ittgenstein the actual possibility of language reveals the nature of 
rea lity . (N either inquiry  leads to any necessary  p ropositions: 
term inological intricacies notw ithstanding, the necessity pertinent to 
both cases is not formal, but ontological. In respect of the T r a c t a t u s , 
the possibility of representation, which grounds its actuality, has no 
tau to logy  as co rre la tiv e . H egelian  rea l necessity  is fo rm ally  
contingent.) The essentialist m etaphysician holds that the accidental 
provides indirect access to the essential: the point is elaborated at 2 . 2  
below .
42 The essentialism I attribute to the Tracta tus  relates to the idea that, 
given the possibility of representation, reality must be a plurality of 
sim ple objects. (W ittgenstein 's world, i.e. the totality  of facts, is 
dependent upon the objects which determine logical space.) The 'must' 
involved here is an essentialist 'must'. The attribution in question does 
not rest upon any claim s about the natures of sim ple objects
th em se lv es .
43 Carnap appears to have had some awareness that W ittgenstein was 
no anti-metaphysician in the manner of the logical positivists, since he 
opines that although W ittgenstein regarded philosophy as the logic of 
science, he drew  'no sharp line of dem arcation  betw een the 
form ulations of the logic of science and those of m etaphysics’
[1934](1937a, 284). In addition, Carnap comments [1934](1937a, 304) 
that W ittgenstein was 'misled into enquiries' of an essentialist nature. 
So, such an attribution is no novelty. (More recent interpretations
which have it that W ittgenstein was concerned with essen tia list
enquiry include Hochberg (1971), Klemke (1971) and Bradley (1992).) 
C arnap 's la tte r com m ent suggests that e ither he did not read
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account of why I attribute an essentialist view to the T r a c ta tu s , I will 
p roceed  to ou tline  some general considera tions perta in in g  to 
W ittgenstein's attitude to metaphysics which show it to be much more 
subtle than that of the anti-metaphysician. Finally, I will dispute the 
claim  that there is any argum ent against real essentialism  in the 
Philosophical  Invest igations.  (I do not believe that W ittgenstein was 
concerned to provide any such argument, so what I write in this 
regard serves as a critique not of W ittgenstein, but of commentators 
who read anti-essentialism into the Inves t iga t ions .)
Essentialism in the Tractatus
Ayer held, throughout his career, that there is no necessity in nature 
and that the only legitimate sense of necessity is logical necessity.45 in 
the T rac ta tus  (6.37, cf. 6.3, 6.31), W ittgenstein claimed that the only 
necessity is logical necessity. At face value, this is a claim  with which
W ittgenstein 's rem arks about necessity (cited below) along standard 
em piricist lines (to the effect that there is no necessity other than 
standard logical necessity) or that he thought that W ittgenstein 's 
views on modality and essence were inconsistent.
44 Russell, in his logical atomist phase, can in no way be regarded as 
advocating the elimination of metaphysics since he stated that his was 
a m etaphysical project [1918](1956, 178, 215-216). Cf. Urmson (1956, 
e.g., 4-6, 47, 69), who characterizes logical atomism as purporting to 
supply a superior m etaphysics, rather than to elim inate m etaphysics. 
In contrast, Burnheim (1952, 3) claims that logical atomism is part of 
'a group of philosophical doctrines which claim to eliminate all forms 
of metaphysical reasoning'. On the basis of Russell's influence on the 
Vienna Circle, and, apparently, of his use of the phrase 'a piece of 
gratuitous m etaphysics', Joergensen (1951, 11-17) goes so far as to 
discuss The Logical Positivism of Bertrand Russell'. Russell (1940, 7) 
writes, I am, as regards method,  more in sympathy with the logical 
positivists than with any other existing school' [my emphasis]. Russell 
[1950](1956, 367) claims: "'Logical positivism" is a name for a method, 
not for a certain kind of result.' It is hard to distinguish between a 
method and a doctrine if the very method includes doctrinal content 
(e.g. that one m ust avoid doing m etaphysics because m etaphysics is 
m eaningless) and, in any case, Russell's sympathy is with the tenet 
that 'there is no special way of knowing that is peculiar to philosophy' 
and later comments [1950](1956, 372) indicate his disagreem ent with 
some of the doctrines of logical positivists. Russell (1937b, 20) holds 
that 'if, through language, we can know facts, that im plies a 
relation...w hich may serve to justify, to some degree, the traditional 
attempt to use logic as a clue to metaphysics'.
45 See 4.3 below, including the quotation of his remarks to Honderich 
(1991, 224).
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Ayer would sympathize. If we assume the prem iss that essentialist 
necessity is not logical necessity or the premiss that logical necessity is 
not a kind of essentialist necessity46 —premisses which Ayer would no 
doubt endorse— W ittgenstein's comment appears to be an avowal of 
anti-essentialism . W ittgenstein often uses terms in non-standard ways 
in the T r a c t a t u s , but if W ittgenstein 's claim  is in terp reted  in 
accordance with how the terms it em ploys are m ost com m only 
understood then there is good reason to call it into dispute, as I hope 
Chapters 2 and 3 will show.
However, there is a case for saying that W ittgenstein's claim  that the 
only necessity is logical necessity has little in common with Ayer's 
refusal to countenance any necessity other than logical necessity, since 
W ittgenstein is concerned with the logic of representation ,47 rather 
than making exclusive reference to the 'logically necessary' as the 
logical positivists would have understood the phrase. W ittgenstein 
uses the word 'logic' to describe the study of the nature of reality and 
its m irroring in language, not ju s t to delineate the p ractice of 
rendering  tautologies exp lic it.48 The question which W ittgenstein 's 
logical atomism addresses is this: how must reality be in order for 
representation to be possible? (That kind of essentialistic  question, 
which is obviously not exhaustive of essentialism , is rejected in the 
P h ilo so p h ic a l  Invest igations:  it is a product of the obsession with 
nam ing which W ittgenstein criticizes right from  the start of that
46 Fine (1994) suggests that it is.
47 This is suggested, for example, by 6.13: 'Logic is not a body of 
doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world.' Cf. M ounce (1981, 13): 
'logic...m akes representation possible'.
48 By 'tautologies' I mean that which would have been considered 
tautologous by logical positivists, i.e. necessarily true propositions of 
logic (as understood by them ) and m athem atics. W ittgenste in 's 
'tautologies' were presumably different, at least in so far as he denied 
them  genu inely  p rep o s itio n a l status. For W ittg en ste in  log ical 
propositions fail to say  anything, although they s h o w  the essence of 
the world. Only fa c tu a l  discourse is strictly possessive of truth value, 
according to W ittgenstein's official  view (and despite his avowal of the 
truth of the contents of the T r a c ta tu s ) .  In the N o teb o o k s  1914-16  
(1979, 126), he comments that 'a logical proposition is one the special 
cases of which are either tautologous — and then the proposition is 
true— or self-contradictory (as I shall call it) and then it is false'. In 
the T r a c t a t u s  (4.461, 4 ,4611) he characterized  tau to log ies and 
contradictions as lacking sense, but not nonsensical. W ittgenstein did 
not use the word 'logic' in a univocal manner.
I
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w ork.) W ittgenstein 's view was that there is isom orphism  between 
language and reality: language and reality were held to share form. 
L anguage does not m ake reality  possible; ra ther, the converse 
relationship holds. That which is represented is prior to the mode of 
representation. The form of reality, the nature of being, is mirrored in 
language. Logical space is the totality of possible facts. It is logical
space, rather than the facts which happen to pertain in the actual 
world, which is relevant to the question of the nature of reality, since 
logical space is exhaustive of all representations, although not itself a 
representation. It is the possibility of sense (linguistic representation) 
which is of concern to W ittgenstein, not the narrow er realm  of the 
representation of actual states of affairs. In other words, the concern is 
with the possibility  of meaning rather than the assertion of truths. 
Form  makes representation possible; the world and language have 
form  in common. The form  of the world, although reflected  in 
language, is not itself linguistic in character, since that which is 
represented is prior to the mode of representation . I w ill later 
m aintain a distinction between modality de re and de dicto, such that 
de re does not reduce to de dicto. This does not preclude de dicto from 
being a subspecies of de re, but nor does it entail that such a 
rela tionsh ip  holds: I seek to uphold neutrality  on the question. 
C onsistent with the classification of m odality de re which I will 
support are the tenets (to which I subscribe) that modality de dicto is, 
narrow ly  construed , purely  form al in ch arac te r and, broadly  
construed, logico-linguistic in character, and that the class of modality 
de re is neither purely form al nor logico-linguistic in character. So, 
w hether or not de dicto is a subspecies of de re (and, therefore, 
whether or not a subspecies of modality de re is logico-linguistic in 
character), if a modality is not logico-linguistic then it is not de dicto. 
As a result, the modality pertinent to the form of the world is de re. 
So, the T r a c ta tu s  is committed to de re modality; furtherm ore, it is 
com m itted to de re m odality realistically  construed. N either anti- 
essentialism  nor anti-metaphysics is consistent with this commitment.
W ittgenstein addresses the nature of reality, whereas Ayer's logical 
necessity relates to modality de dicto, incorporating the assum ptions 
that m odality de dicto  is never de re and that de re m odality is 
misbegotten. As I will attempt to illustrate in later chapters, the notion 
of essence, relating as it does to de re modality, cannot be explicated in
■I
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terms of the standard notion of logical necessity.49 There is further 
evidence, then, that W ittgenstein 's claim  about necessity  differs 
greatly from that of Ayer. The sorts of issues associated with recent 
essen tia lis t thought rela ting , for exam ple, to natural k inds, the 
necessity of origin, and causal powers, certainly do not seem to be of 
positive concern to W ittgenstein. It is plausible that he held anti­
realist views where these are concerned —witness, for exam ple, his 
rem ark in the T r a c t a t u s  (6.3) that 'outside logic everything is 
acciden tal'— and none are directly  concerned w ith the logic of 
re p re se n ta tio n .50 However, the point remains that W ittgenstein's early 
thought employed a notion of necessity other than (standard) logical 
necessity. Furthermore, in his attitude to that non-logical necessity he 
was (ontologically speaking) no anti-realist.
W ittgenstein and M etaphvsics
From a historical point of view, there is no doubt that the dismissal of 
m etaphysics as nonsensical which was proffered  by the logical 
positiv ists was influenced by a reading of the T r a c t a t u s Their
I
49 Bradley (1992) depicts W ittgenstein as a de re modal atom ist for 
whom logical necessity reduces to necessity de re (1992, 24). The 
notion of logical necessity operant here is by no means standard. 
Bradley's interpretation is confused in so far as it depicts essentialistic 
attributions in terms of necessary truths (1992, e.g., 183: 'any  modal 
ascription, if true, is necessarily so'), despite his own recognition 
(1992, 175-176) of the lack of equivalence between m odality de re 
and de dicto.
50 Any argum ent for attributing to W ittgenstein an essentialism  any 
more lavish than that which I attribute here would have to look 
e lsew h ere , since c o n s id e ra tio n s  p e rta in in g  to the lo g ic  of 
representation do not provide sufficient justification for such a view. 
B radley (1992) does attribute  a m ore bountifu l essen tia lism  to 
W ittgenste in , but an exam ination of his account would involve 
exegetical issues too numerous and too detailed to be dealt with here.
51 Ayer (1985, 18) states that the logical positivists, in designating 
m etaphysics as nonsense in their pejorative sense, were taking their 
cue from W ittgenstein but that 'W hether W ittgenstein's own use of the 
term  was always pejorative is not clear.' He proceeds to state (1985, 
33) that the logical empiricists who took W ittgenstein to be advocating 
the dismissal of metaphysics and who took themselves to be following 
him  did so on the basis of a m isinterpretation: the 'very great 
influence' of the T r a c ta tu s  was 'partly due to a m isunderstanding'. 
N evertheless, Ayer omits to mention the saying/show ing distinction 
and displays a failure to afford it due cognizance, e.g., in his comment 
that, '[i]n the case of the T r a c t a t u s  we have to choose between
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interpretation of W ittgenstein rested upon an ambiguity in relation to 
W ittg en ste in 's  use of expressions such as 'm ean in g less ' and 
'nonsensica l' and an inapprecia tion  of the im portance  of his 
saying/show ing distinction. Those who read W ittgenste in  from  a 
log ical p o sitiv is t perspective  were prone to regard  u tterances 
classified as 'm eaningless' or 'nonsense' as m eaningless in their own 
sense, whereby metaphysics was held to be unintelligible, or, at best, 
m erely expressive of 'an attitude towards l i f e ' . 52  To say that an 
utterance lacks sense or meaning need not be to say, however, that it 
is 'nonsense' in the pejorative s e n s e . 53 In the T ra c ta tu s  ( 4 . 4 6 1 - 4 . 4 6 2 )  
W ittgenstein  m aintains that tautologies lack sense (con trast are 
nonsensical), in that they do not say anything. This does not mean, 
however, that they do not show anything. Tautologies lack sense, and 
metaphysical claims are nonsensical, for W ittgenstein, in that they are 
not genuine propositions. He does not think tautologies to be gibberish, 
counter-syntactical, unintelligible, or what have you: he calls them 
m eaningless because they do not say  anything. It is clear, then, that 
W ittgenstein means something other than the positivists did by the 
use of the word 'meaningless'. Genuine propositions admit of truth and 
falsity. Unlike genuine propositions, the 'propositions' of logic and 
m etaphysics do not picture anything: they do not say, they s h o w . 5 4
[Wittgenstein's] dismissal of its contents as senseless and his claim  that 
they are true' (1985, 30).
52 The implausible view that metaphysics is expressive of an attitude 
towards life is proposed by Carnap [1932](1959a, 78-80).
53 W arnock (1958, 84-93) counsels against an in terp reta tion  of 
W ittgenstein's use (in both the Tractatus  and the Inves t iga t ions)  of the 
terms 'nonsense' and 'meaningless' which likens his attitude to that of 
the logical positivists.
54 Mounce (1981, e.g., 43, 95, 102), Bradley (1992) and Young (1986) 
are among the comm entators who emphasize the im portance of the 
saying/showing distinction. Young thinks it important to distinguishing 
betw een im m anent and transcendent m etaphysics in reading the 
Tracta tus .  He claims (1986, 291) that W ittgenstein viewed immanent 
metaphysics as relating to what cannot be said but can only be shown, 
whilst, like Kant, 'reject[ing] transcendent m etaphysics as a branch of 
philosophy making scientific pretensions'. On Young's interpretation 
immanent metaphysics is allowed to stand as showing the structure of 
reality: it is not up for elimination. Young (1986, 292) refers to 4.111, 
where W ittgenstein makes specific mention of the status and function 
of philosophy. On Young's account, transcendent m etaphysics is 
allowed to aim at dealing with the problems of life which matter most' 
(e.g. God, im m ortality and free will): it is up for replacem ent by
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M etaphysics is like theology, aesthetics and ethics in so far as 
m e ta p h y s ic a l d isc o u rse  has a n o n -re p re se n ta tiv e  fu n c tio n . 
M etaphysics cannot be eliminated, on W ittgenstein's account, precisely 
because he holds that there are limits to thought about which nothing 
can (literally) be said: his own project is to demonstrate those limits. 
Saying involves picturing, but the relation of picturing, on his account, 
cannot itself be pictured: it has metaphysical status. In contrast, for 
the positivists, there is no (legitimate) metaphysics. W ittgenstein holds 
that trad itional m etaphysics attem pts, and fa ils , to breach the 
boundaries of language. It is illegitim ate only in so far as it 
misconceives its own nature.
W ittgenstein 's position also contrasts with the positivists in that he 
a ttaches im portance to m etaphysics. Ayer cam e to rea lize  this 
d ivergence:
We took it for granted that he judged metaphysics to be 
worthless, whereas in so far as he equated it with what he 
called the mystical', and included in it judgem ents of value 
and the appreciation of the meaning of life, his attitude 
was much more akin to that of Kant... (1985, 31)
W ittgenstein was later to claim, in Z e t t e l  (§458), that it is of the 
essence of metaphysics to confuse conceptual and factual i n q u i r y . 5 5 
This comment may be suggestive of the view that even a metaphysics 
which seeks to recognize its own non-descriptive status cannot avoid 
slipping into an apparently descriptive modus operandi:  such an 
in terp retation  is certain ly  consistent with W ittgenste in 's apparent 
ambivalence concerning the 'propositions' of the Tractatus.  Contrary to 
what m etaphysicians tend to suppose, theirs is not a factual inquiry: 
neither is that of the T r a c ta tu s . Metaphysics and logic are concerned, 
on this account, with form; the essence of the world, which is shown, 
not described. For W ittgenstein, metaphysics is expressive, rather than 
representative, but not, as Carnap claimed 'of an attitude towards life'.
religion. This contrasts with the interpretation offered by Ayer (1985, 
31), who, m aking no reference to any im m anen t/transcenden t 
d is tin c tio n , suggests th a t W ittg en ste in  m ay have id en tifie d  
m etaphysics precisely with these important concerns.
55 Cf. Philosophical Investigations,  §392, where he gives an example of 
an approach to philosophy which oscillates between natural science 
and grammar*.
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A dm itted ly , W ittgenste in 's  opinion of m etaphysics is re la tive ly  
difficult to decipher. Nevertheless, it is not fanciful to suggest that 
W ittgenstein's position may have affinities with that of Kant, in that he 
is concerned with the limits of thought: he believes there is something 
(i.e. the form  of reality) beyond thought and language about which 
nothing can be said.^^
There is significant critical opinion according to which W ittgenstein is
not seeking to elim inate metaphysics in the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  but to 
understand the nature of m etaphysical/philosophical p roblem s.5? The 
critique of m etaphysics/philosophy offered in the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  is ¥
similar to that offered in the T ra c ta tu s . Metaphysicians are held to err 
in that they view their problem s, and their purported answers to 
these problems, as factual, rather than conceptual, because the surface 
form  of the language in which they are couched is akin to that 
displayed by genuinely factual (i.e. empirical) d i s c  o u r  s e .  5 8  Fann (1969,
94) writes that W ittgenstein 'criticises m etaphysics because it has
been p r e s e n t e d  in an em pirical form, not because it deals with 
un im p o rtan t m atte rs '. W ittgenste in  seeks to render c lear the
I
conceptual, rather than factual, nature of metaphysics: 'My aim is: to 
teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that 
is patent nonsense' ( I n v e s t ig a t io n s ,  §464). A lthough this com m ent 
appears to have an extremely disparaging air, it is consistent with 
W ittgenstein 's long-standing view that non-descriptive discourse can 
be valuable and that it can show without saying. Kahl (1986, 297) 
writes, 'for W ittgenstein only conceptual investigations are legitim ate 
heirs to the subject that was originally called "philosophy"': this is 
consistent with the Tractarian view of philosophy as non-factual. 
W ittgenstein would agree with the logical positivists that metaphysics 
is meaningless in the sense that it is u n v e r i f i a b l e ; 5 9  but for him that is 
ju s t another way of saying that its m ethod of investigation  is 
conceptual, not empirical. I56 Readings on which W ittgenstein has been seen, like Kant, not to 
seek the elim ination of m etaphysics but to distinguish between its 
legitim ate and illegitimate species include Kahl (1986), Young (1986), 
and (especially) A.R. White (1987, 116-126).
57 E.g., Fann (1969, 86-96) and Pitkin, (1972, e.g., 19, 289-290). The 
most relevant parts of the Inves t iga t ions  are §§109-133.
58 Cf. Fann (1969, 90-91) and A.R, White (1987, 124).
59 Cf. Kahl (1986, 298).
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W ittgenste in ’s aims included elucidating the structure of reality  
{ T r a c t a t u s , 6.54) and show ing m etaphysics to be m etaphysics
( Inves t iga t ions ,  §464). He advised that whenever someone wanted to 
say something metaphysical, he should be shown that he has failed to 
give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions’ (Trac ta tus ,  6.53). 
This rem ark can be construed as indicating that m etaphysics proper 
shows but does not attempt to say. The recommendation which follows 
this remark, that nothing should be said except that which can be said 
(’i.e. propositions of natural science’), does not entail that there is no 
place for m etaphysical discourse. W ittgenstein 's recom m endation is 
consistent with the m aintenance of a m etaphysics which does not 
a ttem p t to say anyth ing  m etaphysica l, bu t no n e th e le ss  uses 
m etaphysical discourse to reveal the form of reality: this is very 
fortunate, given the plausibility of this as an interpretation of the 
status of the contents of the Tracta tus  them selves.60 W ittgenstein can
be seen as distinguishing between a m etaphysics which conceives 
itself to be saying something and a metaphysics, like his own, which
shows, and recognizes that it is the business of m etaphysics to show 
rather than say.
Essentialism  and the Philosophical Investigations 
W ittgenste in 's  la ter philosophy is regarded by som e as anti- 
e ssen tia lis t. I have already indicated  that I accep t th a t the 
e ssen tia lis tic  m ethodology of the T r a c t a t u s  is rejected in the 
In v e s t ig a t io n s . W hat is not to be found in the latter work, however, is 
any argum ent against real essentialism . Two aspects of the work 
which feature in an ti-essentialist readings 6 i are the considerations 
concern ing  fam ily resem blances and the c laim  tha t essence is 
expressed by grammar.
W ittgenstein writes,
C onsider for exam ple the proceedings that we call 
games'....W hat is common to them all? — Don't say: 'There 
m u s t  be something common, or they would not be called 
"games'" — but look and see whether there is anything 
common to all. —For if you look at them you will not see 
som ething tha t is common to a l l ,  but s im ila ritie s , 
— ----------------------------60 Cf. Mounce (1981, 102).
61 Anti-essentialist readings include Hallett (1991) and Petrie (1971).
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re la tionsh ip s, and a w hole series of them  at that. 
( Invest igations,  §6 6 )
W hat follows from W ittgenstein's claim is not that essentialism  must 
be rejected, but that searching for an essence common to all things 
classified under the same word may be an erroneous project. It does 
not follow that an anti-realist account of all m odality de re must be 
adopted, particularly since it is entirely com patible with essentialist 
m etaphysics and sem antics to recognize that not all nam es and 
classificatory terms relate to real essences.62 in fact, the example used 
by W ittgenstein is particularly unharmful to the essentialist who takes 
the paradigmatic cases of real essence to relate to natural kinds rather 
than artifacts. At most, W ittgenstein's comments indicate that there 
need not always be essences common to items classified under a 
common term. From this it does not follow that there can never be any 
essences corresponding to such terms; nor does it follow that there are 
no such instances. Nothing W ittgenstein  says about essence is 
inconsistent with real essentialism . The paradigmatic essences —those 
pertaining to natural kinds— are not threatened by his comments, 
since the essentialist can well recognize that not all purported natural 
k ind  term s even succeed in referring . The d iscovery  tha t a 
purportedly natural kind term fails to refer, or that it picks out a 
m erely nominal essence, constitutes an advance in our knowledge of 
the natural realm, far from being an illustration of the ill-foundedness
of essentialism.63
Essence  is expressed by grammar. (Invest igations,  §371)
From this it does not follow that all, or even any, necessity is purely 
linguistic in character.64 W ittgenstein's claim should not be mistaken 
fo r the non-equ iva len t c la im  that essence is essen tia lly  and 
exhaustively linguistic. That the source of necessity is in language
62 Cf. Sorabji (1980, 194) who comments that, as an objection to 
A ristotelian essentialism , W ittgensteinian considerations about family 
resemblance are 'misplaced'; the Aristotelian does not have it that, for 
any classificatory term, all things classified under the term  share a 
common essence.
63 Cf. Wiggins (1980, 82).
64 Contrary to Petrie (1971, 144) it does not follow from the quoted 
com m ent and the "’m eaning is use" doctrine' that the s o u r c e  of 
necessity must be in language.
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certainly does not follow from the claim that essence is expressed by 
grammar any more than that it follows that the source of the artist's 
inspiration is the painting because it is expressed by the painting. 
(There is a sense in which the tenet that essence is expressed by
grammar accords well with the defence of essentialism  I will support
in C hapter 3, w here I w ill argue that e ssen tia lis t a ttribu tions
pertaining to natural objects exhibit a characteristic grammatical form. 
Of course, this does not entail that such attributions are always
expressive of a real essence.)
,s:
It is generally accepted that the later W ittgenstein propounded an 
anti-realist account of (standard) logical necessity. Granting that he 
did, it does not follow in any obvious manner that he had an anti­
realist view of necessity de re. This is illustrated by the fact that there 
is no obvious incoherence involved in maintaining, for example, that 
the only real necessity there is involves natural compulsion, biological 
need, etc., w hile viewing logical necessity as lacking ontological 
ground. To deny coherence to such a stance at the outset would, on the 
assumption that meaning is crucial to the logical m odalities, beg the 
question against any physicalist realist about nature who combined 
anti-realism  about meaning with realism about natural necessity. I see 
no obvious way in which to object to such a position in point of 
o n to logy .  However, I believe that a realist view of logical necessity is 
necessary to the e p i s t e m o l o g y  of some de re m odal claim s: m ost 
obviously, those concerning de re possibility. A fuller account is given 
at 2.2: the specific form of realism about logical necessity I adopt is of 
conceptualist, rather than platonist, hue.
Even if W ittgenstein did have an anti-realist view of necessity de re, 
there is no argument to support such a view in the I n v e s t ig a t io n s . The 
passages which are sometimes regarded as an ti-essen tia list do not 
actually  establish anti-essentialism : it is doubtful that they even 
suggest anti-essentialism . W ittgenstein does not explicitly set out to 
offer a rebu ttal of essentialism  and there is no ind ication  in 
W ittgenstein’s text that he regarded his com m ents on essence as 
expressive of anti-essentialism. Of course, W ittgenstein may well have 
been ill-disposed to essentialism  at this stage in his philosophical 
career. However, citation of the purportedly anti-essentialist passages 
m entioned above neither furnishes a critique of essentialism  nor 
provides sufficient evidence that W ittgenstein held anti-essentialistic
.1Ï-
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views. The passages in question are an ti-essen tia list only if one 
identifies essentialism  with the implausible position that it is always 
the case that all things classified under a common term  share some 
ch arac te ris tic  not shared by things subsum ed under d iffe ren t
te rm s .65,66
I
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65 H allett (1991, 2) describes the tenet that all members of a class 
have ' s o m e t h i n g  in com m on...(a shared fam ily resem blance for 
example)' as an 'innocuous' form of essentialism. He seeks to oppose 
w hat he takes to be traditional essentialism , according to which 
essences are core p roperties or clusters of p roperties present, 
necessarily, in all and only those things which share [a] common 
name'. This illustrates the tendency which pervades Hallett's account, 
his reluctance (1991, 3) to provide a precise definition' of essentialism 
notwithstanding, namely to confuse essentialism  with the implausible 
tenet indicated in the main text above.
6 6  The implausible tenet indicated in the main text above is more 
attributable to traditional em piricist semantics, as characterized (but 
no t endorsed) by S idelle  (1989, 10, 170-172). The com m on
characteristic in question is the satisfaction of a definite description or 
an analytic definition. (Sidelle seeks to retain the conventionalist core 
of em piricist semantics, while rejecting the traditional tenet.)
■I
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CHAPTER 2: MODAL PRIMITIVISM
2.1 Primitivism, Elim inativism  and Reductionism
M inimally, modal primitivism  is the view that modal idioms are up 
neither for elim ination nor for reduction^ to non-modal bases. Anti­
realist modal prim itivism  is an option: for exam ple, one can be an 
irrealist about modality. Irrealism is a species of anti-realism  about a 
discourse which, in contrast with reductionism  and elim inativism , 
does not approach the discourse via the traditional m eans, i.e. the 
standard truth-conditional rubric. An irrealist about a discourse holds
that there are no genuine truth-conditions pertaining to that discourse 
and that the discourse has some role other than purporting to be 
traditionally  assertive. Thus, in contrast with the elim inativist, the 
irrea lis t does not hold that attributions em ploying the disputed 
discourse are erroneous.
/
In contrast with a minimal semantic prim itivism , com m itted to the 
tenet that modal discourse is neither eliminable nor reducible, is an 
ontologically committed sort of modal primitivism . This incorporates 
the sem antic prim itiv ist’s m inim al position, and holds the further 
thesis that modality is ontologically, rather than merely conceptually, 
grounded. The ontological prim itiv ist about m odality  holds that 
modality is in the nature of reality: actuality is construed as m odal . 2  
The extent of the difference between this position and that adopted 
by David Lewis will be elucidated later.
Prim itivist positions will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. David 
L ew is (1973, 85) depicts p rim itiv ism  as 'an abstinence from
1 B lackburn (1984, Chapter 5) calls the form er 're jection ' and 
sometimes calls the latter 'analysis'.
2 Recent defences of such a view include W iggins (1980) and Fine 
(1994). The former will be crucial to my support for realism  about a 
class of modality de re in Chapter 3. Shalkowski (1996, 376) describes 
m odal prim itivism  as 'the view that the world has a genuine modal 
character and that it does not possess this character in virtue of any 
nonm odal character it possesses': he fails to d istinguish  between 
prim itivism  and ontological primitivism.
3 Cf. Butchvarov (1970, 113) who comments that if questions about 
necessary truth cannot be answered w ithout appeal to the notion
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why such a depiction of primitivism is erroneous. First, the adoption 
of prim itivism  can, as herein, be argued for on the basis of an 
exam ination of the dem erits of non-prim itiv ist positions. Thus, 
p rim itiv ism  is established through theorizing. Second, even once 
m inim al p rim itiv ism  has been adopted the rea lism /an ti-rea lism  
debate is still open, so the adoption of primitivism does not signal an 
end to theorizing. Third, the elucidation and clarification of modal 
notions is not identical with their reduction, and can be performed in 
a fram ework which includes no reductionist aspiration.4 Lewis seeks 
to debar non-reductive accounts of modality on the basis that only a 
reductive analysis of m odality is genuinely explanatory . D espite 
Lewis’s view, it is both legitimate and explanatorily fruitful to explain 
the m odal via the modal, as I hope to illustrate. For exam ple, the 
nature of the notion of essence can be elucidated by reference to the 
species of modality it involves. This is genuinely explanatory, since 
our rendering a genuine elucidation will direct us away from errors 
concerning the notion. An intra-modal explanation (i.e. an explanation 
of one modality-involving notion via another) does influence our view 
of the notion being explained: for example, it may affect the sort of 
epistemology which we will regard as apposite to the notion. So, in 
order to give fruitful accounts of modal notions it is not necessary to 
explain  m odality  away. In any case, the p rospects for m odal 
reductionism are, I will argue, poor.
The Gulf Between Eliminativism and Reductionism 
Eliminativism, the position which advocates that a type of discourse is 
jettisoned, is distinct from reductionism . Furtherm ore, elim inativism  
and reductionism are not only distinct, they are separate in the sense 
that neither is a subspecies of the other. The issue at hand is that
    ----------------------
itself 'we would have a theory which may be of relevance for other 
philosophical topics...but of no relevance at all for the topic of the 
nature of necessary truth'.
4 Cf.: Pap (1958, 422), 'there is no vicious circle [involved] in the 
attem pt to clarify modal concepts by means of themselves'; Newman's 
comment (1992, 113) that a primitive notion can be characterized by 
saying things about it...and by saying what it is not'; Frege's distinction 
[1892a](1980, 42-43), cited by Newman (1992, 1), between definition 
and explanation; W iggins (1980, 4), m uch can be achieved in 
philosophy by means of elucidations which use  a concept without 
attem pting to reduce it'; Grossm ann (1983, 5), '[in  the] m ost 
fundam ental matters of metaphysics, definitions are impossible'.
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there can be no such position as reductionist elim inativism ; it is a 
mistake to view reductionism as supportive of elim inativism .5
Reductionists hold that the (purportedly) problem atic A-discourse can 
be re-expressed in basic, less problem atic or unproblem atic B-
d i s c o u r s e . 6  E lim inativism  will here be classified  as a position 
stemming from  error theory: it follows, as I will illustrate, that it
cannot be supported by reductionism . If elim inativism  were to be 
alternatively defined so as to include any position which advocates 
that a discourse be jettisoned, then reductionists calling for the 
disposal of the 'problematic' discourse in favour of the 'unproblematic' 
discourse would also count as eliminativists. All such an alternative
definition would do would be to pick out one tenet common to
elim inativism  and reductionism , namely the dispensability claim , to 
which I will later return. i
A crucial reason why reductionism  and elim inativ ism  are quite 
separate stems from the role which truth plays in the two theories. 
R eductionism  and elim inativism , as B lackburn (1986) em phasizes. ■i :share a common approach to the disputed discourse: the truth- 
conditional approach.
¥R eductionist positions are t ru th -p re se rv in g :  claims made in the A- 
discourse are true or false in virtue of the fact that they stem from 
the base discourse and there is a mapping' relation betw een A- 
statements and B-statements. In contrast, elim inativism  is an offshoot 
of error t h e o r y .7 The error theorist about a discourse holds that the 
discourse says nothing true (whether about the world, our minds or
=:ï.
5 On the view attributed by Stalnaker (1976, 70) to Adams (1974, 
224) and suggested by Roper (1982) reduction (in these cases a 
reduction of possible worlds discourse) can advance elim ination. On 
th is view , a reduction ist account of possib le  w orlds discourse 
elim inates possible worlds in the sense that it is illeg itim ate to 
postulate worlds along Lewisian lines as 'non-actual possibles': this is 
d is tin c t from  e lim in a tiv ism  about possib le  w orlds d iscou rse . 
E lim inativism  about a discourse is different from  the exercise of 
parsimony along the lines just mentioned.
6  Cf. Blackburn (1984, 152-153): the problem can be one 'of meaning, 
or of epistemology, or of metaphysics'.
7 The paradigm  error theory oft-cited, particularly by Blackburn, is 
the approach to moral discourse proposed by I.E. M ackie (1977, 35, 
4 8 -4 9 ).
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our linguistic conventions) and is, in a sense about to be described, 
mistaken. An error theorist about a discourse holds that the discourse 
purports to establish truth but that its truth conditions are unfulfilled.
Since claim s in the discourse incorporate the claim  to ( tru th - 
conditionally conceived) objectivity but go unfulfilled, the discourse 
fails in its purported project: the incorporated assertoric claim  is 
unsubstantiated so the claims made in the discourse are false. The 
elim inativ ist subscribes to the error theorist's thesis and stipulates 
that the discourse should be jettisoned . 8  If the reductionist's claims 
about the relation between the A-discourse and the B-discourse are 
adhered to then there can be no question of reductionism  leading to 
elim inativ ism . The two approaches are contrary to one another: 
reductionism cannot be a basis for eliminativism, nor can there be any  
rela tion  of supplem entation or com plem entarity betw een the two 
positions. The elim inativist is committed to jettisoning the disputed 
discourse because of its systematic falsehood; the reductionist need 
not be committed to dispensing with the disputed discourse at all. 
There is reason to suspect that any such aspiration is incom patible 
with the reductionist's project, given that the endorsem ent of non- 
arbitrary equivalence relations between a discourse and its reductive 
base is necessary to reductionism.
2
t:
The Dispensabilitv Claim 
Blackburn (1984, 151) describes reductionism in the following terms:
à
A d iffe ren t a ttitude  to a theory [i.e. o ther than
eliminativism], which yet shades into outright rejection of
it, is that its theses can be accepted, but their content can
be expressed in other ways, using a different kind of
vocabu lary .
How can this be made sense of in the light of the strong separation of 
reductionism  and elim inativism  which Blackburn suggests (e.g., 1984,
8  Note the possibility  of positions which adhere to error theory 
w ithout seeking elim ination. Someone m ight be an error theorist
about a discourse and yet hold that it is not up for elimination due, for
example, to its theoretical utility, or to de facto  considerations about 
human psychology to the effect that we must view the world in terms
of the discourse. An example of the former approach is the possible
worlds fictionalism due to Rosen (1990).
'
    ..........
9 Reductionism  and elim inativism  are not exhaustive of anti-realism , 
as we have seen. Divers (1990, Chapter 6 ; 1992, esp. 113) criticizes 
McGinn’s account on this ground.
I take actualism to be the thesis that only actual objects exist (i.e. 
there are no possibilia). McGinn takes actualism to be what I will call 
’rigid actualism ': the aforementioned thesis combined with the thesis 
that reality is non-modal. This point will be returned to below.
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147) and which I endorse? This is a question upon which Blackburn 
does not dwell. For my purposes, dealing more explicitly with the
sense in which reductionism  may be said (consisten t with the 
a fo rem en tio n ed  d is tin c tio n ) to 'shade  in to ' e lim in a tiv ism  is
worthwhile, since my argument has it that the proponent of (in the
first instance, m in im a l )  primitivism has two birds to deal with which
cannot be killed with the one stone.
A ccording to McGinn (1981, 168, 170, 171): 'an ti-realism  about 
modality is the doctrine known as actualism';  '[m jodal anti-realism is a 
thesis of reductive or eliminative actualism'; and, '[t]o implement the 
actualist programme would...be to show that nothing of significance is 
lost if we purge our thought of all modal notions'. Although I deny 
that modal anti-realism  and actualism are one and the same, and I 
take issue with McGinn's claims on the grounds that his definition of 
anti-realism  is too narrow,9 as is his conception of actualism,lo the last 
claim  may nevertheless serve to assist our understanding of what it 
m ight mean to suggest that reductionism and elim inativism  shade into 
one another. Furthermore, consideration of it may help us to see how 
this shading is not such that either of the approaches in question can 
properly be described as providing rational support for the other. 
E lim inativism  and reductionism  share the truth-conditional approach 
and the tenet that the disputed discourse is dispensable. That a 
discourse is dispensable, however, is not sufficient to establish that it 
is up for elim ination, and to state its dispensability need not be to 
advocate its elimination. (By way of analogy, consider this: there can 
be two ways of referring to one thing. The fact that there are two 
m ight be construed such that neither of them  is regarded as 
indispensable as against the other. At least one is essential to 
referring to the thing, but there is no one such that it and only it is 
essential.) Furthermore, the sense of the dispensability claim  is quite 
different in the case of eliminativism than in that of reductionism. To 
re ite ra te : e lim in a tiv ism  is roo ted  in e rro r th eo ry , w hereas
21
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reductionism  is entirely different in that it is tru th-preserving. It 
holds that the A-discourse (i.e. the one supposedly up for reduction) is 
true in virtue of the B-discourse (i.e. the reductive b a se ) .n  So, 
elim inativism  states that the discourse is dispensable because it is, in 
the specified m anner, false, while reductionism  states that the 
discourse is dispensable because any claim made in it can be made in 
the terms of the base discourse. The reductionist has to show that 
priority genuinely attaches to the purportedly reductive discourse in 
any relation of equivalence between the A- and B-discourses. If, as 
the reductionist has it, the same claim can be made in either A- or B- 
term s then consistency  dem ands that e ither n e i t h e r  form  of 
expression is admissible or that both  are. The reductionist favours the 
B-discourse, but it legitimates the A-discourse, it does not encourage 
its eradication.
E lim inativism  and reductionism , two subsets of anti-realism , can be 
described as shading into one another in that the set of the tenets of 
elim inativism  and the set of the tenets of reductionism  intersect. This 
is so because they share the dispensability claim. The foundational 
claims pertaining to the establishment of the dispensability claim  are 
discrete, with the single exception of the common tenet that allows 
that the disputed discourse is held to aim at t r u t h .  1 2  The sense in 
which reductionism  and elim inativism  can properly be held to shade 
into one another is meagre: the view that reduction cannot provide 
the grounds for elimination is vindicated.
For the modal elim inativist, nothing of significance is lost if modal 
discourse is forsaken because that discourse, despite purporting to do 
so, does not convey any facts. For the modal reductionist modal 
discourse conveys facts, but the facts it conveys are not essentially 
modal: there is no distinctive cognitive content to modality over and 
 -
T ru e  in virtue o f  is to be interpreted in a strong sense (i.e. 
stronger than mere supervenience) where reductionism  is concerned. 
Mapping relations are held by the reductionist to pertain between A- 
and B-discourses, with the latter discourse having conceptual priority 
over the former.
1 2  W here the notion of truth is here understood in terms of the 
traditional truth-conditional rubric, in contrast, for example, with the 
expressivist alternative proposed by Blackburn (e.g., 1984, 197-202) 
and the (anti-expressivist) m inim alist alternative proposed by W right 
(1992).
2.2 Modal Epistemology
%: 
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above what can be expressed in either rigidly actualistic or non-modal 
discourse. The reductionist holds that were modal discourse to be 
jettisoned, none of the fact-stating purchase associated with it would 
be lost because that is entirely contained within the non-modal base 
d iscourse .
The Problem of Knowledge 
In this section I w ill exam ine the problem  of modal know ledge, 
outlin ing  how elim inativ ism  and reductionism  are aligned with 
distinct forms of epistemological concern. I will agree with McGinn 
that there is a strong connection between modality and the a priori 
I w ill suggest that, when modality is approached from  within the 
truth-conditional rubric, the broad options which face the theorist are 
as follows: (a) the a priori,  and thus m odality, is rejected on the 
grounds that it is epistemologically profligate, since either (i) the only 
acceptable model of knowing involves the knowers' being causally 
related to the known (and purportedly a priori  knowledge involves no 
such relation); or, (ii) the a priori requires that some of the contents of 
our web of belief are held to be entirely immune from revision in the 
light of recalcitrant experience, but even the most hallowed principles 
of logic are révisable in the light of pragmatic utility, and other core, 
but more peripheral, beliefs are subject to refutation by experience; 
(b) the a priori  is accepted, but only modality de dicto is held to be 
epistemologically acceptable; (c) the a priori is accepted and modality 
de d ic to  and m odality  de re are reg a rd ed , th e re b y , as 
epistem ologically acceptable. Option (a) constitutes an elim inativ ist 
and radical em piricist approach. Option (a)(ii) constitutes Quinean 
e lim inativ ism . O ption (b) corresponds to the position  of those 
em piricists (who, for convenience I shall call ’Humean em piricists’) 
who accept one of the 'dogmas' criticized by Quine, nam ely a 
d istinc tion  betw een a priori  and a poster ior i  know ledge. (Such 
em piricists commonly adopt reductionist theses concerning m odality 
de dicto and purport to eschew modality de re.) Option (c) will be 
endorsed by those essentialists who accept that the a priori  is
I
i^3 I endorse Thesis (II) of Peacocke (1997, 556): In every case in 
which a content containing a metaphysical m odality is known, any 
modal prem isses in the ultim ate justification which underw rites the 
status of the belief as knowledge are a priori.'
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implicated in all modal knowledge. (I know of no essentialist denial 
that the a priori is implicated in all modal knowledge.) In this section 
I will provide a brief exposition of Quinean elim inativism . Later in 
this chapter I will endorse argument to the effect that the rejection of 
the a priori, and thus modality, along the lines of (a) is untenable. I 
will suggest, after McGinn, that since the essentialist and the Humean 
empiricist both accept the a priori, and since the a priori is implicated 
in all modal knowledge, there is a clear sense in which modality de re 
should be regarded as no more epistemologically problem atic by the 
Humean empiricist than those classes of a priori knowledge which the 
Humean empiricist accepts. I will proceed to provide an epistemology 
for m etaphysical m odality  de re which, although d ifferen t from 
K iipke’s account in some important respects, is of a broadly Rripkean 
form .
Epistem ological concerns are a key source of m otivation for non- 
prim itivist positions about modality. A strain of these are held, in the 
case of error theory, to advance the claim that modal discourse is 
system atically false. (Epistemological concerns are not exhaustive of 
the m otives for m odal reductionism : D.K. Lew is's reductionism  is 
m otivated by the supposed formal and theoretical benefits which it 
a ffo rds.)
E pistem ological concerns are mentioned in rather vague term s by 
B lackburn  (1984, 146, 151) as p rovoking  e lim in a tiv is t and
reduc tion ist responses: claim s may 'seem  susp ic ious’ or invite
scepticism '; 'we might find some particular set of terms awkward or 
puzzling in various ways'. According to Blackburn:
The m otivation for reductive analyses is based on a 
contrast. The com m itm ents expressed in some original 
vocabulary (the A-vocabulary, or A -com m itm ents) m ust 
be felt to introduce some apparent puzzle, e ither of 
m eaning, or of epistem ology, or of m etaphysics, not 
in troduced by statem ents made in the analysing , B- 
vocabulary. (1984, 147)
It is the epistemological sort of 'puzzle' which appears to dominate in 
m otivating elim inativist approaches to modal discourse, and it is a
f
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central motive for other anti-realist a p p r o a c h e s  4  ^
Prelim inary to his discussion of possible worlds sem antics, McGinn 
imposes an epistemological condition upon 'ontological imputations', to 
the effect that:
a..
the introduced objects m ust play a suitable part in the
le a rn in g  and  v e r i f ic a t io n  o f th e  s e n te n c e s
co n ce rn ed .... w hat m akes our sen tences true should
properly relate to our knowledge of their truth. (1981,
1 5 2 -1 5 3 )
McGinn construes 'ontology' in narrowly entitative (i.e. 'ontical' — and 
thereafter rigidly actualistic) terms, which allows him to characterize 
his own project of establishing non-objectual modal realism  as non- 
ontological (1981, 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 ) . McGinn takes ontological questions to 
be exhaustively about what entities and sorts of entities exist. As 
against such a conception, ontology is the study of b e i n g .  That study 
is not exhausted by addressing the kinds of question which would 
count as ontological on McGinn's definition, since the former includes 
questions about the nature of reality and the natures of existents, 
such as the questions as to whether the modalities are real aspects of 
being and whether individuals have essences. Nevertheless, McGinn's 
epistem ological condition is applicable to any non-irrealist and anti- 
elim inativist account of modality in that 'what makes our sentences 
true should properly relate to our knowledge of their truth'.
14 As I will illustrate , Quine's modal elim inativ ism  stems from  
epistem ological concern. An anti-elim inativist theorist who regards 
real necessity as epistem ologically baffling is Sidelle, who claims 
(1989, 134-135) tha t such necessity  is ep is tem o log ica lly  and
m etaphysically 'occult'. I hope to go some way towards addressing 
these charges in this chapter and in the next.
The benefits of an alternative terminology to that of McGinn, in 
which the ontical and the ontological are d istinguished, w ill be 
m entioned later.
16 This is no mere terminological dispute, since M cGinn's discussion 
(e.g . in iden tify ing  ontological realism  with ob jectuai realism ) 
underestimates the tasks of ontology. I will later suggest that where 
modality is concerned ontological realism proper (which holds that the 
m odalities are irreducibly  grounded in reality ) is in fac t non- 
objectual. My conception of the tasks of ontology compares with that 
advanced by Grossmann (1983, 3-5; 1992, 1).
Î.
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M cGinn distinguishes two strains of epistem ological concern which 
foster anti-realism :
In one kind the form of the anti-realist com plaint is that 
the rea lis t truth conditions invite scepticism : this is
because knowledge of those conditions appears m ediated 
by a p roblem atic  in ference .. .In the o ther kind the 
complaint is in a way more fundamental: the trouble here 
is that the an ti-rea lis t cannot com prehend how the 
introduced [problematic cognitive] faculty is supposed to 
operate at all. (1981, 167)
The form  of sceptical concern in the case of the firs t strain is 
associated with the lim itations of the faculty. There is held to be a 
problem  about how the faculty can be sufficient to justify  certain 
know ledge claim s (adhered to by the realist) which seem  to be 
beyond its grasp: as McGinn puts it, they require to be 'mediated by a 
problematic inference’. In the latter case it is the faculty itself which 
is held to be problematic, not the extent of its reach. The sceptical 
suspicion is serious enough, in the m inds of the afflic ted , to 
undermine the possibility of their being such a faculty.
The strains of scepticism which McGinn identifies seem to correspond, 
respectively , to the epistem ological m otives for reductionism  and 
e lim in a tiv ism  abou t m odality . The e p is tem o lo g ica lly -m o tiv a ted  
reductionist is trying to resolve a perplexity which arises in the A- 
discourse as it stands. The A-discourse commands reductive analysis 
because it is held to give rise to a requirem ent for problem atic 
inference. The aim is to reduce it to a base discourse whereby this 
requirem ent can be dissolved. The reductionist aims to give an 
epistem ologically non-perplexing account of the truth conditions for 
m odal claim s. The modal e lim inativ ist's concern is deeper. The 
question  for the e lim in a tiv is t is not as to how (apparen tly  
problem atic) modal knowledge can be rendered perspicuous: rather, 
the sceptical question which the eliminativist raises is as to how there 
can be modal knowledge at all. The eliminativist's answer is that there 
cannot. Furtherm ore, this is not because there is some modal truth 
which we are held to be unable ever to know. Rather, the eliminativist 
holds that since we have no faculty for modal knowledge acquisition
' ï h ' f
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the in te llig ib ility  of the idea that there are m odal tru ths is 
undermined. This is illustrated by the case of Quine's view that there 
are no necessary truths.
Quine's radical empiricism motivates his modal elim inativ ism ^^ he is 
comm itted to the view that all knowledge is em pirical and that all 
beliefs are constrained by empirical evidence. In accordance with his 
radical em piricism , he rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction. He 
opines that if necessity is to be at all intelligible it must rest upon the 
notion of analyticity.i^ He holds to the conviction that the a priori  and is
Divers (1992, 113) lists Quine as a member of a m odal irrealist 
tradition. In contrast, W right (1986, 191) depicts Quine as an error- 
theorist. Quine is hostile to the logical m odalities and essentialist 
modal attributions. Quine (1966, 48-56) states that the only notion of 
necessity with scientific utility is that of natural necessity, which 
relates to dispositional attributions and about which he is an anti­
realist. Dispositional attributions, in turn, are held to be a requirement 
of a relatively primitive science: they become obsolete with scientific 
progress. It is difficult to be convinced by these com m ents. The 
indispensab ility  of d ispositional attributions to both science and 
philosophy is illustrated by their centrality to Quine's conception of 
stim ulus m eaning ' (1960, 33-34). In so far as em piric ism  is
committed to the idea that the world and the realm  of necessity are 
d istinc t, and given that such attributions are not equ ivalen t to 
conditionals (contra  Quine (1960, 33-34, 222-225) and typical 
em piricist accounts), the absence of a credible em piricist account of 
such a ttr ib u tio n s  underm ines the p la u s ib ility  of em piric ism . 
Discursive criticism  of empiricist accounts of dispositional attributions 
is provided by Weissman (1965, esp. Chapter 2).
18 Cf. Hook way (1988, 123): '[Quine's] empiricist approach to science 
ensures that he sees the notion of analyticity as the only hope for 
clarifying necessity — albeit a forlorn one.' (This point also relates to 
the note below .) W iggins (1980, 104) suggests that it is only 
em piric ism  as em piric ism  m isconceives its e lf .. .th a t could  find 
anyth ing ...to  cavil at' regarding W iggins's 'p rinciples and m axim s 
governing the derivation of a m odest essentialism '. (U nfortunately, 
W iggins does not explain the nature of such a m isconception of 
em piric ism .)
19 Quine (1980, 143): 'The general idea of strict modalities is based on 
the putative notion of analyticity';  cf. Quine (1960, 195-96; 1980, 23- 
37; 1966, 169). (Quine (1960, 55, 65-69) em ploys the notion
stim ulus-analytic '; a notion which in turn em ploys the notion of 
d isp o sitio n s.)  The in terdependence of the p u ta tiv e  no tions of 
analyticity and necessity is undermined if, as Kiipke maintains, there 
are non-analytic necessities. This is the case regardless of whether
I f
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the analy tic /syn the tic  d istinc tion  (and thus m odality ) are not 
ep istem ologically  respectable. The analy tic/synthetic  d istinc tion  is 
called  into question by Quine precisely because this 'dogm a of 
em piricism ' cannot be genuinely upheld by a pure em piricism : the 
comm itm ent to the a priori  manifested in the writings of Hume and 
the logical positiv ists is a vestige of rationalism . Given Quine's 
rejection of the a priori, he holds that we possess no cognitive faculty 
pertaining to (allegedly) necessary truth or to the justification of the 
an a ly tic /sy n th e tic  d is tin c tio n : all our co g n itiv e  facu ltie s  are
answerable to the tribunal of experience and there is, therefore, no 
necessary truth and no legitim ate analytic/synthetic distinction.
Quine holds that necessity is not scientifically respectable since it 
comm its us to em pirically unrevisable truth and it is incom patible
with the language of canonical science.^0 That language is extensional, 
m odal contexts are non-extensional: 'referential opacity afflicts...the 
so-called modal  contexts "Necessarily..." and "Possibly...", at least when 
those are given the sense of stric t  necessity and possibility as in [C.I.] 
Lewis's modal logic’ (1980, 1 4 3 ) . Quine has it that there is a trade­
off between instrumental validity and problematic status in point of
epistemology, e.g., in the case of our postulation of physical objects 
(1980, 44). In the case of necessity, however, there is no such
instrum ental validity to be had precisely because necessity involves
comm itm ent to the a priori  and the a priori is in conflict with global 
pragmatic utility. Quine is correct to link modality with the a priori: 
the a priori  is pertinent to all modal knowledge. (However, it is a 
m istake to identify all necessity with analyticity.) Since the a priori  is 
im plicated in all m odality, the philosopher who wishes to preserve 
m odality against the Quinean attack m ust tackle that attack at its
;I
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such necessities are properly construed as necessary truths.
70 As has been noted, Quine is prepared to adm it the adverb 
necessarily' when it relates to natural necessity, but he construes this 
(1966, 51) as conveying no more than regularity.
71 Quine's attribution of referential opacity to m odal contexts is 
criticized by W olfram  (1975) and M illican (1993), both of whose 
arguments rest upon the premiss that definite descriptions can have 
purely referential occurrence. I take that prem iss to be implausible, 
and indeed untenable, in view of my support (at 4.4) for a broadly 
Fregean distinction between sense and reference. Nevertheless, not all 
modal contexts are intensional: I will illustrate that referential opacity 
afflicts only modality de dicto.
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source by defending the thesis that there is a class of a priori  
knowledge, or that there m ust be some such class if our scientific 
practice, broadly construed, is to function. Successful argument to this 
effect constitutes a necessary but non-sufficient condition for the 
defence of modality against the Quinean attack; it must also be shown 
that modal notions will feature significantly in that class of a priori  
knowledge. The meeting of these conditions is sufficient to defeat the 
Quinean attack: arguments which serve to fulfil these conditions will 
be endorsed later.
One way in which the epistem ological difficulties associated with 
m odality can be circum vented is by the adoption of an irrealist 
approach to modal discourse, such as that advocated by Blackburn. 
The epistem ological difficulties which arise within the rubric of the 
tru th -cond itional approach (in which realism , reduc tion ism  and 
elim inativism  participate) do not arise on an irrealist account. On 
B lackburn 's q uasi-rea list p ro jec tiv is t account, 'the  p rep o s itio n a l 
behaviour of the commitments —the reason why they become objects 
of doubt or knowledge, probability, truth or falsity ' is explained on 
the basis o f 'a theory of the m ental state expressed  by the 
commitments in the area in question' (1986, 122). In the next chapter 
I will argue that there is a significant class of m odality, namely 
m odality de re, for which this approach cannot account. Also, as I will 
try to show later in this chapter, that class of m odality is not as 
epistemologically problematic as its critics have maintained.
One realist strategy, in the face of epistemologically m otivated anti­
realism , is to argue that, however serious an epistemological problem 
a m etaphysic of modality might present, the recognition of such a 
problem  neither necessitates nor renders desirable a rejection of the 
m e ta p h y s ic a l p o s itio n  su b je c t to e p is te m o lo g ic a l c o n ce rn . 
E pistem ological qualm s, although they may be serious, are not 
sufficient to undercut our m etaphysics. The realist may attem pt to 
outweigh the kind of scepticism which would reflect back upon our 
m etaphysics by em phasizing the benefits of rea lism  and the 
theoretical drawbacks of the opposition which m ight be even more 
serious than the troublesom e epistemology of m odality. If there is 
serious incoherence or outrageousness in the opposing theories, then 
this will count in realism 's favour, even if realism  gives rise to 
p ro b le m a tic  e p is te m o lo g y . This  a p p e a rs  — a l t h o u g h  not
I
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unambiguously—- to be the strategy adopted by McGinn in defence of 
his own realism . McGinn does not attem pt entirely to resolve the 
problem, but to give it a thorough exposition, showing what is at stake 
by means of analogy. Thereafter he seems to adm it to a certain 
perplexity in the face of the problem. He wants to illustrate that 
modality is, in some important respects, akin to mathematics. His aim 
is to illu stra te  w hat m arks out m odality  as ep istem olog ica lly  
problem atic in a way which is distinct, for exam ple, from  the 
epistem ological status of theoretical entities postulated in science. It 
also em erges on M cGinn's view that for the Humean em piricist, 
m odality de re should be no more — and no less— epistemologically 
problem atic than m athem atics. The challenge to the rea lis t about 
m odality  de re and to the Humean empiricist alike, is to provide a 
plausible epistemology for those species of knowledge in which the a 
pr ior i  is held to have an important role.
The strong connection between modal knowledge, including de re 
modal knowledge, and the a priori is set out by McGinn (1981, 180): 
in order to give rise  to 'transem pirical tru th s ', a 'theo re tica l 
construction’ must meet the conditions that it is realistically construed 
and that its introduction into or removal from an em pirical theory 
neither increases nor lessens the empirical content of the theory. (This 
la tter condition, 'conservativeness', is an adaptation of a notion 
em ployed in Hartry Field 's work on m athem atical theories.) For 
McGinn, a theoretical construction has transem pirical status if  it is 
based on neither direct nor indirect observation (including argument 
to the best explanation, as in the case, for exam ple, of theoretical 
entities). The point for McGinn is that modal constructions are akin to 
m athematics, and contrast with theoretical entities, in that modality is 
transem pirical in the sense outlined.
McGinn (1981, 181) writes that in the case of a theory T,  free of 
modal expressions, and a set of causally modal constructions V,
T u  V is a conservative extension of T: in particular , T u  V 
has no em pirical consequences not shared by T. So 
m odality, like m athem atics, is em pirically conservative.
The reason  is obvious: em pirical consequences are
reported by sentences which can be observed to be true, 
but what is non-actual cannot be observed to be true...So,
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ïby the conservativeness of modality, removing the modal 
com ponent from an em pirical theory does not decrease 
empirical content. In fact, this is just the point which has 
seemed to empiricists to lend such support to a constant 
conjunction  conception of laws: viz., that the extra
assertoric content alleged by the necessitarian about laws 
m ust transcend what we can empirically verify.
McGinn (1981, 183) states that we could not arrive at a theory with 
m odal content purely by means of em pirical observation and that 
'there is a clear and important sense in which all  specifically  m odal 
knowledge is a priori'. This is set against the background of the claim, 
provoked by consideration of K ripke’s discussion of a posteriori  
necessities, that
■we come to know that a certain em pirical statem ent is 
necessary by inference from a pair of premisses: the first 
is the non-m odal em pirical truth which we know by 
o rd inary  a p o s te r io r i  procedures; the second is a 
conditional, affirm ing that if  the concept in question 
applies to a sequence of objects then it does so necessarily, 
where this conditional is known a priori by reflection on 
the concept in question. Modus ponens  delivers the modal 
conclusion. (1981, 157-158)
For example, upon the basis of the empirical discovery (say via the 
scientific analysis of blood samples) that Jill is the daughter of John 
and the conditional that if x  is the (biological) daughter of y then x  is 
necessarily the daughter of y, we arrive at the de re modal conclusion 
that Jill is necessarily the daughter of John.
McGinn offers a conceptualist account of the modal prem iss in such 
argum ents. That is the sense in which all 'spec ifica lly  m odal' 
knowledge can be characterized as a priori, even when the truth of a 
modal statement is arrived at a posteriori. Given that McGinn's modal 
rea lism  is 'T ra c ta r ia n ' , 2 2  that his m etaphysical standpo in t is 
e s s e n t ia l i s t ,73 and that he offers a conceptualist account of modal
s
77 That is, he believes that modal statements m ust feature in 'a 
complete and ultimate description of reality' (1981, 170).
73 McGinn (1981, 152) states that something is a genuine individual
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knowledge, it is clear that his discussion constitutes a conceptualist 
realist account of m odality.74
How ever, the real problem  for the em piricist, which was at the 
forefront of Quine’s criticism of traditional empiricism, and of which 
McGinn makes mention, was how the empiricist can accept the a priori 
at all. McGinn (1981, 181) argues that modality, like mathematics and 
unlike theoretical entities, cannot be epistem ologically established via 
argument to the best explanation, and that
If this is correct, the liberalized empiricist can insist upon 
the n o n -em p irica l n a tu re  of m o d a lity  w h ile  no t 
s im ultaneously  and unw antedly  exclud ing  sta tem ents 
whose epistemological credentials he finds (or should find) 
acceptable [relating, e.g. to theoretical entities]. But now if 
modality is thus non-empirical and if modal realism  is (as 
I have claim ed) true, then this insistence im m ediately 
refutes empiricism, be it ever so attenuated... (1981, 182)
.yThe relevant 'liberalization' of empiricism involves the inclusion of a 
broad notion of indirect observability, including argument to the best 
explanation, but (presumably) a denial of a priori knowledge. The sort 
of empiricism envisaged here by McGinn is inconsistent with Humean 
empiricism. On McGinn's account it emerges that the problem of modal 
knowledge is no more and no less acute for Humean views (which 
seek to uphold the legitim acy of a class of a priori  know ledge  
pertinent to de dicto modalities) than it is for realism  about modality 
de r^.75 The problem  of modal knowledge confronts equally  the 
'em piricist' who wishes to retain logical modalities and the exponent 
of irreducib le and real m odality de re (i.e. the essentialist). If 
McGinn's account is correct, de re modality does not fall foul of Hume's 
fork and versions thereof, so long as interbreeding betw een the
„only if...its properties partition (non-trivially) into the essential and the accidental'.
74 Cf. the discursively defended conceptualist realism  of W iggins
(1980, Chapter 5).
75 W hether McGinn is successful in his stated aim of explicating such a 
rea list view need not concern us. Divers (1990, Chapter 7; 1992) 
righ tly  contests M cGinn's assum ption that upholding m odal-actual 
supervenience (w ithout reduction) is, as Divers (1992, 99) puts it, 
constitutive o f  modal realism.
our metaphysics with our epistemology. On the one hand we have the 
difficulty of establishing that there is genuine knowledge a priori; on 
the other we have the problem that even if there is, how is it to be 
explained, given that we cannot explain it causally?
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species of reasoning/knowledge is not debarred. (It would then seem 
that the Humean em piricist really  has no legitim ate grounds for 
epistemological qualms specific to modality de re.) The epistemology 
offered has it that de re modal knowledge comes about via inference 
from modal major premiss and empirical minor premiss. On McGinn's 
account the epistem ological problem  associated with m odality boils 
down to the problem of how there can be a priori  knowledge. If the a 
p r i o r i / a  p o s te r io r i  d istinction  can properly  be upheld by the 
em piricist then, on M cGinn's account, there is no epistem ological 
problem specific to modality, since the 'problem' of modal knowledge 
just is the 'problem' of a priori knowledge. If we accept the type of 
conceptualist realist account of modal knowledge de re advanced by 
McGinn, and if the empiricist is in a position to explain claims to 
know ledge where the nature of the subject m atter canno t be 
accommodated by a (liberalized) causal model of knowing, then there 
should bo no  problem of modal knowledge. If the empiricist is in no 
such position then the choice which confronts the truth-conditional 
theorist of m odality is between thoroughgoing Quinean em piricism  
and the acceptance of m odality , and thereby the a priori ,  as 
legitim ate, a lbeit epistem ologically problem atic. The theorist m ust 
e ith e r seek to e lim inate  m odality  or adm it that it may be 
epistemologically problematic, but that modalizing has to be preferred 
over eliminativism. The proceeding section will endorse the view that 
the problem  associated  w ith m odal e lim ina tiv ism , nam ely  its 
incoherence, is much more serious than any problem  which m ight 
attach to the a priori ,  and accordingly to logical m odality  and 
m etaphysical m odality de re.
''"■iMcGinn points to an unresolved issue relating to the reconciliation of
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The epistem ological problem  with m odality is ...th a t we 
cannot represent modal facts as causally explaining our 
knowledge of them [i.e. our knowledge of their modal 
status rather than our knowledge of their tru th]. And the 
trouble with this is that we seem to have no other going 
theory of knowledge. We thus reach the uncom fortable
 „
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position of agreeing that there is a priori  know ledge but 
not understanding how such knowledge comes about. And 
this, it seems to me, is the form that the problem atic 
epistemology of modal realism takes....My own view is that 
we are here confronted by a genuine and in tractable 
conflict between what our metaphysics demands and what 
our epistemology can allow. (1981, 185)
M cGinn's account appears to suggest that there may be a need to 
reverse one of the central characteristics of m odern philosophical 
m ethod , stem m ing from  its C artesian  h e ritag e , nam ely  the 
maintenance of epistemology as prior to m etaphysics. If the demands 
of any coherent em piricist approach will require adherence to modal 
elim inativism  then anyone who finds modal elim inativism  implausible 
may have to turn the philosophical clock back by awarding priority to 
m etap h y sic s  over ep is te m o lo g y .76 (I am not suggesting that an 
epistem ology for the a priori  and m odality cannot be found, but 
m erely that the im possibility of elim inativist positions entails that 
ep istem ological qualm s should not take precedence over sound 
ontology.) The desire to revert to pre-Cartesian m ethodology is no 
doubt attractive to any philosopher who shares the predilection that 
the world is ontologically prior to our knowledge of it, and the 
accompanying belief that the metaphysics to which epistem ologically- 
o rien ted  m ethodo logy  often leads — w hich aw ards no t ju s t  
ep istem ological but ontological priority  to epistem ological atoms, 
qualities and the like over substances— is ill-advised. Of course, this 
predilection has to be supported by argument if m etaphysical realism  
is not simply to be assumed. A more direct approach to the relation 
betw een modal m etaphysics and modal epistem ology, involving the 
just i f icat ion  of the conceptualism suggested by McGinn, is available.
76 Although the maintenance of epistemology as prior to metaphysics 
is a central feature of empiricism, it was inherited from  Descartes,
Thus, like the two dogmas criticized by Quine, it has its origins in 
rationalist thought. It is characteristic of non-em piricist philosophies 
to deem something other than epistemology (typically metaphysics or 
logic) to be 'first philosophy'. Regardless of whether there need be a 
f irs t philosophy, philosophers through the ages have tended to 
operate as if some area of philosophical study had priority over 
o thers .
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Outline of an Approach to Modal Epistemology
The following argument encapsulates a line of thought to be further 
supported later in this chapter.
(1). In practice we employ axioms concerning modal notions.77 These 
include examples employing de re forms, e.g., (a) for any thing A and 
any activity, x-ing, if A is x -ing/xd  then it is/was possible for A to x.78 
These axioms, and the deductive principles governing argument forms 
in which they may feature, such as modus ponens ,  are 'norm ative 
with respect to reasoning'.79
(2). Unless we eschew the very notions of possibility and necessity we 
must accept some such axioms, since they govern the meanings of the 
notions. The provision of a (not necessarily formal) logic for modal 
notions is a necessary condition for their possession of cognitive
content. (The fact that this condition is met suggests that even if, as
the projectivist has it, modality is a matter of our adopting modal 
attitudes, such attitudes, unlike, e.g., aesthetic attitudes, are subject to 
rules of a sort which can be formulated fairly straightforwardly.30)
(3). Eschewing modal notions is not an option, since the practice of 
deductive reasoning both relies upon and em ploys them .31 Even
arguments in which the modalities do not overtly feature rest upon
77 E.g., if it is the case that p  then it is possible that p ; if it is necessary 
that p  then it is not possible that not p\  (a) in the main text.
78 Much of what I write in this section rests upon the assumption of 
an account of the form of de re constructions which I will defend in 
greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
79 I borrow the phrase from Haack (1978, 238). Cf. the combination of 
the thesis of normativity adopted in ( 1 ) and the cognitivism  adopted 
in (4) with the weak psychologism' about logic suggested by Haack 
(1978, 238-242).
30 The fact that the condition is met is seen, for more than one reason, 
as a threat to the projectivist's project, as will emerge in Chapter 3.
31 That practice, in turn, is indispensable to science (broadly or 
narrowly construed). This emerges from accepting W right's argument 
for the indispensability of the a priori  to the functioning of empirical 
theories, M cFetridge's argum ent for the indispensability  of logical 
necessity, and the further premiss, (5) below, that logic is an a priori  
science. The arguments of W right and McFetridge are expounded later 
in this chapter. Contrary to Quinean empiricism, there m ust be some 
deductive principles immune to empirical revision.
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the m odalities, because the whole p ractice  of reasoning  from  
suppositions rests upon the notion of logical necessity.
(4). The denial that the possibility of p  entails p  or that the possibility 
for A to X entails that A xs is symptomatic of an understanding of the 
notion of possibility. Someone who regards the objective possibility of 
something as entailing that it actually pertains clearly has a defective 
understanding of the notion of possibility.37 Modal axioms are proper 
objects of knowledge and ignorance. (At the very least, the layman 
and the logician talk as if they had cognitive content. The onus is on 
the non-cognitivist to provide us with an acceptable explanation of 
such talk and of the ordered nature of our use of the notions at issue.)
(5). Since deductive reasoning cannot (primarily) be justified via, and 
does not require justification via, empirical means, modal axioms and 
deductive principles have purely a priori status.33 (Where I attribute 
purely a priori' status to something I do not mean to rule out the 
possibility  — indicated by Kripke— that it can ever be known a 
p o s te r io r i .  Rather, I suggest that, if it can properly be regarded as an 
object of knowledge, the fundamental form of justification for it is 
e x t r a - e m p i r i c a l .34 in addition, my concern is with the cognitive
3 7 The objective m odalities are those which are unrestricted  by 
ignorance and belief.
33 Cf. McGinn (1976, 199-200) and Peacocke (1993, 185) on the a 
priori  status of logic.
34 Cf. McMichael (1986, 37): A priori knowledge is distinguished from 
a posteriori  knowledge not because it can arise in the total absence of 
experience...bu t rather because experience does not constitu te  an 
e v i d e n t i a l  basis for it'. Also, cf. Pap (1958, 126): 'W hat marks a 
proposition as a priori is...that the only kind of cognitive activity 
which we admit as appropriate to its validation is conceptual analysis 
and deduction — the "mere operation of thought".' Even if there are 
purely a priori  items the truth of which can be known a posteriori  
(e.g. via an expert's report) this does not conflict with the claims of 
M cM ichael, Pap and m yself. According to W right (1980, 110): 
A rith m etica l equations certa in ly  are strong ly  borne out by 
experience. If an explanation is to be available of why we give them 
the extra "dignity" of a rule...it is surely that more than experimental 
corroboration of them is possible.' My claim  is that appeal to 
experience is irrelevant to the fundam ental ju stifica tion  of modal 
axioms and deductive principles. W right's W ittgenstein agrees (1980, 
329-330) that deductive inference 'could not typically' be 'inductively 
su p p o rted ', bu t assigns p u r e l y  norm ative sta tu s to log ical
' f4..
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faculties of human b e i n g s 4 5 )
So, there is a class of purely a priori  modal k n o w l e d g e . 3 6
N either (3) nor the argum ent compels us to accept de re m odal 
notions. (Unless, that is, the de dicto is a special class of the de re: in 
such a circum stance the indispensability  of non-de dicto  m odal 
notions remains unestablished). We are compelled to accept de dicto 
modal notions since they are essential to the practice of reasoning 
from suppositions. Although de re modal notions feature in our ac tua l
    .
'" s ta tem en ts '" .
35 Cf. Kitcher (1980, 90-91; 1984, 26, incl. nt. 16) who comments that, 
in characterising the a priori, we are interested only in the cognitive 
faculties which human beings actually possess, not in those which 
they possess in other possible worlds. Thus, my 'a priori' com pares 
with H irsch's 'a priori  in the narrow sense' (1986, 245): 'A truth is 
knowable a priori in the narrow sense if it is m etaphysically possible 
that we (human beings) should know this truth a priori, i.e., that we 
should know it purely on the basis of our understanding and 
reasoning.' This is so long as metaphysical possibility is interpreted as 
de re, notwithstanding Hirsch's own contrasting of the m etaphysically 
necessary with the contingent (1982, 228) and his description of 
m etaphysical necessity as concerning statements which hold 'in any 
counterfactual situation' (1982, 229). Given that any humanly useful a 
p r i o r i / a  pos ter ior i  d istinction  w ill involve re la tiv ity  to human 
cognitive  facu lties and that these faculties involve irreducib le  
m odality de re it seems that the empiricist will be ill-placed to retain 
the distinction while rejecting the modality. This opens up a path to 
the incoherence of the Humean em piricist's denial of m odality in 
nature. In addition, it illustrates Quine's fundamental insight that the 
theoretical apparatus of the orthodox empiricism of his day cannot be 
sanctioned by a pure empiricist epistemology.
36 The argument ju st given has affinities with M cFetridge’s argument 
for the indispensability  of logical m odalities: the form er will be 
bolstered by consideration of the latter in the next section. Schlick 
denied that a priori  propositions are factual and described them  
[1932a](1979, 170) as expressions which have nothing to say, they 
bring no knowledge'. In so doing, however, he did not express non- 
cognitivism, since he regarded the classifications a priori  and analytic 
as applicable to true propositions: e.g., [1932a](1979, 162-163). 
Rather, in describing the a priori as non-factual, he means to suggest 
that no a priori  proposition says anything about the world as studied 
by natural science and that a priori  propositions, which he m istakenly 
takes always to be obviously true, are uninformative: i.e., that they do 
not bring  knowledge does not entail that they are not known.
i
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reasoning practice they are unessential to the  practice of reasoning 
from  suppositions, unless the de dicto is a species of the de re. 
Nevertheless, with respect to the de re modal notions, the argument is 
in tended  to fu rn ish  an ep istem ology , not to e stab lish  the ir 
in d isp en sab ility .
If the above argument holds — and I will support it further in the next 
section— then it lessens the impact of (particularly Quinean) empiricist 
sensibilities where the m odalities are concerned. U nlike M cGinn's 
comments on modal epistemology, the dialectic of the argum ent is 
that much of the tension that there m ight be is, fundam entally, 
between logic and epistemology, not metaphysics and epistem ology. 
The argum ent suggests that the requirem ents of our deductive 
practice have priority over an epistemology dom inated by hard-edged
empiricism . (Since we need the m odalities and knowledge of modal
I
notions is a priori,  a philosophy which outlaws the a priori must be 
deem ed  u n sa tis fa c to ry .)  N ev erth e le ss , the a rg u m en t has a
m etaphysical pay-off in that it helps to establish the epistem ological 
respectability  of modal attributions de re, thereby dim inishing the 
force of some standard objections to such modality.3?
------------------------------------------
37 Empiricists have tended to be less than careful about distinguishing 
between the logico-grammatical respectability of modal attribution d e  
re and the acceptability of the metaphysics of essentialism . Although 
the main Quinean objection to the former is in terms of its purported 
lack  of in te llig ib ility , its source m ight still be said to be 
epistem ological, even to the extent of such talk  of a lack of
intelligibility being viewed as rather disingenuous. The em piricist is 
com m itted to the view that the natural realm  and the realm  of
necessity are entirely detached. For the em piricist, as for W iggins's 
anti-realist conceptualist, there are no modalities in nature. W hatever 
else this is, it is a m etaphysical thesis. It is adhered to by the 
em piricist because the em piricist cannot see how its denial can be 
reconciled with the empiricist's epistemology. It seems to me that it is 
this epistem ologically-m otivated metaphysical thesis which is at the 
heart of empiricist denials of the intelligibility of modal attribution d e  
re. I think that the plausibility of my claim is strengthened by the 
em piricist's customary failure to make the distinction m entioned at 
the start of this note. (In a departure from  trad ition , the self-
proclaim ed 'neo-em piricist' Sidelle (1989, 73-74 and p a s s im )  makes 
the distinction and his whole account requires it, since he seeks to 
show that the empiricist can feast at the table of modal attribution d e  
re without rejecting the thesis that there are no modalities in nature.)
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Examples such as (a) hold of necessity. Although they concern de re 
m odalities they are necessarily true. Knowledge of modal axioms is 
purely a priori. Substantive de re modal knowledge, in contrast, is not 
purely a p r i o r i Substantive de re modal knowledge comes about by 
inference from  axioms concerning de re modal notions, such as (a), 
and empirical p r e m i s s e s . 39 As McGinn suggests, the factual content of 
theories em ploying de re m odalities outstrips that of (putatively) 
unm odalized theories, whilst the theories them selves are em pirically 
equivalent. This presents no metaphysical or epistem ological problem 
unless there are unsettled questions about the possibility of a priori  
knowledge which are sufficiently serious to underm ine our practice: 
this is very unlikely to occur, for the following reason. The proponents 
of any epistemological worries which may be raised in this regaid will 
them selves require to employ the very princip les central to our 
practice upon which they cast sceptical aspersions. The practice of 
philosophizing rests upon the ability to reason, so philosophers cannot 
intelligibly ask questions about our practice of reasoning from outwith 
that practice itself.40
There are differences in the modal statuses of possib ilities and 
necessities them selves, which ought to be reflec ted  in m odal 
epistem ology. These differences are im portant to m etaphysics, but 
tend to be overlooked both in discussions of the epistem ology of 
modality and in discussions of modal m etaphysics which rely upon 
the axioms of systems of modal logic in inappropriate contexts. The 
differences have a significant bearing on the epistem ological issues. 
Substantive de re possibility, unlike merely logical possibility, is an 
aspect o f actuality . Thus, although m etaphysical necessities and 
possibilities cannot be established merely on the basis of observation, 
our know ledge o f substan tive  m odality  de re is ev iden tia lly  
constrained. Where merely logical modalities are concerned evidential
3 8  As I em ploy the term  ’substantive’ I intend it to convey 
concreteness. Substantive m odalities de re are those which relate to 
the essences of concrete entities.
3 9  In commenting on Hegel’s notion of real possibility, Burbidge (1992, 
44) writes: 'Real possibilities are a c tu a l  conditions. Each one is an 
actuality as well as a possibility.' This conveys the idea that there are 
actual facts involving real possibilities. The m odal epistem ology I 
endorse captures this idea.
4 0  Cf. the in te rp re ta tio n  of W ittg e n s te in 's  ru le -fo llo w in g  
considerations adopted by Dancy (1985, 76-82 and esp. 210-211).
41 An example of a discussion which is not careful in this regard is
that of Bradley (1992, Chapters 4 and 5). He claims, for example, that
'we have many good and powerful reasons for holding that any  modal 
ascription, if true, is necessarily so' (1992, 183). This is despite his 
insistence (1992, 176) upon the non-equivalence of de re and de dicto 
m odal attributions.
42 There are de re/de dicto subtleties here: (i) If p  is actual (i.e. true) 
then it is logically possible that p\  (ii) If A xs then it is possible for A
to x; (iii) If A xs then it is logically possible that A xs. (i)-(iii) stem
from the general (unsubtle) principle that actuality implies possibility, 
although the result obtained in (ii) is quite different to that obtained 
in (i) and (iii).
43 I intend 'notional modal knowledge' to denote knowledge of modal 
concepts. Knowledge of modal concepts per se does not involve 
concrete entities, unlike substantive modal knowledge de re. If the d e  
d i c t o  is a subspecies of the de re, then there is a class of modal 
knowledge de re which is not substantive in the foregoing sense.
■|I
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constraints play no direct, fundamental or im portant epistem ological 
role. That which does not admit of a priori justification and is known a 
p o s t e r i o r i  is logically contingent. This points to the necessity for 
carefulness in the application of the axioms of formal systems such as 
the axiom of S5 that if it is possible that p  then it is necessary that it 
is possible that /?.4i Now, the empirical premiss that A xs, and the 
non-em pirical prem iss that actuality im plies possib ility ,42 produces 
the results that: (b) it is possible for A to x, and (c) it is possible that A 
xs. In accordance with the S5 axiom, it follows from (c) that: (d) 
necessarily, it is possible that A xs. The m odalities relevant to the 
axiom and to (c) and (d) are broadly logical possibility and necessity, 
not substantive de re possibility and necessity. Although knowledge 
that something is actual entails that some formulation relating to it is 
logically possible, actuality does not evidentially constrain the logical 
modalities, since the logical modalities are not objects of substantive 
m odal know ledge, but m erely of notional m odal know ledge.4 3 
Knowledge of those modalities is purely a priori,  and what merely 
happens to be true of actuality, i.e., that which is contingently true, 
does not have any direct, fundam ental or im portan t ev iden tia l 
relationship with logical possibility and necessity. Knowledge that (b) 
is related to the nature of actuality. In contrast, the circumstances of 
my example notwithstanding, since the possibility or necessity of a 
d ic tu m  requires no empirical warrant, and is fundam entally justified 
via a priori  means, (c) and (d) have purely a priori  status. Knowledge 
of (b) does not entail that (e) it is necessaiy that it is possible for A to
S
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x: this is where care has to be taken so as not to misapply the axiom. 
Knowledge of (b) does entail that there is nothing in the nature of A 
which precludes it from x-ing. Knowledge of (b) thus provides indirect 
knowledge of the essence of A . W here substantive possib ility  is 
concerned it is a contingent matter as to what possibilities there are: 
where merely logical possibility is concerned it is not a contingent 
m atter as to what possibilities there are.44 in view of the contingent 
status of substantive possibilities, the attempt to argue that no modal 
knowledge is subject to causal constraint fails. Nevertheless, even de  
re  modal knowledge fails to secure the status of being a species of 
knowledge which can be accounted for on a purely causal model of 
knowing. This is indicative of the poverty of such an epistemology, 
rather than the epistem ological profligacy of m odality .45 There are 
many varieties of knowledge which cannot be accounted for on a 
strictly causal model due to the non-spatial/non-tem poral nature of 
their subject m atter.46 A case central to this study is that of abilities, 
which, as Kenny (1989, 27-28, 72-73) indicates, are not spatially 
located, unlike the entities in which they inhere. (One cannot point to 
the key's ability to open the lock, although one can point to the 
vehicle of that ability.) Neither, of course, are abilities abstract objects: 
a broadly Aristotelian account of modality de re has the virtue that it 
does not, as Kenny again indicates (1989, 72), hypostatize possibility 
and necessity .47 The behaviour of an entity m anifests its abilities, 
although our recognition of those abilities is m ediated by a priori  
axioms and rules of inference rather than directly perceived. The
I
44 Contrast D.K. Lewis (1986, 111) who claims that 'what possibilities 
there  are' is a non-contingent m atter. C ontrary  to his claim ,
m etaphysical possibilities de re pertaining to concrete entities are not 
possibilities of a kind which can properly be qualified, in the manner 
of S5, by a sentential necessity operator. (Lewis does not state that his 
claim  concerns only logical modalities.)
45 Cf. Divers (1990, 160-164).
46 Aside from fam iliar examples such as m athem atical knowledge.
Divers (1990, 161-163) indicates that a purely causal epistem ology 
cannot even account for perceptual knowledge of secondary qualities.
4 7  It is noted by van Fraassen (1980, 3) that empiricists have always 
eschew ed the re ifica tion  of possib ility  (or its dual, necessity).
Possibility and necessity they relegate to relations among ideas, or
among words, as devices to facilitate the description of what is actual.’ 
Such an ti-rea list positions, however, have no m onopoly on the 
rejection of the reification of modality. Indeed, the realist primitivism  
I adopt is steadfastly opposed to such reification.
|,
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vehicle of an ability, unlike the ability itself, can often be recognized, 
although not necessarily qua  vehicle of the ability, in the absence of 
any such mediation. The identification of a particular physical aspect 
of a thing as the vehicle of a given ability is a m atter for empirical
science.48
Kripke has influentially  rejected the thesis, supported by logical 
positivists such as Ayer, that the necessary, the knowable a priori  and 
the a n a ly tic  are c o e x te n s iv e .  K ripke p ro te s te d  th a t the 
necessa ry /con tingen t d istinc tion , in con trast to the a priori /a  
p o s t e r io r i  distinction, is one of metaphysics, not of epistemology. I 
think this unfortunate, since the necessary /contingent con trast is
I
Im ore properly described as logical: m etaphysical necessity  is not logical necessity, and what is metaphysically necessary is — or at least 
is often— contingent.49 Knowledge of essence is not — or at least is not 
always— knowledge of logical modality. McGinn claims, after Kripke, 
that:
It is very plausible that, at least for the strict m odalities, 
knowledge of the modality of a given sentence is arrived 
at a priori.  This is pretty evident for sentences whose 
truth (as distinct from their necessity) is known a priori, 
but it also seems to hold for necessary a p os te r io r i  
sentences, e.g., statements of natural kind, com position, 
identity  and origin....w e come to know that a certain  
empirical statement is necessary by inference from a pair 
of prem isses: the first is the non-modal em pirical truth 
which we know by ordinary a posteriori  procedures; the 
second is a conditional, affirming that if the concept in 
question applies to a sequence of objects then it does so 
necessarily, where this conditional is known a priori  by 
reflection on the concept in question. M odus  p o n e n s  
delivers the modal conclusion. (1981, 157-158)
48 Cf. Kenny (1989, 74).
49 McGinn (1976, 195) follows Kripke in referring to 'concepts of 
m etaphysical m odality, viz.,  necessity and contingency'. I will argue 
for the distinction between logical and m etaphysical m odality in the 
next chapter: it is already suggested by the previous paragraph. I 
believe that Kiipke in fact accepts this distinction but that he is less 
than careful when it comes to observing the distinction, as 4.4 will 
suggest.
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Thus, M cG inn claim s tha t substan tive  m odal know ledge, i.e. 
knowledge pertaining to the natures of concrete entities, concerns the 
m odality possessed by sentences and that there are paradigm atically 
a poster ior i  necessary tru ths,5 0 But this cannot provide a viable 
epistemology for substantive modal knowledge, because it distorts the 
nature of the m odality involved. A substantive modal truth is not 
identical with any necessary truth. Substantive modal knowledge is 
not, contra Kiipke and McGinn, knowledge of the m odality of any 
linguistic or metalinguistic item.5i It is clear that the modalities do not 
function solely in the manner required by McGinn's account (i.e., as 
sentential operators); the modal term in (b) (it is possible for A to x) 
does not qualify (b), or any other (meta)linguistic item, at all.52  So, 
contrary to M cGinn’s suggestion, knowledge of substantive m odalities 
de re is not, and cannot be, knowledge of the modality of a sentence'. 
McGinn (1976, 204) has it that:
To claim that we have a posteriori knowledge of essence
might be to claim  e i th e r  that there are necessary truths 
whose t ru th  we know a posteriori  (there being no other 
way), or  that there are necessary truths whose n e c e s s i t y  
we know a posteriori.
In accordance with my account of substantive modal knowledge de re, 
M cGinn’s claim is false. Knowledge of metaphysical m odalities de re
pertinent to concrete entities accords with neither of the options
50 Cf. the account of Kiipke given by Gibbaid (1975, 187).
51 Cf. W iggins's criticism (1974) of Kiipke's m etalinguistic account of 
essence. The distinction between a necessarily true statem ent and a 
true statement of de re necessity em phasized by W iggins pervades 
my account o f m odality. The Kripke an error is perpetuated  by 
M cM ichael (1986) the whole dialectic of whose discussion rests upon 
construing essentialist necessity as attaching to propositions. W itness 
his m isrepresentation (1986, 37) of essentialism  thus: 'E ssentialists 
c la im  the necessity  of singular p ropositions th a t canno t be 
transform ed, by analysis, into logical truths.' Cf. Casullo's comment 
(1977, 154) that if there are essential properties then not all 
necessary propositions can be known a priori. I dispute the view that 
essen tia lism  underm ines the thesis that all (hum anly) know able 
necessary propositions are knowable a priori.
52 Cf. Chapters 3 and 4 on the de re!de dicto distinction and the form 
of essential attributions.
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mentioned by McGinn. McGinn (1976, 204) claims that:
I
The ambiguity can be removed by attending to matters of 
scope: the true statement 'we can know a posteriori  of a 
necessary truth that it is true' is different from  and does 
not imply the (I think) false statement 'we can know a 
pos te r io r i  of a necessary truth that it is a n e ce ssa ry  truth'.
In fact, McGinn has not shown there to be a n y  genuine species of 
necessary truth of paradigmatically a posteriori status.
According to the official logical positivist view, the world and the 
rea lm  of necessity  are detached. N ecessity  is iden tified  w ith 
analyticity and only the analytic is held to be knowable a priori. 
Kripke (1980, 38) points out, quite rightly, that '"necessary" and "a 
priori".. .as  applied to statements, are not  obvious synonym s’ and he 
argues, against the logical positivist position, that the terms are not 
even co-extensive. The conclusion that the terms are not co-extensive, 
even when restricted to statements, is correct. However, the examples 
of a posteriori  necessities which are provided by Kripke do not 
constitute genuine examples of necessary s ta t e m e n t s  at all. I admit 
that there are genuine a posteriori  necessities, but I deny that they 
give rise to necessary a posteriori  statements. II
I
:.A
K ripke's account of the epistem ology of (purportedly) essentia list 
claims is illustrated by the following example. We know empirically 
that a table before us is made of wood. We know, by reflection, that 
this table cannot be made of ice. Kripke's account is accurately 
depicted as f o l l o w s . 53 Where p  states that this table is wooden, and q 
that it is not made of ice, we know empirically that p\  we know extra­
empiric ally that if p  then necessarily q; we know by modus ponens  
that necessarily ^.54 Let us grant that knowledge of a necessity is 
illustrated by the Kiipkean example. The knowledge of that necessity 
is held to be a posteriori  since it is derived, via an a priori  conditional, 
from an empirical, and thereby a posteriori, prem iss. The argum ent 
allows and, as it stands, requires that substantive empirical fact bears 
upon the epistem ology and m etaphysics of necessary  truth. My
53 After Dancy (1985, 219-220), who employs the logical necessity 
operator in his exposition of Kiipke's view.
54 Cf. McGinn (1981, 157-158), quoted above.
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premisses (1) and (5) above allow for de dicto necessities of purely a 
pr ior i  status concerning de re modal notions. This provides a means of 
securing an alternative to the Kripkean argum ent. A lthough truths 
concerning de re modal notions hold of necessity, inferences in which 
such a truth and an empirical truth feature do not result in necessary 
truths. Exam ples such as the prem iss that if w ater has a certain 
chem ical form ula it has that form ula necessarily may thereby be 
disambiguated such that if water is H 2 O then it is necessary for water 
to be H 2 O, but it is not necessarily true that water is H 2 O (i.e. the 
statement that water is H 2 O is not possessive of truth in all logically 
possible w o r l d s ) . 5 5  On the account just offered the contingency of that 
which is established  by m ethods which essen tia lly  include the 
empirical is not s a c r i f i c e d . 5 6  The Kripkean rejection of the thesis that 
the necessity that p  (and p 's  being know able) en tails that p  is 
knowable a priori is i l l - f o u n d e d . 5  7
When we know, on the basis of empirical premiss, a priori  prem iss 
and inference, that it is possible for a thing to participate in an event 
of a given kind we have indirect knowledge of its nature: we know 
that there is nothing in the nature of the thing which rules out such 
possibility. How do we tell when, or whether, it is necessary for a 
thing to initiate a paiticular type of event, or to react in a certain way 
upon the exercise of some external influence? The distinction between
55 Cf. Chapter 4, on the de dicto status of logical possibility. In fact, I 
do not hold that the major premiss mentioned constitutes a necessary 
a priori  truth: see below.
56 Contrast: McGinn's view, quoted above; Kripke (1980, 159, cf. 40) 
w here he conflates the essen tia l/acc iden tal d is tin c tio n  and the 
necessary/contingent distinction. Like Kripke and M cGinn, H irsch 
(1982, 228-229) construes m etaphysical necessity  as qualify ing  
statem ents. In addition, he contrasts m etaphysical necessity with 'a 
priori contingency'.
57 McGinn (1976, 203-204) claims that the thesis is false since 'cases 
of de re necessity —necessity of identity, of constitution, of kind, of 
origin, etc .—  seem counterexamples to it; none of these necessities 
could be known a priori'. My claim is that standard cases of de re 
necessity do not constitute counterexamples to the thesis at all, since 
they are not necessary truths. McGinn (1976, 205) claims that 'a priori  
ev idence is constan t across w orlds, because availab le  w ithout 
observation of the specific properties of each world'. Likewise, but 
contrary to his account, knowledge of necessary truths is a priori  and 
available without observation of the specific properties of any world.
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those sorts of change through which an entity endures and those
which constitute its destruction will bear upon such questions.5 8  
M etaphysical necessities de re relate to (at least) the non-deontic
requirem ents of entities. It is plausible to suggest that we have 
defeasible knowledge of such requirements. We know, I suggest, that 
human beings (as distinct from persons) cannot survive decapitation. 
This is perhaps révisable, but in this and sim ilar cases, non-modal 
know ledge  (th a t hum an beings never su rv ive  d eca p ita tio n ) 
constitu tes defeasib le  grounds for the m odal claim  (tha t they
c a n n o t) .59 (Compare the case of our knowledge that animals need 
food.) We m ight regard the conditional that if a thing is a fully
developed human being then it is necessary for that thing to have a 
head as having the form  of necessity-involving counterparts of 
possibility-involving examples such as (a). However, there is a crucial 
difference between the two cases. The possibility conditional (a) is 
necessarily true: the necessity conditional, if true, is so contingently.
In my view, examples commonly provided as a priori m odal major 
premisses for use in arguments to substantive modal knowledge de re 
are neither a priori  nor necessary truths. For example, I deny that the 
claims that the material composition of a material object at the time of 
origin is essential to the object^o and that 'whatever the origins of any 
given human individual, they are essential to that individual'6 i are 
necessary a priori. Neither of these claims seems to me to be true in 
virtue of the notions it involves. So, I hold that i f  these claims hold 
they are them selves dependent upon em pirical tru ths and more 
fundamental truths of a purely conceptual nature . 6  2
58 See 3.3 on the metaphysics of essence and change.
59 Cf. Shalkowski (1996, 387): The world sometimes confirm s...our
m odal hypotheses.'
60 Kiipke (1980, 114 nt. 56). After Salmon (1979), Kripke (1980, 1) 
expresses doubt about his original claims about this claim.
61 Peacocke (1997, 530), after Kripke (1980).
62 For example, (j) below. For the record, I regard the principle of the
essentiality of m aterial origin as implausible because I do not think 
that the 'hunk of matter' from which a m aterial object is originally 
composed is of its nature (i.e. explanatory with respect to its abilities). 
I grant that, as a matter of a priori  necessity, it is of the essence of 
m aterial objects to be materially constituted. I do not agree with the 
thesis that, for any material object, the matter of which it is actually 
composed at time of origin is of its essence. Cf. Anscombe (1953, esp. 
93), which entails the rejection of the principle of the essentiality of
7 1
It is fairly easy to come up with non-controversial a priori  truths 
involving the notion of de re possibility. In contrast, many commonly
provided de re necessity-involving major premisses held to feature in
argum ents to substantive modal knowledge de re do not seem to me 
to be a priori  necessities and it is not so easy to furnish non- 
controversial examples which merit that status. The notion of identity 
furnishes a truth which does, I believe, merit such status, although I 
do not claim  that the relevant truth is non-controversial.
It is often held that there are no contingent identities. This position is 
defended by Ruth Bare an Marcus [I961](1993, 9), who holds that if x 
and y  are identical then it is logically necessary that x and y are 
identical. (The form al version of this claim  is a theorem  of her 
extended m odal system  QS4.) Marcus (1993, 9) claim s that the
conjunction of the assertion of the holding of an identity relation and 
the assertion of the logical possibility of its negation constitutes a 
contradiction. She includes identities involving concrete entities when 
she claims (1993, 1 2 ) that to say truly of an identity (in the strongest 
sense of the word) that it is true, it must be tautologically true or 
analy tically  tru e '.63 The view that there are no contingent identities 
has unfortunate consequences which are indicative of its untenability. 
One such consequence is that it results in identity relations involving 
concrete entities, accurately described by M arcus (1993, 2 0 2 ) as
'm etaphysical', being (purportedly) accounted for in terms which are 
de dicto rather than de re. In addition, it would seem that the view is
entirely unequipped to cope with the platitude that concrete entities
are contingent existents. Necessary truths do not depend for their 
truth upon that which just happens to exist in the actual world and, 
contra Kripke, the case of true essentialist attributions concerning 
concreta does not constitute a counterexample to the thesis that all
m aterial origin.
63 Marcus (1993, 10) comments that, where T stands for the identity 
relation, 'aIZ?...doesn't say that a and b are two things that happen,
through some accident, to be one'. Her claim is correct. However, the
non-accidental nature of a relation does not, contra Marcus, secure the 
logical necessity of the claim in which it is expressed. We see here the 
im portance of the under-appreciated distinction between accident and 
contingency. Although an identity relation involving a concrete object 
is no accident with respect to the object, the formulation in which it is 
expressed is no logical necessity.
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necessary truths are purely a priori.
U nlike M arcus, Kripke does not identify concrete identities with 
tautologies and analytic truths since he regards the latter, unlike the 
form er, as necessary a priori  (1980, 39). N evertheless, despite his 
adm onition that we 'in terpret necessity here w eakly' [1971](1977, 
6 8 ), his account has it that true identity statements in which objects 
are designated  by proper names are necessary  tru th s , a lbe it 
discoverable a p o s t e r i o r i . Kripke (1977, 67) depicts the necessity in 
(as opposed to the necessary truth of) the thesis that 'every object...is 
necessarily self-identical’ thus: (x)O(x =x).
This characterization of the necessity of the identity relation falls prey 
to some of the same criticisms as the account of particular concrete 
identities provided by Marcus. Identity is a relation of an object to 
itself65  so, where concreta are concerned, it cannot be accurately 
represented via the use of the sentential necessity operator . 6 6  There 
are necessary truths about the notions of identity and m etaphysical 
necessity de re, but many identity relations hold contingently. It may 
well be a necessary truth, true in virtue of the very concept o b j e c t  
that it is necessary f o r  every object to be identical with itself, but this 
does not even assert the existence of objects: thus, it does not assert 
their necessary existence. Nor does it m isrepresent the em bedded 
necessity as de dicto or logical. Thus, the statement that Hesperus is 
identical to Phosphorus is such that, if true, it sanctions a true
64 Kripke (1980, 98) holds that descriptions can be used to make 
contingent identity statem ents'.
65 Cf. Grossmann (1983, 170-172).
6 6  This criticism  applies equally to Kiipke's representation (1977, 69, 
67) of the thesis that 'for every object x  and object  y, if x  and y are 
the same object, then it is necessary that x  and y are the same object' 
as (x)(y)(x=y ) = ) 0  (x=y). Kiipke claims that this thesis is about objects, 
not statements. Rather, the thesis that where an identity holds it holds 
of m etaphysical necessity is a truth about the very notion of identity. 
The em bedded notion of necessity is indeed of the kind which 
concerns objects: it has to be rendered de re. That objective is 
achieved neither by the informal employment of a that-clauso  — a 
classic symptom of oratio obliqua— nor by the use of a sentential 
necessity operator. For a truly de re version of the thesis see the main 
text below. Like Kiipke, Davies and Humberstone (1980, 10; cf. Davies, 
1981, 241) take it that all 'true identity statem ents using proper 
names' are necessary truths.
-W iggins's argument secures the truth of the following:
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sta tem ent of necessity  de re, not, contra K ripke (1977, 89), a
necessary truth. The Bare an M arcus account cannot cope with the
aforementioned platitude. According to Kripke (1977, 6 8 ), a statement 
is weakly necessary 'if whenever the objects mentioned therein exist, 
the statement [is] true'. The Kripkean might claim  to cope with the 
platitude in view of the fact that weak necessity is hypothetical, not 
categorical. This, however, effects the abandonment of the thesis that
there are non-contingent identities concerning concrete objects.
A nother account of the m odality involved in iden tity  rela tions 
actively avoids both of the unfortunate consequences ju st associated 
with its rival.^7 Wiggins gives a de re adaptation of the Barcan proof 
of the necessity of identity (using a lambda abstraction operator and 
NEC as a de re necessity operator, in contrast to the logical necessity 
box em ployed in the o r i g i n a l ) . ^ 8  C rucially , W igg ins 's  account 
incorporates the distinction between 'a necessarily  true statem ent' 
and 'a true statement of de re necessity’ (1980, 110, cf. 214).<^9 There 
is some ambiguity in W iggins's account as to whether it is the de re 
necessity  of particu lar iden tities which is not put forw ard as 
necessarily true, or whether it is the general statem ent that for all % 
and all y, if x is identical to y  then it is necessary for x  to be identical 
to y. In point of necessity Wiggins does not seem to disambiguate the 
two claim s. Nevertheless, the latter makes no assertions concerning 
the existence of particular objects, is shown to be true by means of 
proof (i.e., is a priori), and is a true statement about the notions of 
iden tity  and necessity  de re. A ccordingly, it does constitu te  a 
necessary truth, although the necessity it em beds is not of that 
c h arac te r.
Îi
67 Cf. Wiggins (1976, 301-303; 1980, 214).
6 8  W iggins (1976; 1980, 109-111, 214-215). W iggins rails against the 
contingency theorist'. This terminology is rather m isleading, since the 
opponent of tha t th eo ris t holds that id en tity  sta tem ents are 
expressive of necessity but need not hold that they are logically 
necessary. Stalnaker (1986, 137, 139 nt. 37) erroneously attributes 
the view that if x=y  it is necessary that x ~ y  to W iggins. The thesis 
defended by W iggins is an a l te rn a t i v e  to that attributed to him by 
S ta lnaker.
69 Cf. Mondadori (1995, 233) on the distinction.
74
if X is identical to y, then it is metaphysically necessary for
X to be identical to y.
Particu lar identity  relations involving concrete objects cannot be 
explicated in terms of necessary truths. The denial, adhered to by 
M arcus and Kripke, of the contingent status of particular identities 
rests upon a failure to delineate truths in which the notion of identity 
is used from truths about that very notion. (The very expression 'the 
necessity of identity' is apt to foster this confusion due to its inherent 
am bigu ity .) W iggins's account allow s for log ica lly  con tingen t 
m etaphysical necessities and respects the purely a priori  character of 
necessary truths. It thereby undercuts Kripkean tenets concerning 
necessary a posteriori  truth, while allowing the strengthening of the 
general approach to m odal epistem ology adopted by K ripke by 
expunging from it a serious error.7 0
It is a necessary a priori  truth that (i) for all x  and all y , if % is 
identical to y then it is metaphysically necessary for x  to be identical 
to y .7 l This is consistent, however, with the tenet that identity  
relations concerning concrete objects hold as a m atter of l o g i c a l  
c o n t in g e n c y ,  albeit m etaphysical necessity de re. (i) is a truth about 
the notion of identity. Particular identity relations involving concreta 
are seen to constitu te  m etaphysical necessities de re (co n trast 
necessary truths) via inference from (i) and the em pirical premiss of 
the existence or, in Hesperus/Phosphorus-type cases, the identity, of 
the objects in question. So, (i) is an example of a de re necessity- 
involving counterpart of de re possibility-involving prem isses such as
70 The idea that we can arrive at a posteriori  modal truth, via m o d u s  
p o n e n s ,  from modal premisses and empirical, non-modal premisses is 
retained. Kripke's unfortunate view (1980, 159) that 'cases of the 
necessary  a posteriori...Qdinnoi be contingently true’ and 'have the 
same special character attributed  to m athem atical sta tem ents ' is 
avo ided .
71 I am under no illusion that this is a non-controversial claim. I reject 
the view, e.g., of Gibbard (1975), that there are particular identities 
which are in no sense necessary. Gibbard's view rests upon the claim 
that if  a statue and a lump of clay share all their non-m odal 
properties they are non-necessarily identical. Since I hold, unlike 
G ibbard (1975, 201-206), that m etaphysical necessity  de re is 
typically extensional in nature, I deny Gibbard's claim: if x  and y 
differ in terms of what is possible for them, then they are necessarily 
non -iden tica l.
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(a). Compare also the following principle: (f) if it is m etaphysically 
necessary  for A s to x  and this is an A , then this xs .  This is a 
consequence of the general modal principle that necessity  im plies 
actuality . There is no difference in po in t of m odal status or 
epistem ology between (i), (f) and (a): they are a priori  necessary  
truths. U nderstanding the notions with which they are concerned 
secures knowledge of their truth.
The fact that observation of a thing's actual behaviour yields, via (a) 
and modus ponens ,  indirect knowledge of its nature, since what is 
poss ib le  f o r  a thing can only be that which its nature does not 
preclude, suggests the following principle:
(j) Necessarily, that which is necessary for a thing's having 
all its fundam ental capacities (including its capacity to 
acquire whatever abilities it can acquire, regardless of 
whether it actually has them, but excluding its existence) 
is of the essence of the thing.
I propose (j) as an addition to the inventory of de re m odal-no tional 
truths fit to be regarded as instances of fundam ental modal m ajor 
prem isses in m odus  p o n e n s  argum ents to substan tive  m odal 
know ledge de re: i.e., I propose that it is necessary a priori.  The 
vehicle of an ability' is characterized by Kenny (1989, 72) as 'the 
physical ingredient or structure in virtue of which the possessor of an 
ability possesses the ability and is able to exercise it', (j) is intended to 
capture the idea that the fundamental vehicle of a thing's abilities is 
of the essence of the thing. (My being a human being is necessary for 
my possession of the totality of capacities and abilities I possess.) This 
is at one with the Aristotelian conception of essence as e x p l a n a t o r y . 7 2
The threat of anti-realist conceptualism —the idea that modality is all 
in the mind— arises with the ascription of a priori status to specifically 
modal content. Sidelle advances a broadly Kripkean epistemology for 
the necessary a posteriori  which he sees as lending support to a 
conventionalist anti-realism  about essence and m odality de re. His 
epistemology is of the standard modus ponens  form. He has it that all 
necessities ultimately owe their necessity to some analytic necessity.
72 Exegesis is provided by Kung (1977, esp. 368-372).
76
Sidelle claim s that 'our m ethods of know ledge for ascertain ing  
knowledge of necessity are not methods for learning about the world' 
(1989, 93). However, as Yablo (1992) indicates, the epistem ology 
advanced by Sidelle does not entail an anti-realist m e t a p h y s i c  of 
essence and modality de re. Furthermore, Sidelle's claim  rests upon 
confusing our comprehension of the notion of de re necessity with our 
recogn ition  of particu lar necessities. A dem onstra tion  tha t our 
knowledge of the concept of necessity is not a method 'for learning 
about the world' does not show that our practice of applying that 
concept is no such method. Sidelle's epistem ology would certainly 
count against the anti-conceptualist realist about modality, but it does 
not, contrary to Sidelle's supposition, undercut realism  tout court.  
(This is all the more evident from the implausibility of the thesis that 
the truth of a priori  necessities such as (a), (f) and (i) above is secured 
m erely by convention.73) This point illustrates a general weakness in 
Sidelle's account, to which I will return in Chapter 3, namely its 
id en tific a tio n  of rea lism  w ith an ti-co n c ep tu a lis t rea lism  and 
conceptualism  with conventionalism.
I hope to have alleviated som ewhat the epistem ological w orries 
associated with modality, especially those associated with modality de  
re. To reiterate: principles of the forms exhibited by examples such as 
(a) and (f) aie true a priori. They are de dicto necessities concerning 
de re modal notions. The status of (f) as an a priori  necessary truth 
tells us nothing about the epistem ology of it is m etaphysically  
necessary for A s to x \  Whether or not it is necessary for A s to x will 
depend upon the essence of things of kind A . When A s are concreta, 
neither our knowledge of necessary truths nor a priori  reflection will 
supply us with an answer to the question as to the essence of As: the 
empirical is essentially implicated in our arrival at the right answer to 
that question. Our knowledge of what is always the case concerning 
A s supplies us with defeasible grounds for having certain beliefs 
concerning the nature of A s. There may be characteristic marks or
73 To appropriate Forbes (1997, 530), it is unsatisfactory to suppose 
that these truths are manufactured by stipulations....To the extent that 
one finds the principles plausible, they seem forced on us by the 
nature of our concepts.' Cf. the metasemantic account of the a priori  
proposed by Peacocke (1993), according to which a priori  principles 
constitute possession conditions for our concepts, rather than m e r e  
tru ths in virtue of linguistic m eaning' after the fashion of the 
Carnapian account of analyticity.
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behaviours we associate with things of kind A  and which figure in our 
individuative practice concerning As. If a thing displays these then we 
have defeasible grounds for regarding it as an A. In the next chapter I 
will suggest, on the basis of Wiggins (1980), that reality is modal in 
nature since it is such that it can be subsumed under the substance 
concepts we employ: it is reciprocally related with our conceptual 
apparatus. We discover which of our purported substance concepts
are satisfied by reality: this entails that we have knowledge of real
necessity . Furtherm ore, I w ill argue that an ti-rea lis t positions 
concerning necessity, essence and individuation are comm itted to an 
untenable and epistem ologically bankrupt m etaphysic.
2.3 A Defence of Modal Primitivism
The Untenabilitv of Modal Eliminativism
The im possibility of elim inativism  can be established by illustrating 
that modal discourse not only characterizes our thought and practice, 
but that it is indispensable. Also, quite apart from  any particularly 
so p h istica ted  ph ilo soph ical ob jections to m odal e lim in a tiv ism , 
aspersions can be cast upon the position by pointing to its own p r i m a  
f a c i e  internal inconsistency: the eliminative programme is apparently 
im bued with reliance upon possib ility .7 4 The advocation of the
elim ination of modal idioms presupposes that we could so elim inate 
them: the statem ent of the position is dependent upon som ething 
which it seeks to discredit since the advocacy of elim ination implies
its p o s s i b i l i t y Also, the appeal to possibility perm eates that which
74 Quine, like other empiricists hostile to m odality, is more prone to 
make use of the notion of possibility than that of necessity. Although 
Quine has it that modal attribution de re is unintelligible, his charge 
against m odality de dicto must be that there are no necessary truths 
rather than that the very notions of possibility and necessity are 
unintelligible: cf. Hale (1997, 487). Quine's claims about revisability 
seem to be double-edged. He seems committed to the de dicto claim  
that every statement is révisable, as well as the de re claim that it is 
possible for us to have experience, relevant to any given statement, to 
engender the negation of that statement.
75 To prescribe a course of action is to presuppose that it is p o s s i b l e  
fo r  us to follow the course in question. So, in this respect, the Quinean 
program m e rests upon modal attribution de re. In so far as Quine’s 
critique, in 'Two Dogmas', is directed at the logical modalities this is 
relatively unproblematic. In relation to his critique of modality de re, 
however, it is problematic. If Quine regards his own philosophy as
I
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m otivates the elim inative programme, since its foundational prem iss 
relates to the ever-present possibility of recalcitrant experience. It is 
because all statem ents are held to be r e v i s a i n  the light of 
recalcitrant experience that Quine attacks the a priori, analyticity and 
necessity : the Quinean attack is itse lf rooted in m odality . The 
om nipresent possib ility  of recalcitrant experience entails that it is 
im possible that any statement is immune from the effects of such 
experience. It thus en tails that the poss ib ility  of reca lc itran t 
experience holds as a matter of necessity. The elim inative programme 
is itself reliant upon the modalities it seeks to jettison.
The Quinean faces something of a catch-22. On the one hand there is 
the issue ju st discussed, relating to the Quinean revisionist's reliance 
upon the ever-present possibility of recalcitrant experience. On the 
other, there is an issue about how, if at all, the Quinean programme 
can retain any prescriptive element if all statem ents are révisable.
M odal elim inativism  undercuts itself if the prescription that modal 
discourse be jettisoned cannot have any clout without appeal to the 
class of judgments it seeks to banish.
The charge that a Quinean attitude to the logical modalities collapses 
goes back at least as far as Pap's discussion. According to Pap (1958, 
372), the Quinean pragm atist's account of 'logical truths' as those 
which we are least likely to forsake in the face of recalc itran t
experience, but which are answerable to such experience nonetheless, 
fails to explain why it is that those truths enjoy such privileged status 
in the first place. Pap comments that the abandonment of logical and 
m athematical principles would itself be answerable to the demands of
prim itive science, then it is consistent for him  to employ talk of 
natural necessity and possibility therein. Such m odality is perm itted 
by Quine, e.g, (1966, 48-56; 1969, 130-138) solely because it is
required  by dispositional attributions, which are a hallm ark of 
prim itive science. When science moves from the dispositional to the 
categorical the need for such attributions is held to wither away. In 
the case of the revisability of all statements, it is not clear that
dispositional attribution is at all pertinent. Quine is at liberty to help
him self to a notion of primitive-scientific possibility but it seems that
revisability  cannot be accounted for in terms of that notion, since 
Quine's stance is that total science is continually, and will ever be, 
subject to the tribunal of (possibly recalcitrant) experience. It thus
appears that Quine's philosophy is itself inconsistent with canonical
science, in which the modalities have no role.
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logical necessity, since even Quine (1980, 42) has it that revisions 
m ust be consistent.
W right provides a critique which, although independent of Pap's 
d iscussion , puts flesh on the bones of the charge that global 
em piricism  is incoherent. W right (1986, 192 194; cf. 1980, 322-323, 
327-330, 415-420) argues that the assessm ent of an experience as 
reca lc itran t w ill require the a priori,  thus rendering  Q uinean
pragm atism  incoherent. W right argues that in order to be adjudged 
recalcitrant, a barrage of experience, E'  (1986, 192) will be at odds 
with a theory 0 and its underlying logic L , to the effect that the 
experience would conflict with a conditional /  -> F  which is derivable 
from 0 via L. That is to say, E  will be such that it inclines us to assent
both to I  and to the negation of P ' (1986, 192). If  there can be no
resort to the a priori  then there would appear to be nothing to 
prevent us from denying that the experience is recalcitrant: unless the 
judgm ent that it is recalcitrant is really correct on a priori  grounds 
there is no way in which any experience can be so adjudged. This is 
because the judgm ent that E  is recalcitrant is dependent upon the
sta tem en t W , that I  P is derivable from 0 via L . W  itself is 
established via proof that I P  follows from 6 via L. (W right (1986,
193) notes that this proof is independent of any endorsem ent of the
principles of L .) W right comments that the very description of E  as 
recalcitrant for 0 -w ith -F  presupposes acceptance of a statement which 
is established by proof, which is analytic if any statements are, and
which is independent of V  (1986, 193). The problem for Quine is that
if, as he maintains, all judgments are révisable, then this will apply to 
W . The global empiricist is in no position to rule out the option of 
d e n y in g  that E  is recalcitrant, via a denial of W . W hether or not this 
move could be positively sanctioned will rest upon further pragmatic 
considerations. The problem is that judgments about recalcitrance will 
always rest upon statements similar to W which are themselves to be 
adjudged in the light of their own pragmatic acceptability (in which 
judgm ents about recalcitrance will them selves figure). The Quinean 
can only designate an experience as recalcitrant on the basis of a W- 
like statement which is itself révisable and in respect of which we are 
left with no justificatory guidelines: in fact we are left with no means 
of assessment for recalcitrance. The revisionism to which the Quinean 
is com m itted is seen to resu lt in a regress. If  judgm ents of 
recalcitrance are to have any support and any bearing they m ust be
Jf
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treated as non-revisable; otherwise the regress will ensue.
M cFetridge (1990, 149) notes that W right appears to move from  his
initial conclusion that at least some statements such as W  should be 
taken to admit of proof —where proof is construed 'as a theoretically 
uncontaminated source of rational be lief, W right (1986, 194)— to the 
suggestion that some statements are logically necessary. In effect, 
M cFetridge accuses W right of conflating the modal and the epistemic, 
charging that while W right is successful in arguing that there is a 
requ irem ent for exem pting some statem ents from  the class of
révisable statements it does not follow that necessity pertains to these 
s ta tem en ts :
nothing in the anti-Quinean argument showed any need 
for the statements [e.g. W] established by these 'proofs' to 
be regarded as n e c e s s a r i l y  true: m erely  true, and
conclusively established in a way neither requiring nor
vulnerable to holistic appraisal. But this feature seemed 
not to add up to a notion of necessity. (1990, 149)
M cF etridge  em phasizes, like K ripke (1980, 34-39), th a t the
epistem ological classification of statem ents is d istinc t from  their 
classification according to modal status. M cFetridge comments that 
W right's move from the epistemic to the modal in the concluding 
steps of his anti-Q uinean argum ent stems from  W right's own 
tendency to favour a non-cognitivist account of logical necessity 
(associated with W ittgenstein) according to which the use of the 
notion of logical necessity in relation to a statement is an indication of 
our reluctance to treat that statement as refutable. In M cFetridge's 
view (1990, 150), the trouble with this conception of our operations in 
respect of logical necessity is that it allows no room for statements 
which we may regard as i f  true then necessarily true nor does it leave 
much room, if any, for distinguishing between dogm atic acceptance 
and classification as logically n e c e s s a r y . 76 M cFetridge's discussion
7 6  On the assum ption that the first criticism  is predicated upon 
Kripkean considerations concerning necessary a posteriori  truths it is 
one with which I cannot agree, given my criticism  of that aspect of 
Kripkean modal epistemology. However, it may well be that it is the 
case of examples such as Goldbach's conjecture which m otivate the 
criticism, in which case I have no quibble.
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suggests that there is a gap in W right's account. If a non-cognitivist 
account of necessity is accepted, then W right's argument succeeds in 
establishing that there are logically necessary statem ents. However, 
since such an account is at least dubious the anti-Quinean argument is 
successful in establishing only the weaker conclusion that some 
statements must be exempted from holistic appraisal.
The anti-Q uinean argum ent expounded by M cFetridge (1990, 153- 
154) argues directly for the indispensability of logical necessity, 
thereby undermining the cogency of the Quinean project, rather than 
proceeding by means of an initial argument for the incoherence of the 
Quinean position. McFetridge prepares the ground for his argument by 
emphasizing the detachment of the notion of validity from that of the 
truth of the constituents of an argument, stating that the notion of 
validity we employ is such that a mode of inference is valid (i.e., 
logically necessarily truth-preserving) or invalid irrespective of the 
specific content of the prem isses of any argum ent in which it is 
m anifested. Thereby, principles of inference can be im plem ented 
which have an extent such that they are applicable to any and all of 
the suppositions we might make. This notion of validity as logically 
necessary  tru th -p reservation  is ind ispensable to reasoning  from  
suppositions, so logical necessity is needed. This conclusion is 
established as follows.
To reject logical necessity would be to suppose that for every 
acceptable mode of inference M  there is at least one proposition r 
such that r would fall outwith the range of appropriate applicability of 
M , thereby precluding M  and the supposition that r from employm ent 
in one and the same argum ent. If it is know n under which 
suppositions r it will be that M  is illegitim ate then the position 
depicted in the previous sentence is self-refuting, since it will then be 
the case that the mode of inference M  conjoined with not-r will be 
app licab le  under all suppositions. M cFetridge (1990, 153-154)
suggests that there is no supposition such that it falls outwith the 
range of applicability of the modified mode of inference that 'M can 
be applied under the supposition that not-r'. If, on the other hand, it 
is not known which proposition the supposition of which would 
exclude the applicability of M  to any argum ent in which such a 
supposition were to feature, but there is believed to be some such 
proposition, then M  would be inapplicable. In order to employ M  it is .1
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necessary to know whether, for any supposition that p  which might 
feature in an M  -relevant argum ent, the truth of that proposition 
w ould underm ine the tru th-preserv ing  capab ility  of M . In the 
situation outlined this would not be known, thereby rendering the 
m ode of inference inapplicable. There would be no m eans of 
determ ining the tenability of M  with a supposition that p  since the 
rules of inference embodied in M  could not be employed subsequent 
to the supposition that p ,  since those very rules themselves would be 
under scrutiny.
So, if r is known then the rejection of logical necessity is self-refuting; 
if r is unknown then no reasoning from suppositions can occur, since 
modes of inference are inapplicable in such a circumstance. The notion 
of logical necessity is indispensable to reasoning from suppositions. 
Since the practice of reasoning from  suppositions is not up for 
elimination, we must not jettison logical necessity.
M cFetridge's argum ent illustrates that there m ust be at least one 
logical necessity if the general  practice of reasoning from suppositions 
is to be preserved. My argum ent in the previous section set out 
specific  m odal p rincip les which m erit c lassification  as logically  
necessary since they are constitutive of the very notions we employ. 
Such principles are essential to our ac tua l  reasoning practice. They 
in c lu d e  tru th s  concern ing  de re m odal no tions. G iven the
ind ispensab ility  of logical necessity the a priori  is shown to be 
indispensable, since logic is an a priori science.
Criticisms of the modalities may fail to justify, never mind necessitate, 
th e ir  e lim in a tio n . R ather, such c ritic ism s m ay in d ica te  the
requirem ent for a clarification of our m odal notions or for an 
approach to these notions other than that in which the criticism s in 
question have their source. Quine's attack upon the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is summarized by Grice and Strawson (1956, 147):
There is a certain circle or family of expressions, of which 
'analytic' is one ['necessary' is another], such that if any 
one m em ber of the circ le  could be taken to be 
sa tis fa c to rily  understood  or exp la ined , then  o ther
m em bers of the circle could be verbally , and hence
satisfactorily, explained in terms of it....U nfortunately each
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member of the family is in as great need of explanation as 
any other.
There is a way of interpreting the intensional circle other than that 
adopted by Quine. Quine appears to take it for granted that in the 
'explanation ' of the term s figuring in the in tensional circ le , no 
explanation from  outwith that circle can be p rovided .77 Thus, he 
m aintains that the terms in question are hopelessly unclear and have 
no place in canonical science. Even if we concede to Quine that his 
view of the relationship between the (mooted) notions of analyticity 
and necessity  is correct, it is not im perative to in te rp re t the 
intensional circle in a Quinean manner, as compelling us to accept, or 
being suggestive of, modal eliminativism. In fact, it may be taken to 
suggest the appropriateness of modal prim itivism . If necessity need 
not be as strongly associated with analyticity as Quine suggests, i.e., if 
Quine's intensional circle does not represent the fram ework for the 
supposed explanation of m odal notions, it m ight nonetheless be the 
case that no extra-modal explanation could be provided for modality 
(such an explanation would seem to be what would be required, in 
Quine's eyes, for the provision of any respectability to the notions in 
question, although he does not see it as having positive prospects).
Such a circum stance would again be strongly suggestive of the 'I-appropriateness of modal primitivism .
The Poor Prospects of Modal Reductionism
M odal reductionism  is the view that the modal reduces to the non- 
modal. This is a better way of putting the matter than to suggest that 
modal reductionism  is the view that the modal reduces to the actual, 
since that would be to make the unwarranted assum ption that the 
actual is non-modal. In addition, Lewisian modal reductionists hold 
that the modal reduces to non-modal, non-actual reality .7 8
3
77 Cf. Grice and Strawson (1956, 147-148) and Haack (1978, 173-175) 
on Quine.
7 8  M cFetridge (1990, 141) states that the modal realist holds that 
there are i r r e d u c i b l y  modal facts, yet he counts the Lew isian 
approach as a form of realism. McFetridge takes the possible worlds to 
be 'm odal objects' on the basis that 'the m odal expressions are 
interpreted as various kinds of quantifiers over them'. The point of 
the Lewisian project, however, is precisely to reduce  the modal to the 
non -m odal.
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A ctualism  is the thesis that the totality of real existents does not
include unactualized possibilia: nothing follows from the adoption of 
this stance as to which approach to m odality should be favoured,
other than that objectual modal realism, i.e. the thesis that there are
non-actual truth-m akers for modal discourse, should not. Being an 
actualist in this sense is consistent with both (non-objectual) realist 
and anti-realist accounts of modality. The position that I call 'rigid 
actualism ' supplements actualism  with the thesis that the actual is
non-m odal. The contrast between actualism and possibilism  concerns 
ont ical  matters: it concerns questions as to what entities exist.?9 Rigid 
actualism  contrasts w ith both non-objectual m odal rea lism  and 
possibilism. The contrasts here are both ontical and onto log ica l:  they 
concern not only that which is posited as real, but its nature. The non- 
objectual realism  I adopt herein subscribes to the ontological thesis 
that necessities and possibilities inhere in actuality. Only this position 
challenges the specifically ontological tenet of rigid actualism .80 (It is 
unfortunate that the view that modal realism  involves the acceptance 
of possibilia has gained so much currency due to the views of David 
Lew is, who is bold enough to state flatly (1986, vii) that modal 
realism  is 'the thesis that the world we are a part of is but one of a 
plurality of worlds’.) It is unhelpful, but commonplace, to suppose, as 
does M cGinn, that the polarities in the approach to m odality are 
actualism  and realism , since actualism  opposes not realism , but 
possib ilism .
79 Cf. McFetridge (1990, 141).
80 The term 'modal actualism' is used by Shalkowski (1994, 687-688) 
to designate his own view that there are irreducibly m odal facts 
ontologically grounded in actuality. (Cf. the usage of Loux (1979a, 
55).) The phrase 'modal actualism’ was coined by Kit Fine in Prior and 
Fine (1977, 116), to designate the conjunction of the theses that modal 
idioms are prim itive (modalism) and that only actual objects exist 
(actualism): the adoption of that position does not comm it one to the 
on to log ical thesis to w hich Shalkow ski subscribes. Shalkow ski 
apparently equates non-objectual realism  with prim itivism , when in 
fact, the form er is a subspecies of the latter. This m istake is a 
consequence of Shalkow ski's foundational assum ption (1994, 669) 
that one of the prime tasks of the modal metaphysician is to provide 
an account of the truth conditions for modal facts. It is bad policy 
simply to assume that the modal metaphysician m ust adopt a truth- 
conditional approach. Shalkowski is himself guilty of a m istake he 
attributes to others (1996, 386), namely of foreclosing the theoretical 
options before their discussion even begins.
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The taxonomy favoured here is an improvement upon that employed 
by McGinn, since the former clearly marks out the distinction between 
the issue of actualism /possibilism  and that of realism /anti-realism  
about m odality. This im portant distinction between m atters ontical 
and m atters ontological has been insufficiently recognized in much 
recen t w ork on m odality .81 To reiterate: rig id  actualism  is an 
ontological thesis with which modal realism  is wholly incompatible. 
M odal realism  is compatible with actualism, the ontical thesis that 
only actual entities exist.
Once modal elim inativism  has been rejected the fundam ental choice 
w hich confron ts the m odal m etaphysic ian  is betw een m odal 
prim itivism  and modal reductionism: this will be dealt with prior to 
the question as to whether realist primitivism is to be favoured over 
an ti-rea list prim itivism .
Lewis explicitly criticizes modal primitivism. In his view, our modal 
idiom s are quantifiers over worlds. W orlds other than the actual 
world, and the objects occupying them, are non-actual but real. 
Objectual modal realism  is ontologically anti-realist: it is realist not 
about the modal, but about the possibilia which are held to supply the 
non-modal truth conditions for modal discourse. Lewis asks,
If  our m odal idioms are not quantifiers over possible 
worlds, then what else are they? (1) We might take them 
as unanalyzed primitives; this is not an alternative theory 
at all, but an abstinence from theorizing. (2) We m ight 
take them as metalinguistic predicates analyzable in terms 
of consistency...If a consistent sentence is one that could 
be true, or one that is not necessarily false, then the 
theory is circular...If a consistent sentence is one whose 
denial is not a theorem  of some specified  deductive 
system, then the theory is incorrect rather than circular: 
no falsehood of arithmetic is possibly true, but for any 
deductive system ...either there are falsehoods among its 
theorems or there is some falsehood of arithm etic whose 
denial is not among its theorems. If a consistent sentence
81 Lewis and McGinn are among the guilty parties. Plantinga (1987, 
189, 196-197) is cognizant of the distinction.
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is one that comes out true under some assignm ent of
extensions to the non-logical vocabulary, then the theory 
is inco rrec t: som e assignm ents o f ex ten sio n s are
im possible, for instance one that assigns overlapping 
extensions to the English terms 'pig' and sheep'. If  a 
consistent sentence is one that comes out true under some 
possible assignment of extensions, then the theory is again 
circular. (3) We might take them as quantifiers over so- 
called 'possible worlds' that are really  some sort of
respectable linguistic entities; say, maximal consistent sets 
of sentences of some language....B ut again the theory 
would be either circular or incorrect, according as we 
explain consistency in modal terms or in deductive (or
purely m odel-theoretic) terms. (1973, 85)
The first approach, modal primitivism, is rejected by Lewis: he simply 
stipulates that modal m etaphysical theorizing must provide an extra- 
m odal account of m odality if it is to count as theorizing. I have 
already criticized this prejudice (at 2.1). The second and third are
rejected because each is either false or fails to be genuinely reductive, 
constituting primitivism  by the back door.82,83
In the quo ta tion  L ew is charac te rizes  m odal p rim itiv ism  as
prim itivism  about our modal i d i o ms .  Elsewhere, he suggests that 
m odal prim itiv ism  is the view that the m odal o p e r a t o r s  are
unanalyzable (1986, 13-14, 17). He then appears to suggest that since 
these operators are not exhaustive of our m odal id iom s, the
prim itiv ist has more to deal with than the prim itiv ist anticipates: 
Lewis seems to be trying to present this as a difficulty for modal
prim itivism . Since the modal operators are not exhaustive of our 
m odal idioms, and the prim itivist is by no means compelled to hold 
the contrary view, there is no reason to succumb to Lewis's rhetoric 
here, and we can m aintain that his earlie r characteriza tion  of 
prim itivism  is more accurate. Modal primitivism  just is the rejection
82 Lewis (1986, Chapter 3) objects to linguistic ', 'p ictorial' and 
m agical' forms of 'ersatzism ' about worlds on the grounds that they 
require primitive modality. (3) is the ersatzist approach.
83 In relation to the second and third we might add that neither could 
hold since neither is exhaustive of our modal idioms: neither approach 
can account for irreducibly de re modal idioms.
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of reductionism  and eliminativism about modal discourse: the view is 
not confined to the m odal operators. Lew is's rejection  of m odal
prim itivism  is both arbitrary and predicated upon m isrepresentations
of m odal p rim itiv ism . The ea rlie r ch arac te riza tio n  of m odal 
prim itivism  as abstinence from  theorizing is m isrepresentative and 
rests upon the im plausible assum ption that only reductive analysis 
constitu tes theory or explanation. His later account m isrepresents 
prim itivism  by assuming that the prim itivist 'has more on his hands
than he thinks he has' (1986, 14), i.e. by assuming that the prim itivist
is not cognizant of the fact that there are modal idioms other than the 
m odal operators.84
Lewis's own project is to provide a reductive analysis of our modal 
idiom s, not ju s t the modal operators, in terms of quantifiers over 
possible worlds and their inhabitants.85 He is a semantic realist about 
modality, but his position is ontologically anti-realist in that he holds 
that the modal is nothing over and above the non-modal. So, Lewis’s 
modal realism is not, in point of ontology, modal realism  proper at all, 
contrary to his own regular insistence that his is the only 'genuine' 
modal realism. Lewis is a realist about possibilia, not about modality: 
possibilia serve as the reductive bases whereby the modal is held to 
reduce to the non-modal. His hostility to prim itivism  stems from the 
view that accounting for the modal in modal terms is explanatorily 
void and an abstinence from theorizing. According to Lewis, 'the 
ersatzers m ust resort to primitive facts where genuine modal realists 
can offer analyses' (1986, 140-141). Lewis rejects attem pts, other 
than his own, to reduce the modal to the non-modal on the ground 
that they make appeal to notions which they seek to explain, thereby 
resulting in primitivism . Since we recognize that reductive analyses 
are not exhaustive of genuine modal theories we re ject Lew is's 
principle that for any account of modality to qualify as a genuine 
theory it must not make appeal to modal notions. However, if Lewis's 
principle is watered-down to form an alternative principle such that
84 In relation to operator primitivism , Lewis's views are in sharp 
contrast with those of Peacocke (1978, e.g., 475), according to whom 
'one major at tract ion  of an operator treatment [of necessity] is that it 
does not treat as any kind of quantifier' [my emphasis].
85 Contra Blackburn (1984, 213), who attributes the view that modal 
idioms are irreducible to Lewis. Commentators who subscribe to the 
view that Lewis is a modal reductionist include W eiss (1980), 
Plantinga (1987), Rosen (1990), Shalkowski (1994) and Divers (1997).
a
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for an account of modality to qualify as a genuine reduction it must be 
extra-modal, we are in a position to endorse this latter principle.
Contrary to his own claim, Lewis fails to show that the ersatzist must
resort to primitive fac ts:  to show that ersatzism does in fact resort to
prim itive m odality need not be to show that it is prim itive modal 
f a c t s  to which appeal is being made. E rsatzism  m ight rest upon 
prim itivism  about our modal notions without necessarily postulating 
m odal facts. Lewis's criticism  of linguistic ersatzism  will serve to 
illustrate the ways in which ersatzist program m es make appeal to 
prim itive m odality. Lewis (1986, 150-151) describes two routes to 
prim itivism  inherent in linguistic ersatzism. The first arises via the 
requ irem ent fo r consistency. If  m odality is to be reduced to 
quantification across ersatz worlds characterized as sets of sentences 
then any such set must be consistent: 'An inconsistent set might be an 
ersatz im possible world, but it is not an ersatz possible world.' 
E m ploym ent of the notion of consistency w ill m ake appeal to 
primitive modality, since, 'a set of sentences is consistent [if and only 
if] those sentences, as interpreted, c o u ld  all be true together'. The 
second route to primitivism
comes via im plicit representation. It may be that so-and-
so, according to a certain ersatz world, not because there is
a sentence included in that world which just means that 
so-and-so, no more and no less; but because there are 
sentences which jointly imply that so-and-so. There might 
be a single sentence which implies that so-and-so but 
doesn't ju st mean that so-and-so because it implies more 
besides; or there m ight be a finite or infin ite  set of 
sentences w hich jo in tly  im ply that so -and-so . This 
implication is prima facie  modal: a set of sentences implies 
that so and so [if and only if] those sentences, as 
in terpreted, c o u ld  not all be true together unless it were 
also true that so-and-so; in other words, if it is n e c e s s a r y  
that if those sentences are all true together, then so-and- 
so. (1986, 151)86
8 6  Lewis (1986, 154-156) identifies two places w here prim itive 
m odality 'w ill not go away' in linguistic ersatzist accounts: in the 
ax iom  co rrespond ing  to the m ain tenance o f the consistency  
requirem ent, and, in the connecting axioms  which relate local and
89 I
'3This will be im m inent if and only if it is the case that the 
w orldm aking language lacks the expressive pow er to rep resen t 
explicitly what it represents implicitly. Lewis makes the formal point 
that a language may be impoverished syntactically or sem antically 
such that the language itself lacks the m eans to render explicit 
something which it implies. An ersatz world may be constituted by 
sentences of a worldm aking language in which entailm ents arising 
from  the relevant set of sentences cannot be explicitly  represented 
due to an expressive inadequacy in the language. Lewis m aintains 
th a t e rsatz  w orlds are m axim ally  co n sis ten t re la tiv e  to the 
w orldm aking language, not absolutely. There will be a trade-off 
between the demands of consistency, which are more easily m et by 
an impoverished language, and the desirability of expressive power, 
which characterizes a rich language (1986, 152). It m ight be objected 
that the second route to prim itivism  will not arise for the ersatzist 
whose worlds are sets of maxim ally consistent propositions, rather 
than sentences of any worldmaking language. For Lewis, however, this 
would be no objection, since he regards propositions as sets of 
Lewisian worlds (1986, 5 3 -5 5 ) . 8  7
If it can be shown that the Lewisian approach fails to capture the
modal facts, or that the purportedly reductive term inology is itself 
overtly  m odal, or that it requires prim itive m odality  e ither in
explicating the meanings of the terms it employs or in explicating the 
m etaphysical theses to which it is committed, then its plausibility will 
be u n d e rm in e d . 8 8  We m ight in tu it that our m odal notions, and
accordingly our modal idioms, are in some sense prior to possible 
worlds, or at least that a possible worlds account is not genuinely
reductive o f m odality .89 in the recent literature attempts have been 
made to substantiate this intuition. Lycan (1988, 46) charges that the 
facts of modality cannot be accounted for without the ruling out of 
impossibilia, and that the Lewisian has no resources to do this without
global descriptions within a world.
87 Lewis's view is criticized by Plantinga (1987).
8 8  This dialectic is laid out by Divers (1997, esp. 147, 153). Even if the 
outcome is less than conclusive, the account of m odality I defend 
herein may have the advantage in that it is not ontically profligate 
and is comparatively respectable from an epistem ological perspective.
89 The latter stance is adopted by Kripke (1980, 19 nt. 18); cf. Putnam 
(1983, 67-68).
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m aking appeal to prim itive modality: 'world' is a m odal prim itive, 
since for Lewis it has to mean 'possible  world'.90 The charge, then, is 
that in any purportedly extra-modal worldly analysis of a given {de  
d ic to )  possibility claim, 'possible' will be implicated, in a relatively 
unsubtle manner, in the supposed base discourse. Some critics have 
claim ed that L ew is's argum ent for possib ilia  app lies, m u t  a t  is  
m u t a n d i s , to impossibilia, which might be taken to suggest that the 
Lew isian 's explicit ontical comm itm ents are, ironically , arbitrarily  
p a rs im o n io u s .91 The Lewisian reply is that only possibilia are needed 
to account for the modal facts.92 This, in itself, constitutes a reply only 
to those who accuse Lewis of ungrounded parsimony: Lycan's charge 
that 'world' is itself a modal primitive is unaffected.
In the absence of any such provision in Lycan’s discussion. Divers 
(1997, 147) proposes the following as a necessary condition on non­
c ircu larity :
(NCI) A proposed reduction is non-circular only if
the [purported ly  reductive] r ig h t-s id e s  o f 
equivalences involve the use of neither: (i) 
vocabulary from the proscribed class; nor (ii) 
vocabulary  the sense of w hich could be 
conveyed adequately only by using vocabulary 
from the proscribed class.
W here modal reductionism is at issue overtly modal vocabulary is of 
the proscribed class. Lycan's charge might appear to be that 'world' 
falls foul of (ii). However, Lycan's charge is (invalidly) deduced from
90 The same charge is made by Lycan and Shapiro (1986, 358). 
Putnam (1983, 67) claims that it is evident that one cannot explain 
the notion of p o s s ib i l i t y  itself in terms of possible worlds'. Cf. the
claim  of Mondadori and Morton (1976, 19) that a reduction of the
modal 'is unobtainable on anyone's account'.
91 The argument at issue occurs at Lewis (1973, 84): it relates to the
claim  that there are 'ways things might have been', with which Lewis 
agrees and which he says he takes literally by committing him self to 
realism  about possible worlds. The im possibilist version: there are 
ways things could not have been, so there are impossible worlds. This 
is due to Naylor (1986); cf. Yagisawa (1988, esp. 183). On the charge 
of arb itrary  on tical econom y see the ensu ing  d iscussion  of 
Shalkowski's critique of Lewis.
92 Miller (1989, 476), after Shallow (1988); cf. Lewis (1986, 7 nt. 3).
Thus, it is suggested, base discourse involving quantification over 
w orlds is in te llig ib le  independently of acquaintance with modal 
concepts: reductionism  has not been shown to fa il.93 This treats
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the claim  that, the very flesh-and-bloodiness [of Lew isian worlds] 
prevents [Lewis] from  adm itting im possibilia' (1988, 46). D ivers 
(1997, 146ff) points to a conflation —inherent in Lycan's charge— 
between matters intensional and matters extensional. (N C I) lays down 
a condition on the vocabulaiy, and the sense of the vocabulaiy, which 
is to feature in the purportedly extra-m odal base discourse. Since 
there is no such conception as circularity in extension (1997, 146), the 
L ew isian  com m itm ent that im possib ilia  do not fea tu re  in the 
e x t e n s i o n  of 'world* is not sufficient to convict the Lewisian of 
circularity  by the lights of (N C I). Lycan's charge, then, does not 
straightforwardly convict Lewis of importing prim itive m odality into 
his analysis along the lines of (ii). Divers (1997, 149ff) emphasizes 
that the sense of a term, the justification for beliefs concerning its 
ex tension , and the articu lation  of com m itm ents concern ing  its 
ex tension  are d istinc t: respec tive ly , they concern  in tensiona l,
ep istem ological, and m etaphysical m atters. In so far as Lycan's 
objection is predicated upon the Lewisian's concretist commitments, it 
fails, by the light of (NCI), to convict the Lewisian of circularity, since 
the com m itm ents at issue, and the justifications thereof, concern 
matters extensional, rather than the intension of 'world'. Accordingly, 
the Lew isian reduction of m odal discourse to quantification over 
worlds is not shown to fail to be analytic  of that discourse.
In response to Lycan's charge, Miller (1989, 477) suggests a non- 
modal definition of 'world' such that:
(1 ) In d iv id u a ls  a re  w oiT dm ates i f  they  are  
spatiotem porally related. (2) A world is a m ereological 
sum of worldmates.
493 Cf. van Inwagen (1986, 187) and Divers (1997, 149), both with 
more detail. (Unlike Divers, van Inwagen (1986, 194-199) accepts 
that Lewis provides a genuine reduction of the modal to the non- 
m odal but argues that the analysis which Lewis provides, although 
genuinely reductive, is incorrect. Unlike Divers, van Inwagen takes it 
that the provision  of equivalence relations betw een m odal and 
worldly term inologies and a non-modal explication of the sense of 
world' is sufficient for a genuine reduction of the modal to the non-
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Lycan's charge per se, illustrating that it is not just Lycan's argument 
for it that is insufficient to establish circularity.
D ivers (1997, 150-153) outlines two further escape routes from  
L ycan 's charge tha t, given the L ew isian com m itm ent to the 
concreteness of worlds, 'world' must mean 'possible world' since their 
concreteness precludes worlds from having logically  incom patible
constituen ts ' and if 'the C oncretist needs or w ants to ru le  out 
im possibilia by fiat, the Concretist is stuck with a m odal prim itive' 
(1991a, 224). It m ight be held that there is an absolute, but non- 
analytic, necessity such that whatever is concrete is possible. Such a 
tenet is insufficient to establish that 'world' means 'possible world', so
again, the reductionist is innocent of circularity by the light of (N C I).94 
A lternatively, the reductionist may admit  that world' means 'possible 
world'. This is again insufficient to dem onstrate (N C I) circularity, 
since, w here the reductive  vocabulary  is uncon tam inated  by 
proscribed vocabulary, the reductionist account is c ircular only if 
conceptual priority genuinely attaches to the overtly modal discourse. 
Such priority cannot be laid down as a prior condition upon debate. 
Reductionists have it that the a n a l y s a n d u m  contains no cognitive 
content over and above that contained in the a n a l y s a n s :  we can 
hardly fittingly proscribe the reductionist's position merely in virtue 
of its reductionist aspiration. In order to avoid begging the question, 
the an ti-reduction ist has to show that the reduc tion ist has no 
leg itim ate  claim  to conceptual p riority  for the purported  base 
d iscourse.
t
Following his defence of the reductionist against Lycan, Divers adds 
that the reductionist is still vulnerable to attack, since (N C I) is not a 
sufficien t condition for non-circularity. He proposes an expanded 
conception of circularity:
(NC2) A reductionist proposal is non-circular only if
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
m odal.)
94 Though, as Divers indicates (1997, 151), this line of defence comes 
at a heavy price in that the semantical and logical benefits purported 
to accrue from the analyticity of equivalences betw een m odal and 
worldly discourses would then be lost. This is very serious indeed 
given Lewis's claim  (1986, 133-135) that these benefits m otivate, and 
are supposed to compensate for, the prima facie  im plausibility of his 
m etap h y sics .
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the red u c tio n is t can ad equa te ly  ex p ress , 
w ithout using proscribed vocabulary, whatever 
other claims he is committed to expressing in 
defence of his proposal. (1997, 153)
This expanded conception covers not only the senses of the 
purported ly  reductive term s, but also the expression  of beliefs 
concerning their extensions.95
This conception m ight be applied as follows. D espite Lewis's own 
com m itm ent to the concreteness of worlds — his disavowal of any 
p e rsp icu o u s  c o n c re te /a b s tra c t d is tin c tio n  n o tw ith s ta n d in g — a 
philosopher who accepts the non-arbitrary equivalence of m odally 
qualified dic ta  and quantification over worlds need not have it that 
w orld ' m e a n s  'concrete world'. The tenet that the terms are co- 
extensional is consistent with the tenet that they do not have the 
same sense. Lewis's commitment concerns the extension of 'w orlds’. It 
rem ains to be seen whether that commitment can be expressed in a 
manner not proscribed by (NC2). Lewis (1986, 165) states that the 
linguistic ersatzist has to appeal to prim itive m odality, since only 
consistent sets of sentences will count as worlds. Lewis claims that his 
account faces no such problem  since 'there is no such thing as an 
inconsistent world'. Lewis is apparently claiming that concre ta  (unlike 
linguistic  item s) are not the kinds of item s which can exhib it 
inconsistency. It is difficult to see how this claim  can be interpreted 
except as a de re modal claim about worlds: Lewisian worlds are such 
th a t it is m etaphysica lly  im possib le  for them  to adm it of 
inconsistency. So, Lewis's com m itm ent to the non-abstract, non- 
linguistic, natures of worlds appears to convict him of circularity by 
the light of (NC2).
M iller's (1) (1989, 477, quoted above) has it that spatiotem poral 
relatedness is a (merely) sufficient condition for worldmatehood. This 
contrasts with the specification of worldmatehood provided by Lewis 
(1986, 71), according to whom spatiotem poral rela tedness is a
;
95 There is a caveat: the case has yet to be made that...(NC2) is both 
justified  and effective [in convicting the reductionist of circularity]' 
(1997, 154). In the light of the hiatus relating to justification attempts 
to apply (NC2) to would-be reductionist views should be viewed as 
p rov isional.
9 6  W orlds in which only tem poral relatedness pertains are here 
understood to be included as m axim al sums of spatio tem porally
94
n e c e s s a r y  and sufficient condition for worldm atehood: 'things are 
worldmates [if and only if] they are spatiotemporally related '.96 Lewis 
has it that a world is 'a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally 
in terrelated things [i.e. worldm ates]' (1986, 73). Lewis's comm ents, 
unlike those of M iller, are not explicitly set out as providing the
m e a n i n g  of 'world'. Were they so intended, it would appear that
neither the notion of worldmatehood nor that of a world could be 
m odally innocent. On the other hand, insofar as Lew is’s comments 
concern the characterization of worlds ,  they might fall foul of (NC2). 
Lewis (1986, 72) views the worldmate relation as non-prim itive, but
it appears that his com m itm ents regarding its nature cannot be 
explicated non-m odally. In addition, the m odality involved cannot
reduce to quan tification  over w orlds, since such an attem pted 
reduction would generate a vicious regress.
D ivers seeks to combine (NC2) with considerations highlighted by 
Shalkowski's discussion of Lewisian reductionism, in order to bolster 
the an ti-reduc tion ist case presented  therein . Shalkow ski (1994) 
employs the relatively imprecise principle that if one is going to 
advance m odal reduction ism  then one p rec ludes o n ese lf from  
imposing a modal constraint on theorizing: modal reductionism  fails 
because it cannot both honour this princip le  and rem ain non- 
arbitrary. Shalkowski argues that: (i) all objects in the (supposedly) 
reductive base m ust 'meet the prior  modal condit ion  that they are 
possible ' (1994, 677); and, (ii) in order to provide grounds for 
m odality , the set of non-actual objects appealed  to m ust be 
exhaust ive ,  i.e., inclusive of all possibilia. It will be exhaustive not if it 
is merely the case that it has no more members, but only if it c a n n o t  
have any more members: another prior modal condition is required 
(1994, 679-680). If the Lewisian meets conditions (i) and (ii), his 
account will be circular; if he attempts to jettison the two prior modal 
constraints, then the modal theory which results w ill be arbitrary 
(1994, 680).
Shalkowski contends that the condition requiring that im possibilia are 
debarred from  featuring in the reductive base shows that modal 
facts' are m etaphysically  prior to nonm odal facts involving the
related worldmates (1986, 73).
■
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existence of w orlds' (1994, 678). D ivers (1997, 156) raises the 
suspicion that this is question-begging against the reductionist, since 
it seems to suggest, contrary to the reductionist's contention, that two 
distinct sets of facts are at i s s u e . 9 7  Shalkowski, like Lycan, has failed 
adequately to justify the allocation of priority to the modal over the 
non -m odal. N ev erth e le ss , D ivers (1997, 156) co n ten d s th a t
Shalkowski's claim  that Lewisian reductionism  is either arbitrary or 
circular might stand:
it is fair to raise the question of what it is that the 
reductionist has to do to convince us that, even if there 
does exist a suitably rich totality of worlds and other 
objects, the set of facts so constituted does suffice as 
truthm akers for left-side as well as right-side sentences.
The anti-reductionist m ight reason, following reflection on 
arbitrary cases of material equivalence, that to get beyond 
m aterial equivalence to identity of truthm akers, we need 
the supplem entary hypothesis that the equivalences are 
also ...necessary .
The re levan t notion of necessity  is described  by D ivers as 
'm etaphysical', but given that he means an unrestricted  sense of 
necessity  perhaps subject to 'the S5 princip le  that w hatever is 
possib le  is necessarily  possible ' we would do better m erely to 
describe it as 'unrestricted'. In accordance with the S5 principle, and 
expanding upon Shalkowski's point (ii). Divers indicates that even if 
reduction ism  sa tisfies the dem ands of m ateria l equ ivalence , it 
rem ains to be dem onstrated that it meets the necessary condition 
upon non-arbitrariness that the equivalences hold of necessity. The 
reductionist still has to demonstrate 'that all and only the possible 
objects ex is t a n d  necessarily  this is so' (1997, 157). So, the 
reductionist must assert: (i) 'that the objects that exist are all and only 
the objects that there could be' (1997, 157); (ii) that the equivalences 
to which he subscribes hold of (unrestricted) necessity; and (iii) the
97 In addition, I would suggest that even if modal restrictions are 
p rio r to the postulation of w orlds, this does not, contrary  to 
Shalkowski's suggestion, show that modal facts aie prior to non-modal 
facts, but at best that modal notions enjoy a priority over non-modal 
notions. Even if prim itivism  could be established on such a basis, 
ontological primitivism does not follow.
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(unrestricted) necessity of (i).98 I f  the reductionist cannot adequately 
express these commitments in purely non-modal terms then he will 
be guilty of circularity in light of (NC2). In respect of (i), the specific 
problem  relates to expressing the absolute unrestrictedness of the 
u n res tric ted  ex is ten tia l quan tifie r o f the f irs t-o rd e r  (w orld ly ) 
language in that language itself. The reductionist m ust express the 
claim  that there could not be more than there unrestrictedly  is'
(1997, 158) in worldly terms. In respect of (ii) the reductionist might
claim  that the equivalences to which he subscribes hold at every 
world. A way of doing this has to be found which avoids the
consequence that many worlds exist in each world (1997, 158).99 if 
this can be done then (iii) will be satisfiable by the same means, in 
respect of the necessity held to attach to (i), w hilst the problem  
pertaining to the assertion of (i) itse lf rem ains unresolved. The 
Lew isian approach, then, is shown to be open to anti-reductionist
attack quite independently of the implausibility of its m e t a p h y s i c s .
V arious other objections to the Lewisian account may arise. For 
instance, that it undercuts the purity of the logical m odalities. For 
Lew is, worlds and their occupants are concreta, and facts about 
concreta will have a determining effect upon what is unrestrictedly 
possible or impossible. Lewis has it that if (unrestrictedly) all swans 
are birds then it is not logically possible that there are swans which
'î;iiare not birds (1986, 7). On the account of logical possibility to which I
98 (ii) and (iii) are rephrased versions of the form ulations given by 
Divers (1997, 157).
99 Cf. Plantinga (1987, 200) on satisfaction in a world and satisfaction 
at  a world and Noonan (1994, 136) " a t  w"  is am biguous betw een 
"accessible from w"...and "in w'".
1 0 0  We might add that Lewisian metaphysics is open to more than a 
mere 'incredulous stare’ by way of objection. Divers (1990, Chapter 4) 
argues that worlds are not genuine individuals, and that we should be 
(ontological) anti-realists about worlds, because they fail to meet one 
of the necessary conditions upon individuality originally set out by 
M cGinn (1981, 152), namely possession of ex tra-linguistic  status. 
D ivers's version of the condition (1990, 71) is that 'Entities of a 
purported kind are genuine individuals only if they admit of proper 
identification  short of exhaustive characterization.' Possible worlds 
adm it neither of causally  dependent indexical iden tifica tion  nor 
descriptive identification (1990, 72-73). Since purported individuals 
are genuine only if they admit of identification, there are no possible 
worlds (1990, 76-78).
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will subscribe in Chapter 4, allowing matters extensional to affect the 
logical modalities in such a manner is undesirable because it conflicts 
with the point of having the notion and subverts its epistemology.
In addition, further possible sources of primitive m odality m ight be 
identified. Lewis (1986, 7) depicts nomological m odalities as restricted 
by accessibility  relations between worlds. N om ological m odalities, 
unlike logical m odalities, require restrictions on the accessib ility  
relation between the actual world and other (unrestrictedly) possible 
worlds. It has to be shown that an extra-m odal analysis of the 
accessibility  relation is a v a i l a b l e . i ^ i  Since Lewis admits that it is a 
contingent m atter as to which worlds are nom ologically accessible 
from  the world we inhabit it appears that accessibility relations do 
not them selves admit of analysis in terms of quantification over 
worlds. If this is correct then they function as modal primitives.
It is unclear that the Lewisian position is equipped to handle modality 
de re and to do so in a manner which does not make appeal to 
prim itive m odality. M odality de re is depicted as quantification over 
possible individuals. Individuals in other possible worlds are held to 
'rep resen t de re' individuals in the actual world. The form er are 
counterparts of the latter and vice versa. However, it is unclear as to 
what is to count as a counterpart of any actual individual:
sometimes one is expected to take a position...about what 
is or isn't possible de re for an individual. I would suggest 
instead that the restricting of modalities by accessibility or 
counterpart relations...is a very fluid sort of affair...N ot 
anything goes, but a great deal does. (1986, 8 ; cf.
[1968]1983, 42-43)
This seems to undercut the point of the notion of necessity de re, since 
it is unclear that such fluidity could deliver anything that would merit 
the title of necessity. Counterpart Humphreys are held to 'represent 
de re' the actual Humphrey. They are supposed (1986, 194) to be 
'very like' the actual Humphrey. But how is that supposed to fit with 
the claim  that counterpart relations are very fluid? If they are fluid 
then it appears that attributions de re do not have determ inate truth-
.-4:
101 M ondadori and Morton (1976, 19) claim  that 'accessible from' 
cannot be explicated non-modally.
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values. This does not sit comfortably with an account which purports 
to provide a semantically realist account of modal idioms but which 
adds no caveat to the effect that some modal idioms are not included: 
on the contrary, in commenting that the prim itivist has more to deal 
with than diamonds and boxes Lewis (1986, 13-14) implies that his 
account can accommodate all modal idioms. It seems, however, that 
Lewis can claim  semantically realist credentials only for his treatment 
of modality de dictoA^'^ As depicted by Forbes (1986, 3), Lewis is a 
c o n te x tu a l i s t  about essence: he holds that for each P and x ...there  is 
n e v e r  ’an unqualifiedly correct yes/no answer to the question is P 
essential to x?'. The a b s o lu te  essentialist denies this, but may hold 
that for s o m e  P and x there is no unqualified  answ er to the 
q u e s t i o n .  1 0 3  Forbes (1986, 24) observes that Lewisian contextualism  
is motivated by ’skepticism  about the existence of modal facts that 
determine the de re possibilities'. Thus, contextualism  about essence 
appears to constitute a variety of anti-realism  about e s s e n c e .  1 0 4  ( i t  
will therefore be vulnerable to criticisms, which I will outline at 3.4, 
common to anti-essentialist views.)
Forbes (1985, 64) indicates that the counterpart theorist’s notion of 
sim ilarity appears to differ from our intuitive notion. Intuitively, we 
m ight reasonably hold ’that Jones's life could have been very different 
from the life he has actually led...while at the same time others lead 
lives quite sim ilar to Jones's actual life'. In such a situation, the 
counterpart theorist would have it that only the latter individuals 
count as counterparts, so the intuitive judgm ent about Jones would 
have to be deemed false. While there is no obligation on the reductive 
theorist to m aintain our pre-reductive i n t u i t i o n s , ^ ^ 5  this introduces an
Lewis [1968](1983, 42) is aware of this point: 'The true-hearted 
essentialist might well think me a false friend’.
103 I hold, like W iggins (1980), that vagueness arises where non­
par adigmatic substances, such as artifacts, are concerned.
104 c f. Forbes (1986, 25).
105 Cf. Divers (1997, 144-145). A possible exception to this proposal is
ind icated  by C asullo 's suggestion (1992, 133-139), that log ic ist
reductions of number concepts are bound to retain our pre-reductive 
intuitions concerning the truth-values of judgm ents involving those 
concepts. Quine [1936](1966, 72-73) suggests that the log icist is 
bound to uphold 'traditional usage', including judgm ents about truth- 
values, and that this is just a particular instance of a general adequacy 
condition upon 'definitions’.
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im plausible measure of revision. Forbes remarks that the counterpart 
theorist m ight reply that he is using a technical notion of similarity, 
which he would then have to explain. Forbes (1985, 65) poses the 
follow ing dilemma: if the counterpart theorist can provide no such 
explanation then the motivation for counterpart theory, that it avoids 
the purportedly problem atic transworld identity relation, is undercut; 
if  such an explanation  is provided, then, unless it p recludes 
counterparthood from being 'a one one equivalence relation, the same 
elucidation could presumably be applied to transworld identity, which 
elim inates the motive for developing counterpart t h e o r y ' .  1 0 6
Lewis (1986, 12-13) recognizes that the standard modal operators are 
not exhaustive of our modal idioms and that the form of essentialist 
claim s may not be best represented by the em ploym ent of those
operators. It follows from Lewis's claim that there are 'modal idioms
that outrun the resources of standard m odal logic ' that even a 
successful reduction of the standard modal operators would not be 
sufficient to expurgate prim itive modality. Lewis's com m ent (1986, 
13) that 'm odality is not all boxes and diamonds' illustrates that a 
reduction of the standard modal operators is not enough to establish 
modal reductionism . In particular, there is a case to answer where 
m odality  de re is concerned even if modality de dicto admits of 
successful Lewisian reduction. In order to establish the genuinely 
reductionist credentials of his account of modality it has to be shown
------------------------------------------
106 Forbes (1985, Chapter 7) seeks to resolve this dilem m a where 
artifact identity is concerned, by introducing 'fuzzy essences' and a 
many-valued semantics with degrees of possibility. Brody (1980, 106) :
suggests that, since the resem blance betw een an object and its 
counterpart is such that resemblance in certain respects is obviously 
going to have to count more than resemblance in other respects' it 
appears that the properties to be weighed m ost are the very 
properties that are intuitively essential'. He then appears to suggest 
that counterpart theory may fail to meet a non-circularity condition: 
'Something analogous to a theory of essentialism  is probably needed 
in order to develop an adequate theory of resem blance, and any 
approach that wants to use the latter to develop the former is in very 
serious trouble.' (Cf. Forbes's comments (1986, 22-26, esp. 23-24) on 
the dubious coherence of contextualism.) Criticism  of Lewis's notion 
[1968](1983, 28) o f counterparthood in terms of resem blance 'in 
im portan t respects ' is offered by Kripke (1980, 76-77), w hile 
B lackburn (1984, 215-216) raises concern about the counterpart 
theorist's notion of similarity and its application.
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that quantification over possible individuals really is reductive of
m odality  de re. To that end, the nature of the modality involved in
accessibility and counterpart relations has to be determ ined. As has 
been indicated, this does not seem to be explicable, on Lew is's 
account, in terms of quantification over worlds.
In the broadest sense, all possible individuals w ithout
exception are possibilities for me. But some of them are 
access ib le  possibilities for me, in various ways, others are 
not.... My qualitative counterparts are m e t a p h y s i c a l l y  
a c c e s s i b l e  possibilities for me; or better, each of many 
legitimate counterpart relations may be called a relation of 
metaphysical accessibility. (1986, 234)
Accessibility for me, is held, by Lewis to relate to the de re m odalities 
pertinent to me. The Lewisian must either: revise his account so that 
accessibility is shown to be explicable in terms of quantification over 
w orlds, proceeding to show that such quantification is genuinely 
reductive of de dicto modality; or, he must illustrate by some other 
means that the accessibility relation itself is not a modal primitive. 
Lewis m ight reply that accessibility is accounted for non-m odally, 
since talk of accessibility just is talk of similarity, which seems to be a 
m odally innocent notion. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how any 
truth conditions can be provided for a de re attribution involving a 
given individual in the absence of any prior modal restriction upon 
what is to count as sufficiently similar to that i n d i v i d u a l .  1^7 it might 
further be objected that merely qualitative sim ilarity cannot play a 
crucial role in the determination of what is m etaphysically possible 
for a given i n d i v i d u a l ,  108 since that possibility will be determined by 
the essence of the individual, which is not a purely qualitative matter, 
since qualities inhere in individual substances rather than bundles of 
qualities being identical with substances. In addition, the problem  
rem ains that the com m itm ent to fluidity where m odality  de re is 
concerned  is inappropriate , if  not incoheren t, in the case of 
paradigm atic essences (i.e., those pertinent to the objects subsumed 
under natural kind concepts).
107 Cf. Brody (1980, 106) and Forbes (1986, 23-24).
108 Cf. K ripke (1980, 45 nt. 13) who com m ents that both 
counterparthood and transworld identity, which it is meant to replace, 
'must be established in terms of qualitative resemblance'.
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Since identity relations for concreta are m etaphysically necessary d e  
re  (not logically necessary), it is unclear as to how the Lewisian 
account can grant them a c c o m m o d a t i o n . ! 0 9  Lewis (1986, 192) takes 
identity to be 'sim ple' and 'unproblem atic'. Lewis comm ents (1986, 
192-193) that nothing can ever fail' to be self-identical and that 'two 
things never can be identical'. If, however, identity  is necessity- 
in vo lv ing , on L ew is's account that w ould en ta il tha t e ither 
accessib ility  relations or counterparthood com es into play. Since 
identity relations pertinent to concrete entities cannot be expressed in 
term s of necessary t r u t h , iio  [ t  would have to be counterparthood 
which pertained. Now a standard objection to counterpart theory, 
namely that what happens to a counterpart of Humphrey is irrelevant 
to Humphrey himself,! n  acquires additional acuity. Humphrey's self-
109 The criticism  I am about to offer contrasts with that of Forbes 
(1985, 66-69), e.g., in that he construes the necessity of identity in 
term s of the principle  ( 1 ) a=b-> □ (a=b) and charges that the 
counterpart relation is incompatible with the S5 logic of identity. I am 
in agreement with Forbes's charge, but I take the S5 logic of identity 
to constitute an incorrect explication of the necessity involved in 
identity (for at least a large class of entities), since that necessity is de  
re  and the principles operant in the logic are equipped to handle 
neither modal attributions de re nor the de re m odal-notional truth 
which expresses the general claim  that where identities hold they 
hold of m etaphysical necessity. Forbes (1985, 177-179) seeks to save 
counterpart-theoretic  sem antics for de re m odal attributions about 
artifacts by rejecting (1) via a rejection of the principle (V x ) 0  (x = x )  
from which, in conjunction with Leibniz's Law, the former principle is 
held to be derived. Forbes points out that the counterpart relation is a 
fuzzy relation introduced by de re sentences, and that where artifacts 
are concerned, there is no firm intuition to rule out exceptions to ( 1 ). 
W hether or not this is so, Forbes's strategy does not resolve the 
problem I point to, since I point out a problem for the Lewisian when 
identity is construed in terms of m etaphysical necessity de re, not 
logical necessity.
!!9 The Lewisian is in fact committed to the claim that everything that 
(unrestrictedly) exists does so as a matter of necessity. The difficulty 
w hich the Lew isian faces in making this com m itm ent has been 
mentioned above, in the discussion of a point made by Shalkowski 
and developed by Divers.
! ! ! E.g., Klipke (1980, 45 nt. 13). Forbes (1985, 65-66), after Hazen 
(1979, 321) dism isses the objection  on the g rounds tha t it
m isrep resen ts  the coun te rpart theo rist's  sem antics. K ripke, in 
com m enting that, according to the counterpart theorist, when we
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id en tity  holds of m etaphysical necessity  and that m etaphysical 
necessity cannot be accounted for by talk of counterparts precisely 
because the necessity concerns a relation of Humphrey to himself. So, 
n e ith e r  the red u c tio n  of the standard  m odal o p e ra to rs  to 
quantification over worlds nor the apparatus of counterpart theory 
can encom pass identity relations pertinent to concreta. Self-identity 
cannot be accounted for via counterpart theory, nor can it be 
accounted for via unrestricted quantification over worlds. (The latter 
point is bolstered by the recognition that the necessity of self-identity 
is not logical necessity, at least so far as concerns concrete objects.) So, 
it again appears that an extra-m odal analysis of all m odality is 
elusive. In addition, as Plantinga (1974, 111-114) observes, Lewisian 
sem antics has it  that Socrates is not necessarily  iden tical with 
Socrates, since his counterparts are distinct from  him. Lew isian 
sem antics secures the truth of the general claim  that n e c e s s a r i l y ,  
every th ing  is se l f - iden t ica l  but fails to secure the truth of the 
particularized claim that it is necessary for  Socrates to be identical to 
Socra tes .  Socrates’s self-identity is, in the terms of Grossmann (1983, 
173), 'an instance of the ontological law that every entity whatsoever 
is identical with i t s e l f . ! § o  far as objecthood is concerned, this
attribute a de re possibility to Humphrey, 'we are not talking about 
something that might have happened to H u m p h r e y  but to someone 
else' does m isrepresent the counterpart theorist's sem antics, because 
it is not what m i g h t  happen to the counterpart which is held to be 
relevant, but what does .  Nevertheless, it m ight still be objected that 
som ething w hich does happen to a coun te rpart H um phrey is 
irrelevant to what is de re possible for the actual Humphrey. (Cf. 
R osen (1990, 349). The non-m isrepresen ta tive  version  of the
objection  is given by W eiss (1980, 202), who com m ents that 
'possibility  for this  paper is identified by Lewis with a c t u a l i t y  [at 
another world] of that  paper' —although the use of the latter indexical 
is inappropriate.) The objection highlights the conflict between our 
modal intuitions concerning the truth values of de re modal claims 
and the Lewisian semantics for such claims. I can speak Arabic' and I 
m ight have learned A rabic ' can have neither the sam e truth  
conditions nor the same truth-values: the truth of one precludes the 
truth of the other. By the lights of Lewis's semantics the two claims 
differ in neither respect. This constitutes a r e d u c t i o  of the theory. 
(Like all theories which construe de re modality as relativized logical 
m odality, Lewisian theory is semantically ill-equipped to cope with 
the distinction between possession of an ability and possession of the 
capacity to acquire the ability.)
!!2 Cf. Grossmann (1983, 177) and Plantinga (1974, 111).
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'ontological law ' is, by the lights of my m odal epistem ology, a
necessary  a priori  truth. Where concreta are concerned, I take it, 
unlike Plantinga, that its instances are not of the essences of the 
objects they involve. Particular instances of the law constitute true 
statements of m etaphysical necessity de re, but this is insufficient for 
their essentiality with respect to their objects. Particular instances of 
the law are, on my account, not dependent upon the natures of the 
entities they involve: the former are not explanatory with respect to 
the abilities of concrete objects.
On the modal epistem ology offered at 2.2, knowledge of concrete 
identities is a species of substantive modal knowledge which derives 
from a conceptual truth about the notions of objecthood and identity 
and an empirical premiss relating to a concrete particular. The major 
prem iss, although itse lf necessary, contains an em bedded de re 
necessity. If this account is correct then the counterpart theorist 
cannot account for a given thing's being such that it is necessary for it 
to be identical with itse lf by claim ing that all of the thing's 
counterparts are such that it is necessary for them to be self-identical. 
This cannot be done because irreducible necessity  de re is still 
involved. The best the counterpart theorist can hope for is: (i) a 
worldly explication of the necessity of the claim  that objecthood 
involves self-iden tity , since (unrestrictedly) all ob jects are se lf­
identical, and (ii) the claim that all of the counterparts of an object are 
self-identical and that this makes it true that it is necessary for the 
object to be self-identical. This seems to leave the theorist with no 
means to account for truths involving our de re m odal notions (— 
con trast substantive de re m odal truths). In addition, the problem  
identified by Divers arises in relation to (i) and (ii): the counterpart 
theorist has to non-modally express the absolute unrestrictedness of 
his unrestricted existential quantifier if the possibility of an object's 
failing to be self-identical is genuinely to be foreclosed.
1
,s;r
'
There are several reasons, then, why we ought to be suspicious of the 
Lewisian's claim to have provided a genuinely extra-modal analysis of 
our m odal idiom s. Furtherm ore, even if success can be achieved 
where some of these idioms are concerned, that does not establish the 
wider aim of banishing all appeal to primitive modality.
Other purported reductions do not succeed in eradicating prim itive
£
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m odality . The standard tw entieth -cen tury  em p iric ist account of 
m odality involved attempting to reduce the modal to our linguistic 
conventions. This account was concerned to reduce the logical 
m odalities ; m odality  de re was either rejected or classified  as 
lingu istic ' by fiat. Radical conventionalism, as specified by Dummett 
[1959](1978, 170), is not a form of reductionism: it depicts necessity 
as consisting in nothing more than 'our having expressly decided to 
treat [a] statem ent as unassailable '. Beside the fact that rad ical 
conven tiona lism  (like m oderate conventionalism ) could  at best 
account for modal attributions de dicto, it provides an im plausible 
account of logical necessity, in that it fails adequately to distinguish 
betw een dogm atically accepting a statem ent and deem ing it to be 
logically necessary, and it fails to accommodate our acceptance of 
certain  statem ents, such as — on a classical m odel— G oldbach's 
conjecture, as if  true, then necessarily t r u e . ! ! 3  Further, since only 
fin ite ly  m any such decisions can be m ade the view  has the 
im plausible consequence that there is a finite num ber of necessary 
tru ths.!!4  Moderate conventionalism, which was the logical positivists' 
preferred view, is a reductionist thesis according to which the class of 
necessities includes both our linguistic conventions and those truths 
w hich  are true in v irtue  of those c o n v en tio n s . M oderate  
conventionalism  is discredited because it results in a regress.!!5 The
!!3 Cf. McFetridge's critique (1990, 150) of the non-cognitivism  about 
necessity advanced by W right. W right's position is inspired by his 
own interpretation (e.g., 1980, 372-373, 375, 379) of the intent of the
later W ittgenstein’s account. W right d istinguishes betw een rad ical 
conventionalism  as described (and attributed to W ittgenstein) by 
D um m ett (loc. cit.) and the position which W right attributes to 
W ittgenstein. W right seeks, and sees W ittgenstein as having sought, to 
advance a conventionalism  which is non-cognitivist but which does 
not suffer from what W right views as the incoherence of the radical 
conventionalism  described by Dummett. (W right (1980, 379): The
[non-moderate] conventionalist must hold that we are not r e q u i r e d  
—by the constraint of conformity to the facts, or whatever— to accept 
the new necessary statem ent which we allow; but neither [contra 
D um m ett's in terpretation of W ittgenstein] do we have a freedom  
in te llig ib le  in terms of the idea of arbitrary choice.' Cf. Stroud 
[1965](1971).) N evertheless, M cFetridge's c ritic ism  is generally  
applicable to non-cognitivist conventionalism.
!!4 The point is emphasized by Putnam [1979](1983, 116) and Hale 
(1996, 107). Radical conventionalism is thus, for exam ple, unable to 
account for arithmetical necessities.
!!5  This apparen tly  unassa ilab le  ob jection  is due to Q uine
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class of necessities is to include not just our linguistic conventions 
them selves, but their c o n s e q u e n c e s . There is no way to explain the 
consequence involved w ithout appeal to the very notion which is 
supposed to be up for r e d u c t i o n . ! I f  necessity reduces to our 
linguistic conventions then the necessity involved in the consequence 
would have to so reduce: therein is the regress.! !^
C o m b in a to ria lism , w hich  a ttem pts to reduce  the  m odal to 
com binations betw een actual elem ents, is advanced by D.M . 
Arm strong (1986; 1989).ü8  Armstrong's theory includes com m itm ent 
to the following theses (1986, 576-577). Atomic states of affairs are 
held to be 'Hume distinct', i.e., logically independent. The constituents
[19361(1966, 96-97), cf.: Pap (1958, 167, 419); Dummett [1959](1978, 
169-170); Putnam  [1979](1983, 116); Mounce (1981, 114-115); Hale, 
(1996, 107-108). J. Bennett (1961, 20) describes this as an 'invalid 
objection to modified conventionalism ' on the basis that the demand 
for a reduction is 'absurd': this misses the point that the objection 
works against the position precisely because the position is intended 
to supply a reduction (cf. W right (1980, 350-351)). Shalkowski (1996, 
375-381) critic izes attem pted linguistic  reductions of the m odal 
contending that, like Lewisian reductionism , they fail to m eet the 
conditions of non-arbitrariness and non-circularity.
! ! 6  Putnam  [19791(1983, 116) puts the point thus: The "exciting"
thesis that logic is true by convention reduces to the unexciting claim 
that logic is true by conventions plus logic. No real advance has been 
m ad e .'
!!7 The failure of conventionalist reductionism , aw areness of the 
inadequacies of expressivism, and the desire to avoid a problem atic, 
n e c e s s ity -d e te c tin g  fa c u lty  have p ro m p ted  a n ti- re d u c tio n is t  
conventionalist approaches to m odality, such as that offered by 
W right (1980; 1986; 1989). Criticisms of such contemporary views are 
offered by Shalkowski (1996, 383-386). On my account (at 2.2) modal 
knowledge requires a rational faculty, but no m ysterious necessity- 
detecting faculty (cf.: Divers (1990); Peacocke (1997)). W right (1989, 
237) comments that 'the driving force behind non-cognitivism  as a 
philosophy of m odality has always been the belief that the cost of 
cognitivism  m ust be epistem ological extravagance or epistem ological 
head-burying’. Realist conceptualism  results in the form er cost only 
by the lights of a hard-edged empiricism. It results in the latter only 
in the absence of an explanatorily viable account of the a priori: such 
an account is provided by Peacocke (1993).
! ! 8  Armstrong is inspired Skyrms (1981), reprinted as an appendix to 
Arm strong (1989). The reductionist intent of Arm strong's project is 
d isplayed by (1986, 575) and (1989, 47-48). Kim (1986, 597) 
provides an exposition of Armstrong's reductionist aspiration.
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of states of affairs are simple (i.e. indivisible) individuals and simple 
p ro p erties  and re la tions. Sim ple p roperties and re la tio n s  are 
conceived of as sim ple universals. A rm strong subscribes to the 
Tractarian thesis that simple elements have all possibilities written 
into them: the totality of combinations of the elements provides for all 
possibilities. So, the possible is held to be dependent upon the actual
in the sense that actually  existing  ind iv iduals and un iversals
determ ine the possib le . There are no d isjunctive  or negative 
properties. An individual cannot both possess and lack a given 
property , because, although conjunctions of universals count as 
properties, the only conjunctions of universals which are admissible 
are those which are actually instantiated (1989, 70). No individual can
both have and lack a given property because no individual does
possess contradictory properties (and there are no negative properties 
anyw ay).
Properties are regarded as ways that individuals are; relations as 
ways they stand to one another. A ccord ing ly , there are no 
uninstantiated (or 'a lien ') universals. All individuals are such that 
they possess at least one property. That is to say, individuals exist 
only in states of affairs: there are no bare individuals (1986, 578; 
1989, 43, 47). The possible is restricted by the actual in the sense that 
all possibilities are composed from actually existing elem ents, but 
actually existing combinations form a subset of possible combinations. 
Any statem ent which respects the form of atomic states of affairs
constitutes a statement of possibility: if a is F  in the actual world, a is
G in another possible world. Armstrong sum m arizes the approach 
thus:
The simple individuals, properties and relations may be 
combined in all  ways to yield possible atomic states of 
affairs, provided only that the form of atomic facts is 
respected. That is the com binatorial idea. Such possible 
atomic states of affairs may then be combined in all  ways 
to yield possible m olecular states of affairs. If  such a
possible m olecular state of affairs is thought of as the
totality of being, then it is a possible world. (1986, 579; cf.
1989, 47-49)
In addition, the theory is m odified to allow for 'expansion ' and
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'con trac tion '. E xpansion allows for worlds in w hich there are 
individuals which do not exist in (i.e., are alien from the point of view 
of) the actual world. C ontraction allows for w orlds in which 
individuals and universals existent in the actual world are absent 
(1986, 580-586; 1989, Chapter 4 ) . ü 9  Armstrong suggests that alien 
individuals are permissible via analogy, whereby they are taken to be 
like existing individuals, but simply quantitatively other than existing 
i n d i v i d u a l s . ! 2 0  Alien universals are held to be unacceptable since they 
would have to have their own natures (or quiddities'). Since such 
quiddities 'are not to be found in the space-tim e world ', they are 
unaccep tab le  to a na tu ra lis tic  theory of p o ss ib ility  such as 
A rm strong's com binatorialism  (1986, 581; cf. 1989, 55-57). Only 
instantiated universals exist, and these set a lim it to the possible 
universals. Accordingly, Arm strong concludes (1986, 582) that 'the 
denial of alien universals is a necessary truth'.!
Arm strong may not escape making appeal to prim itive m odality in 
setting up the basic apparatus of his theory. P ossib ilities  are 
determined by simple individuals and relations. Armstrong states that
!!9 Armstrong seeks to debar expansion, but perm it contraction, for 
u n iv ersa ls .
!^ü Critics of this move include Kim (1986, 604-606), Bradley (1992, 
215-216) and Bacon (1995, 6 6 ), the last of whom views it is as 
inconsistent with Armstrong's commitment to actualism.
!2! Armstrong (1989, 57) writes, less dogmatically:
I have not proved the impossibility of alien universals, but 
it does appear that the impossibility follows from a certain 
theory of possibility. If that theory is true, then alien 
universals are impossible. But it is an intelligible thought 
that alien universals are possible, if only because nobody, 
at this stage of philosophical inquiry, can k n o w  that he 
puts forward a true theory of possibility.
.U n iv ersa ls  a lso  pose problem s for the c o n s tru c tiv is tic  and 
conceptualistic account of possibility advocated by Rescher (1975), 
since he has it both that possibilities 'are in te l lectual  construc t ions  
(entia rationis)  developed from a strictly actually-pertaining starting 
point' the elem ents of which are actual ind iv iduals and their 
p ro p e rtie s  (1975, 2) and th a t '[p jro p e rtie s  m ust ad m it of
exem plification, but they need not be exemplified' (1975, 6 ). Rescher 
thus seeks to establish his idealist theory of possibility  such that 
possib ilities  are m ental constructs from actual e lem ents, w hilst 
sim ultaneously denying the instantiation requirem ent. This anomaly 
is observed by Weiss (1980, 204-205).
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the simples that exist are all and only the simples that could exist 
(although alien individuals are admissible via the method of analogy). 
The appeal to prim itive m odality m ight arise in rela tion  to the 
characterization of simple individuals and u n i v e r s a l s . ! ^ 2  A rm strong 
(1989, 51-53) m aintains that there is never a necessity-involving 
relationship between a given simple individual and a given property. 
Armstrong takes this to constitute a rejection of essentialism , which 
indeed it does, since it constitutes a rejection of a necessary but non­
sufficient condition —namely that some of the traits of individuals are 
had of m etaphysical necessity de re— for the existence of essences. 
(A rm strong  does not h im self acknow ledge th is d is tin c tio n .)  
Nevertheless, he holds that every such individual m ust possess some 
property, although there is no property such that the individual must 
have that property. Armstrong claims that he rejects an ontology of 
bare particulars on the grounds that;
To be individuals, individuals must be an  individual, must 
be o n e  thing. But this demands that they 'fall under a 
concept' as Frege would put it, that they have some unit- 
making property. (1986, 578; cf. 1989, 43)
Now the 'm ust' here looks like a clear exam ple of the 'm ust' of 
m e ta p h y s ic a l n ecess ity  de re. A rm strong 's re jec tio n  of bare
! 2 2  Cf. Newman (1992, 51):
A thing that is a universal and happens to occur just once 
has the potentiality  for repeated presence, w hereas a 
thing that is a particular and happens to occur ju st once
lacks that potentiality. These...strike me as being brute
facts. They are modal facts because if som ething is a
universal then necessarily it is a universal, and therefore 
necessarily it can occur many times, whereas if something 
is a particular then necessarily it is a particu lar, and 
therefore necessarily it can occur only once.
(Cf. the charac teriza tion  of the u n iv ersa l/p a rticu la r d istinc tion
provided  by Lowe (1989, 38; 1994b, 532) according to which
un iversa ls  are in stan tiab le  and particu lars in s tan tia te  bu t are
uninstan tiab le.) Newman rejects the possibility  of an extra-m odal 
analysis of the m odal throughout the chapter, w hich includes a 
discussion (1992, 69-72) of Lewisian reductionism. That discussion is 
less in trica te  than D ivers (1997) and m ore fo rth rig h t in its
denunciation of reductionism .
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particulars and his supposed rejection of primitive m odality appear to 
be in tension, since it is unclear that it makes sense to deny that 
individuals have any necessary properties w hilst asserting that they
m ust have some unit-making property. Having to have some property 
looks like a candidate for being a necessary predicate of its bearer: 
even if there is no lower-order property such that an object m ust
possess that property, the object’s having to have some property is a 
higher-order property had of metaphysical necessity de re. Since the 
'm ust' is involved in the characterization of sim ple individuals it 
cannot be reducible to those individuals. If it is to be accounted for 
along the lines of Armstrong's reductionism  then it would have to 
reduce to properties and relations. Armstrong (1986, 587) writes:
that a certain universal is or is not simple...seems to me to 
be a necessary truth. Certainly, it may be a question to be 
decided a posteriori to the extent that it can be decided.
But it is not a contingent matter. It is what we might call a 
K lipke an necessity.
This claim  again appears to be in tension with others made by its 
author. The claim  that it is a necessary truth that there are no alien 
universals m eans that there are no worlds in w hich there are 
universals that are not instantiated in the actual world, not that all 
actually instantiated universals are instantiated in every world. Now 
if it were a necessary truth that a given universal is simple then that 
un iversal w ould have to be instan tiated  in every w orld: but
contraction is provided precisely to avoid the requirem ent for such 
instantiation. Simples are characterized by Armstrong in modal terms. 
He does not show that those modal terms can themselves be explained 
by appeal to his own theoretical apparatus. It appears that in 
characterizing simples Armstrong either posits brute modal facts or 
makes arbitrary stipulations on controversial m atters for the sake of 
consistency with his account. Since the very notion of sim plicity
required by Armstrong's theory appears to be such that its sense can
be conveyed only in terms which employ modal vocabulary, the 
theory stands accused of employing primitive m o d a l i t y . !^3
!23 Pap (1958, 408) suggests that the notion of simplicity implicated 
in logical independence theses (e.g., the thesis of Hume independence' 
adopted by Armstrong) is such that 'the concept of entailm ent, or 
alternatively the concept of possibility, must be used in stating this I
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a certain theory of possibility, and I reasoned about this
An epistem ological objection to Arm strong's theory is that it is 
incom patib le  w ith the a priori  status of logic. T hat concrete 
individuals cannot have contradictory properties holds a priori, as a 
m atter of logic, if  it holds at all. In proposing that mere possibilities
depend upon the actually existent simples A rm strong appears to 
award par adigmatic all y a posteriori  status to all mere possibilities. In 
accordance with the approach to modal epistemology proposed earlier 
in this chapter, it is mistaken to portray the determination of logical 
m odalities as dependent upon the a posteriori.  Arm strong does not 
pay much attention to the issue of the epistem ology pertinent to 
m odality-involving axioms and principles of inference, although his 
account would seem to involve their being dependent upon the a 
p o s te r io r i ,  since the fundamental restrictions on possibility deriving, 
for exam ple, from supposed necessary truths about universals, are
held by him to be paradigm atically a poster ior i . I  have already
argued for their a priori  status: so far as concerns them, what happens
to be true of, and even what is a true statement of de re necessity
c o n ce rn in g , the ac tual w orld , has n e ith e r  sem an tica l nor 
epistem ological bearing. I suggest that it is more likely that such
principles (e.g. that actuality entails possibility) have a role in shaping 
the theory offered by Armstrong than that they can be shown to 
reduce to the factors provided by the apparatus of that theory. A 
p o s t e r i o r i  means can provide us with neither m odality-involving 
axioms nor principles of deductive inference. Even if there w e r e  
necessary a posteriori  truths, the identification of the modal status of 
such truths could not be established via purely a posteriori  means. 
A rm strong's naturalism  would appear to construe logic as an a
pos te r io r i  science, but whatever the observation of the concrete realm 
can do it cannot supply us with the apparatus of deductive reasoning.
1 -
Armstrong acknowledges that the principles of inference employed in 
the construction and defence of his account of possib ility  raise 
problems as to their own status:
I postulated a certain structure for the world which yields
.£'0-: 
Isrre q u ire m e n t'.124 E.g. (1986, 587; cf. 1989, xi), where necessary truths about 
universals are characterized as exhibiting 'Kripkean necessity'.
Ï
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structure. Possibility  was defined using that structure.
B ut...w hat of the status of the postulation and of the 
theory, and, again, the principles of reasoning used in their 
development? Are they to be taken as necessary truths?
If they are necessary, how are they to be brought within 
the scope of my theory? (1989, 138)
In drawing consequences, I was deducing. But what is the 
sta tus of the p rincip les of deduction  thus tac itly  
em ployed? It seems natural to treat these principles as 
necessary truths. But given the general theory they are 
used to develop, what is the force of calling  them  
necessary? (1989, 138)
Armstrong makes three points in relation to such difficulties. First, he 
suggests that many of the claims made and the principles of inference 
employed in the construction and defence of the theory are 'analytic':  
they are held to be true s o l e l y  by virtue of the m eanings of the 
symbols employed in the statement’ (1989, 138-139). He then invites 
us to recall
that by ’property' should be meant 'ways particulars are' 
and by 'relation' should be meant 'ways individuals stand 
to each other'. I f  these are correct definitions (I pass over 
the truly delicate question of how to estab lish  this 
an teceden t), then it is analytic that p roperties and 
relations demand particulars to instantiate them. And, it 
would seem, analyticity of this strong sort yields necessity 
without  appeal to Combinatorial theory. (1989, 139)
I
He then points to the plausibility of the claim  that modus  ponens  
’flows from the very meaning  of "if...then...'". Various problems arise 
in relation to this first response to the difficulties. First, even if it is 
true that this 'strong' analyticity yields necessity w ithout appeal to 
C om binatorial theory ', the question rem ains as to w hether the 
necessity can be analyzed via the theory. W ith the benefit of the 
insights afforded by Divers (1997), Armstrong m ight be seen, in his 
emphasis upon necessity arising from m e a n in g s  here, as suggesting 
that the necessity in question, given its intensional source, arises 
independently  of his theory, which provides a m e t a p h y s i c s  for
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m odality. Thus, the necessity in question arises independently  of 
commitment to that metaphysics. However, this would undermine the 
claim  made by Armstrong (1989, 48) that his com binatorial theory 
renders a reductive analysis of the n o t i o n  of possib ility . The 
commitment to a reductive metaphysic does not necessarily render an 
account which is non-prim itivist at the level of m e a n i n g . ! ^ 5  in order 
to provide a reductive analysis of modality which succeeds in doing 
more than registering a commitment to the ontologically derivative 
status of m odality, it has to be shown that m odal notions can be 
accounted for non-modally. Thus, the issue is not whether 'strong' 
analyticity  yields necessity without appeal to com binatorial theory, 
but whether that analyticity can be accounted for non-m odally via 
notions em ployed in that theory which are them selves e ither 
explicable non-m odally, or explicable via m odality-involving notions 
w hich are them selves conceptually prior to the very notions of 
necessity and possibility which they involve. Second, ju s t as Divers 
identifies ambiguity in Lycan's suggestion that 'world' m e an s  possible 
world', so we may accuse Armstrong of ambiguity in claim ing, for 
exam ple that 'property ' m e a n s  'ways particulars are'. A rm strong's 
casting  of the rela tionsh ip  between these term s in p rescrip tive  
terminology does not help, since it lays him open to the charge that he 
affords no analysis of modality by stipulating the meanings of certain 
terms employed in a reduction of the modal. Setting that to one side, 
and more importantly, it is unclear whether such claim s are to be 
taken as expressing commitments as to the extensions of the terms at 
issue or specifications of their intensions. Since Armstrong emphasizes 
analyticity, and independence from com binatorial theory, it appears 
that he is concerned with the latter, but this is not clear given that his 
original claims appear under the heading 'Sketch of an Ontology', and 
concern, e.g., 'what properties are to be thought of as', i.e. what sorts 
of things they are to be conceived of as being, not the intension of 
property'. Armstrong's claims suggest a commitment to the claim that 
'instantiated universal' is an analytic definition of 'universal'. It m ight 
be objected, however, that there is no extra-m odal analysis of this 
claim  to be had if it is held to exhibit a necessity not explicable via 
appeal to the apparatus of combinatorial theory itself. In addition, the 
charge m ight be levelled  that A rm strong's exp lic it com m itm ent
]§■
!25 A rm strong him self recognizes m etaphysical approaches which 
'm ight be said to be onto logically  reduction ist, w ithout being 
sem antically reductionist' (1989, 104).
I
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!26 A sim ilar concern seems to pervade New m an's critique of 
Arm strong. The seriousness of the charge will depend upon the 
defensibility of (NC2), which Divers admits (1997, 159) might require 
to be bolstered further, as a condition upon non-circularity.
!27 This echoes Divers's discussion (1997) of Lewisian reductionism.
regard ing  the ex tension  of 'u n iv ersa l', i .e ., the in s tan tia tio n
requirem ent, in that it dictates that the only universals which can 
exist are those which are instantiated in the actual world, falls foul of 
D ivers 's (not untentatively) proposed condition on non-circularity  
(N C 2 ) . ! 2 6  Third, the com binatorialist, like any m odal reductionist, 
faces the difficulty of explicating the necessity which m ust attach to 
the equivalences which he posits betw een m odal and reductive  
terminology: their necessity is a necessary condition upon their non­
a rb itra r in e ss . !^7
This las t problem  relates also to A rm strong 's second proposal 
concerning the d ifficu lties concerning the theses and ru les of 
inference involved in the construction and defence of the theory. He
suggests that he might have to be committed to the postulation of 
truths which are classifiable neither as necessary nor as contingent.
W here necessity and contingency are analysed by means 
of a certain theory, the Com binatorial theory, then the
price that may have to be paid is the denial that the 
theory itself is either necessary or contingent. I do not
think the price is too high. (1989, 139)
Arm strong is here confronting a similar problem  to that faced by 
W ittgenstein concerning the status of the contents of the T ra c ta tu s ,  
but where W ittgenstein denied them genuinely prepositional status, 
A rm strong adopts the more contorted position that the theses of 
combinatorial theory are true, but have no modal status. It is difficult 
to see how this move can be defended other than in so far as it is
intended to save the theory: it has a definite air of arbitrariness. In
addition, this mooted response would not be sufficient to cope with
the reductionist's equivalences between modal and supposedly extra- 
modal discourse because, as has been mentioned, these have to have a 
certain  m odal status, nam ely that they hold of necessity , if  the 
proposed reduction is to provide non-arbitrary truth-conditions for 
modal claims. Furthermore, the stipulation that there is a species of
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truth with no modal status might justifiably be said to constitute an 
unacceptably strong revision of our pre-reductive in tu itions. The 
proposal would presum ably entail that other theses, such as the 
com m itm ent to the necessary truth of the statem ent that there are 
only instantiated universals, would have to be revised. This in turn 
would have the uncomfortable result that, if it is m erely true (but 
ne ither con tingen tly  nor necessarily  true) that there are only 
instan tia ted  universals, then the statem ent would appear to be 
unequipped to restrict possibilities, if, that is, we make the plausible 
assumption that a statement which is restrictive of possibilities cannot 
itself be devoid of modal status. Armstrong's proposal would suggest a 
rejection  of the idea that only necessities res tric t possib ilities . 
Accordingly, the proposal has little claim to intelligibility.
Armstrong's third response to the problem is to state (1989, 139) his 
hope, rather than his conviction, that his theory does not employ 
primitive modality, and to state that even if it did, it would still count 
as a worthwhile modal theory in so far as it attempts 'to exhibit in a 
perspicuous manner the s tructure  of m o d a l i t y ' . The third response, 
then, although unobjectionable in itself, does not serve to rescue the
reductionist credentials of the theory. Armstrong comm ents that he 
does 'not like the idea that modality is a fundam ental, unanalysable 
feature of rea lity ', because he believes that this presents 'g reat 
epistem ological problems' (1989, 139-140), This comm ent is intended 
to be expressive of the contrast between reductive and non-reductive 
modal theories. It illustrates a crudity in Armstrong's appreciation of 
reduction ism  and prim itiv ism , which is re la ted  to the general 
intension/extension ambiguities in discussions of this issue which are
identified by Divers (1997). As I have em phasized, the prim itivist 
need not posit that actuality itself is modal in nature: m inimally, all
that the prim itivist claims is that modal n o t io n s  are up neither for
elim ination nor for reduction to non-modal notions. The problem  for 
Arm strong’s account which is at issue, relating to the modal status of
128 Bradley (1992, 219) argues that Armstrong's theory does fail to be 
genuinely reductionist on the ground that the crucial 'notion of
respecting the form of a state of affairs, as Armstrong employs it,
is...irrem ediably  m odal'. Bradley claims (1992, 220) that the early 
W ittgenstein 'took pains to point out the modal nature of the notion of
form ' (this claim  seems to be borne out by the early parts of the
T r a c t a t u s , esp. 2 .0141, 2 .033) and that, un like  A rm strong,
W ittgenstein's account of modality was explicitly prim itivist.
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the contents of the theory and of the reductive equivalences it must
posit, is not one of ontology, but of conceptual priority.
2.4 Conclusion
It has been suggested that modal elim inativism  is untenable due to 
global problems which call its very coherence into question. Linguistic 
versions of modal reductionism , as has been long and apparently
unassailably established, generate an infin ite regress. M ore recent 
attem pts to reduce the modal to the non-m odal do not appear to
succeed: qu ite  independen tly  of the dubious m etaphysics or
epistem ology which such positions may require, it has yet to be 
dem onstrated that they do not collapse into prim itivism . There is 
n o th in g  th e o re tic a l ly , m e ta p h y s ic a lly  or e p is te m o lo g ic a lly  
objectionable about the minimal prim itivist's thesis that m odality is
up neither for elim ination nor for reduction. A ccordingly, m odal 
prim itivism  is vindicated.
;1
Ï
I
I
I
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CHAPTER 3: MODAL REALISM
3.1 Realist and Anti-Realist Modal Primitivism
3.2 Anti-realism I; Against Projectivism
Once the forcefulness of the case for modal prim itivism  has been 
established the fundam ental choice which rem ains is betw een the 
broad options of realist modal prim itivism  and an ti-rea list modal 
primitivism. For the sake of this discussion the former will be defined 
as the view that at least some modality inheres in reality,! the latter 
as the view that, despite the primitiveness of modality, no modality is 
so grounded. Only realist modal prim itivism  challenges the thesis 
(common to rigid actualism and Lewisian possibilism ) that the actual 
is non-m odal. I defend realist modal prim itivism  both by arguing 
against the opposition and by setting out the case, independently of 
the shortcomings of the opposition, for favouring realism. Anti-realist 
m odal prim itivism  can be characterised as a sort of 'an ti-rea list 
conceptualism ', in the terminology of Wiggins (1980, Chapter 5). Anti­
realist modal primitivism  is anti-realist conceptualist in that m odality 
is regarded as having purely m ind-dependent status: it is not to be 
identified  with conceptualist reductionism , which holds the further 
thesis that modal notions reduce to non-modal notions.
t
Î
A nti-realist approaches to modality which may qualify as prim itivist 
are various. We might envisage a theory which endorses error theory 
but a lso  ho lds, con trary  to e lim ina tiv ism , th a t m odality  is 
indispensable or that it is dispensable in principle but ought not to be 
e lim inated .^  Such an approach would not be intentional in Blackburn's 
sense, since error theory operates from within the standard truth- 
conditional rubric. Nonetheless, it would attribute purely conceptual 
status to m odality .3 (Such an err or-theoretic but non-elim inative
I! So, on this account, the realist modal prim itiv ist need not be 
com m itted to the view, expressed by Fisk (1973, e.g., 44), and 
suggested by Fine (1994), that all  modality is grounded in the natures 
of things. The view of Weiss (1980, 212) compares with those of Fisk 
and Fine.
2 Non-elim inative varieties of error theory are described by Railton 
and Rosen (1995, 434-435).
3 Fisk (1973, 28-29) contrasts the real' with 'the in tentional' in 
respect of necessity . His term inology is at variance w ith that
   li .. . . . . .
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approach would be conceptual in this metaphysical sense, but not in 
the ep istem olog ica l sense according to w hich there is m odal 
knowledge via knowledge of concepts.)
Subsequent to my discussion of the realism  favoured herein, I will 
turn my attention to the general thesis that the actual is non-modal. 
By taking issue with this thesis I hope to d iscred it an ti-realist 
prim itivism  of whatever hue. In this section, however, one of the 
main strains of anti-realist primitivism , namely projectivism , will be 
independently  discussed.
Projectivism  about modality holds that modal discourse has a non­
representative function: it has some role other than the statem ent of 
(standard) facts, such as the expression of attitude. There are some 
fairly well-known objections to expressive theories (which take their 
m ost fam iliar form in an objection to the emotivist's claim  that moral
discourse is non-factual). It would be dishonest to pretend that these
can conclusively discredit a projective account of m odality, but they 
do have considerable persuasive force. The central problem  which 
confronts the projectiv ist is how to account for the prepositional
behaviour of the discourse deemed expressive: the anti-pro jectiv ist 
will take exception to the projectivist’s denial that locutions which are, 
on the surface, tru th-conditional, m erit genuinely tru th-conditional 
status. If, as the projectiv ist would have it, the m eaning of any
statem ent in a given discourse is (nothing but) expressive, then the 
problem  arises as to how such a statement can feature in a context 
with which such an account is not harmonious. An example of such a 
context is argument by modus ponens.  Ethical projectivism  may be 
objected to on the grounds that a purely expressive account of the 
m eaning of m oral discourse is im plausible  given tha t eth ical 
statements can feature in apparently valid arguments such as:
(1) If lying is wrong then getting little brother to lie is also
w rong.
(2) Lying is wrong.
H ence
(3) getting little brother to lie is wrong.4
employed here in that he applies the latter term  to non-projective 
an ti-rea lis t conceptualism .
4 Blackburn (1984, 189f) is well aware of the difficulty. This example
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As it occurs in (1), lying is wrong is not an evaluation: this appears to 
underm ine the em otiv ist's  thesis that it has purely  expressive 
m eaning . This com plain t may also be ra ised  again st m odal 
p ro jec tiv ism .5 Constructions incorporating modal idioms can feature in 
such apparently valid argum ents.6 Given that, on a standard account, 
a ttitudes are taken not to feature in log ical re la tions such as 
entailm ent, the projectiv ist m ust provide an alternative account of 
what is going on in such cases. The projectivist will proceed either by 
denying that the discourse in question should properly be considered 
to partake in such relations or by seeking an alternative account of 
such prepositional behaviour (which, in this case, am ounts to an 
account in some terms other than those em ployed in the standard 
account of the notion of logical validity). Blackburn adopts the latter 
course: the function of the 'quasi-realism ' with which his projectivism  
is combined is to explain, and preserve, the prepositional behaviour of 
the purported ly  pro jective  discourse. The a lterna tive  to logical 
validity which Blackburn proposes is attitudinal approval. Rather than 
the conclusion in the above argument follow ing, in the traditional 
sense associated with logical entailm ent, from  the prem isses, the 
acceptability of the argument is explained such that: the consequent 
in (1) follows from the antecedent in the sense that if the antecedent 
expresses the appropriate ethical attitude, then the acceptance of the 
consequent is the appropriate ethical attitude; given that (1) and (2) 
express appropriate moral attitudes, it is attitudinally appropriate to 
accept (3). There is no (traditional) logical entailment: the holding of 
the conditional is due only to its attitudinal appropriateness. The 
recognition of that appropriateness is again an attitudinal matter: the 
failure to recognise that the consequent follows from the antecedent is 
a m oral-attitudinal failure, rather than a failure to recognize logical 
entailment. Someone who rejects the argument cannot be said to lack
is a modified version of Blackburn's own: it is provided and discussed 
by Hale (1986, 7 If). The point, and this form of example, originate 
from Geach (1972, 250-269, esp. 268).
5 Blackburn seeks to provide a quasi-realist projectiv ist account of 
m oral and m odal discourses. He does not point to any substantive 
difference between the two cases as to how this account is to be 
co n stru c ted .
6 Of course, arguments can incorporate idioms which are both modal 
and moral (e.g. where deontic modalities occur —including entailments 
from the deontic 'ought' to the non-deontic 'can'.)
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the competence to recognize, or accurately opine upon, logical validity, 
since it is not logical validity which is pertinent. Blackburn does not 
deal explicitly with the occurrence of modal idiom s in argum ents 
which are traditionally regarded as valid. It would appear that modal
cases could not be implanted in the explanatory fram ew ork which 
Blackburn provides for moral cases without some prior tweaking of 
the account. The failure to recognise that a modal consequent follows 
from the acceptance of a modal antecedent cannot be an identical sort 
of attitudinal failure as that displayed in the first (moral) case: that 
failure was a moral failure; the one with which we are now concerned
'S
m ust be interpreted as a modal failure. W right (1988, 47-48 nt. 19) 
emphasizes that in such cases the problem remains that the failure to 
accept an argum ent considered valid on the traditional account is 
irrational:  it is not solely a moral (nor, we will add, modal) at t i tud ina l  
failure. W right gives the following example:
Provided that stealing is wrong, and that, if  stealing is 
w rong, encouraging others to steal is w rong, then 
encouraging others to steal is wrong
the point of which is to illustrate the claim that the failure to accept as 
valid arguments such as (l)-(3) above involves a failure of rationality. 
No m oral attitude towards all or any of the statem ents in the 
antecedent of W right's example is necessary in order to recognize that 
the consequent does indeed follow from the antecedent. One ought to 
accept the conditional, regardless of one's moral attitudes (and indeed 
regard less of the appropriate m oral a ttitude). W right's exam ple 
isolates the rational element in arguments employing moral discourse, 
facilitating its recognition in arguments in which moral evaluations do 
occur. The projectivist, then, still has a case to answer concerning the 
p rep o s itio n a l behav iou r o f m oral and m odal d isco u rse . The 
predisposition to regard the sorts of inconsistencies under discussion 
as logical, and not merely attitudinal, has not been overcome.?
Another difficulty  for the projective account, em phasized by Hale 
(1986, 78-79) and W right (1988, 34), concerns iterated m odalities. 
According to the projectivist, a modally qualified locution asserts no 
facts. The modal attitudes which modal idioms express are attitudes to
? Further debate on the issue occurs between Schueler (1988) and 
Blackburn (1988), and Hale (1993a, 1993b) and Blackburn (1993).
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propositions, but a modally qualified proposition, taken as a totality 
(i.e. the p roposition  plus the m odal m odifier) is not itse lf  a 
proposition , since it is expressive rather than fac t-sta ting . The 
problem  for the projectivist is that this account precludes iterated 
m odalities from  featuring in w ell-form ed constructions. On the 
p ro je c tiv is t’s account, 'n ecessarily , necessarily  /?', and equally , 
necessarily, possibly p',  cannot be well-formed since 'necessarily p'  
and 'possibly /?', although well-formed, are not propositions. Modal 
idiom s are taken to qualify propositions, not expressive discourse; 
'necessarily p'  is expressive, so 'necessarily p'  cannot be qualified by a 
fu rther m odal operator. M odal projectivism  thus renders iterated 
m odalities unintelligible and is incom patible with their featuring in 
modal logic. Given that iterated modalities are generally regarded —by 
those who regard modality as intelligible— as intelligible and that they 
are adm issible w ithin,8 or feature in the axioms of, each of the usual 
systems of modal logic, the onus is on the pro jectiv ist either to 
convince us that the failure of projectivism to accommodate them is 
not unsavoury or to attem pt to reconcile them  with the projective 
accoun t.9
A further point is especially relevant to the project in which this 
chapter is ultim ately engaged. As the previous paragraph notes, the 
projectiv ist treats modal idioms as functioning solely as sentential 
operators. This leaves room only for de dicto m odalities. On the 
credible assum ption that de re modal locutions are gram m atically 
irred u c ib le  fea tu res of natural language it  fo llow s tha t the 
projectivist's account is incomplete. This incompleteness rests upon no 
prio r endorsem ent of any m etaphysical position. A very closely 
related issue is that the account apparently fails to accommodate the 
com m on d istinc tions betw een d ifferen t kinds of necessity  and 
possib ility  w ith which philosophers are acquainted, regardless of 
whether or not they would grant them endorsement. Hale (1986, 79) 
relates this to the issue of the presence, or avoidance, of vicious 
circularity in the projectivist’s account of modality. On the projective 
account, in modally qualifying a proposition we are expressing an 
attitude: that attitude is a modal attitude. In treating a proposition as 
possible I express (but do not say anything about) an ability of mine
8 Cf. Hughes and Cresswell (1996, 51).
9 Shalkowski (1996, 382) rejects modal projectivism  on the basis of 
the objections raised by Hale.
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to accept it, imagine it, or what have you; in treating it as necessary I
express the relevant inability. W hat is the nature of the notion of
possibility appealed to in the projectivist’s account? Hale points out 
that if it is logical possibility then the theory is circular. (There are 
good reasons why it cannot be logical possibility anyway since, p a c e  
Schlick [19381(1979, 311), the notion of logical possibili ty f o r  me
implausibly conflates logical and non-logical modalities.!0 In any case, 
the projectiv ist may be due the benefit of the doubt here.) Hale
m entions that circularity in the account is avoided if the m odality 
involved is psychological (as distinct from logical), but then the
trouble is that this does not sit comfortably with the norm ative force 
allocated to logical modalities, which Blackburn (1984, 217) appears
to want to preserve. If modal projectivism is intended to account for
all m odality (rather than being restricted to logical m odalities), as
there is good reason to think that it is, then it seems to be committed 
to regarding all modal talk as expressive of one and the same type of 
psychological attitude. Thus it appears to be committed to the view 
that there is only one sort of modal notion, pertaining to the relevant 
psychological m odality . If indeed it is so com m itted then the 
projectivist has a considerable job of work to do in convincing us that 
the intuitions and practices which incline us away from such a view 
are misplaced or are assimilable into the projective view. If a credible 
defence of realism  about m odality  de re is available then the 
p ro sp ec ts  of a com prehensive  p ro jec tiv ism  are underm ined . 
Independent of that, the projective account as it stands is incomplete 
due to its failure to accommodate a large class of ordinary modal 
d iscourse .! !
3.3 Realism
According to the realist, there are ontologically grounded necessities 
and possibilities. The thesis that they are ontologically grounded need
!0 Ayers (1968, 33-37) and Hacking (1975, 322-323) distinguish two 
sentential forms concerning two kinds of possibility: Tt is possible 
that /?', and Tt is possible for A to x'.  My suggestion is that logical 
possibility  typically relates to the former, not the latter. H acking’s 
own view (1975, 332-334) is that logical possibility typically relates 
to the latter. I take up the issue in Chapter 4.
! ! Cf, the observation of A.R. White (1975, 174) that expressive and 
illocutionary accounts of modal terms exhibit a clear allegiance to a 
de dicto interpretation of their application'.
12 Thus Plantinga's strategy (1969, 248-257; 1974, 29-34), cf. D. 
Bennett (1969, 491-499), whereby appeasement of the sceptic about 
m odality de re is attempted by exp l ica t ing  it in terms of modality d e  
dicto ,  is impossible to follow. It seems that even if any such strategy 
could succeed, it m ight fail to appease the sceptic whose worry is 
m etaphysical rather than sem antical. In addition, the attem pt of 
Fumerton (1986) to reduce  essence to modality de re and modality de  
re to modality de dicto cannot succeed. Fumerton's discussion is all the 
less credible given that he (1986, 281) makes the mistaken claim that 
essential attribution and talk involving necessity de re are equivalent 
and his entire argum ent rests on the illegitim ate assum ption that 
definition is a sufficient condition for reduction.
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make no stronger a claim than that a purely intentional or conceptual 
(intensional) account of modality is misplaced: it does not entail that 
concepts are irrelevant to the m etaphysics or the epistem ology of 
modality. The argument I will support will be confined to discussion 
of m odality de re. I seek to avoid com m itm ent concerning the 
question as to whether modality de dicto is a subspecies of modality 
de re. I aim to establish that there is at least a range of modality de re 
which is neither dispensable nor (gram m atically or ontologically) 
reducible. This lack of reducibility should here be understood to 
include a lack of reducibility to modality de dicto. I will argue that a 
necessary but non-sufficient condition for the success of such a 
reduction, namely the holding of equivalence relations such that all 
m odal locutions de re are translatable into modal locutions de dicto, 
cannot be met. 1 2
Metaphvsical Necessitv as Distinct from Logical Necessitv 
I seek to establish the credentials of realism  about objective non- 
logical m odalities both as a means of underm ining anti-m etaphysics 
and to establish that the requirem ent for substantive m etaphysical 
possibility cannot be usurped by attempting to use logical possibility 
as a surrogate. I seek to establish that metaphysical m odalities do not 
reduce to logical modalities, and a large part of the rest of my project 
rests upon that view. (I emphasize that it is no part of my project to 
try to reduce logical modalities to metaphysical m odalities: I try to 
rem ain neutral on this issue.) There is a prima fa c i e  accep tab le  
assum ption to the effect that logical necessity  is de dicto.  In 
accordance with this assumption, if primitive logical necessity were to 
be interpreted realistically  that m ight involve a com m itm ent to a 
certain sort of abstract entities, such as propositions. Thereby, de dicto
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necessity  m ight be construed in terms of the de re n e ce ss itie s  
characteristic of such e n t i t i e s . O n  such an account, logical necessity, 
although explicable in terms of de re necessity, would nonetheless be 
d istinc t from  the sort of necessity which qualifies predicates in 
constructions concerning ordinary  spatio tem poral e n t i t i e s . O n e  
m ight deem the latter sort of necessity to be m etaphysical, rather 
than logical. This is without prejudice to the view that some abstract 
entities (e.g., numbers) or metaphysically necessary beings (e.g., God) 
have essences. My contention is that m etaphysical necessity concerns 
c o n c r e t a  (not necessarily to the exclusion of a b s t r a c t a ) ,  w hereas 
logical necessity does not. (We are, of course, free to hold that human 
beings are natural entities whose rational operations are, so to speak, 
bound by logical necessity: by saying that logical necessity does not 
concern concrete entities I mean that the logical necessity operator 
does not q ua l i fy  such entities or the predicates attributable to them.) 
So, that may be a reason for maintaining that logical and metaphysical 
necessity  should be distinguished. My intention is to endorse a 
d istinc tion  betw een these species of necessity  w hilst rem aining 
neutral on w hether they are disjoined. My account excludes the 
possib ility  of m etaphysical necessity being a subspecies of logical 
necessity or merely a restricted version thereof, it does not rule out
This, or a similar account, is implicit in Fine (1994), criticized by 
Hale (1996, 102-114), although matters are considerably obscured by 
F ine 's  m isrep resen ta tion  of de re necessity per  se in terms of 
necessary truth. A related view is suggested by Shalkowski (1994, 
687), conditional upon the supposition that 'propositions and other 
lingu istic  units are en tities...w hether abstract or concrete ', while 
Forbes (1986, 11-12) suggests that de dicta necessities are grounded 
in de re necessary features of properties.
1^  Even on Shalkowski's suggestion, logical necessity would still be 
d istinct from  the class of m etaphysical necessity de re, since the 
former would concern only a subclass of all necessities.
15 Farrell (1981) argues that m etaphysical necessity is not logical 
necessity on the ground that metaphysical necessity is a variety of 
Popperian  natural necessity. The argum ent involves a de dicta 
in terp reta tion  of m etaphysical necessity (since Popperian  natural 
necessity is held to qualify statements) and it involves a weaker 
distinction than that advanced here. In so far as Farrell's account is 
couched in terms of a contrast between logical necessity and the 
em p iric is t's  physical necessity  the conception  o f m etaphysica l 
necessity I advance escapes its attention. (In Chapter 4 I suggest that 
physical and natural necessity  are subspecies of m etaphysical 
necessity  de re and that, as a consequence of this and the theses of
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the converse.
There is another way of putting the m atter, which relates to the 
notions of existence and contingency. Shortly, it will be illustrated by 
a consideration of an interpretation of an aspect of Leibnizian modal 
m etaphysics. The identification of logical and m etaphysical necessity 
is fairly common in contemporary discussions, both generally and in 
the interpretation of Leibniz. According to Slote:
a property p  is essential to an entity e if and only if e 
(logically or metaphysically) could not have failed to have 
p . A property p  is accidental to an entity e if and only if e 
has p , but (logically or metaphysically) could have failed 
to have p . (1974, 1)
I shall no t d is tin g u ish  log ical im p o ss ib ility  from  
metaphysical impossibility. (1974, 1 nt. 2)
This is am biguous. Slote may be expressing abstinence from
:i
the irreducibility of, and lack of adequate equivalences between, the 
de re and the de dicto, they are neither de dicto nor explicable in 
terms of the de dicto.)
16 In my discussion of modal epistemology I have already emphasized 
the d ifferences betw een essen tia list necessity  per  se and logical 
necessity. The attack upon accounts (more explicit than Slote's) which 
portray essence in terms of logical necessity or necessary truth will be 
a recurring theme. Such accounts include: Sprigge (1971, p a s s i m ) ,  
P lantinga (1974, p a s s i m ) ,  Bolton (1976, e.g., 517-518) and Jacob 
(1987, 532-533). Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994, 90 nt. 1) claim  to 
account for the concept of substance in purely de dicto terms, but this 
cannot be done if, as I m aintain, even necessary truths concerning 
essentialist c o n ce p ts  include embedded m odalities of an irreducibly 
de re character. W olfram (1989, 112-115) specifies 'several senses' of 
essentialism ', all o f which concern belief in synthetic necessary 
tru ths. A lthough Sorabji holds that A ris to te lian  essences for 
destructib le  en tities re la te  to m odality  de re, he nevertheless 
characterizes such essences in terms of necessary truths (1980, e.g., 
215). Such confusions have typified tw entieth-century  philosophy 
since the heyday of logical positivism . Carnap [1934](1937a, 304) 
provides talk of the 'analytic' as the translation into the formal mode 
of philosophical talk of the 'essential'; this is especially odd given that 
he argues that the use of the latter but not the former idiom reduces 
to absurdity. We might take it, therefore, that Carnap holds that the
" ""g
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attem pting to elucidate any such distinction or he may be deeming 
m etaphysical necessity and logical necessity to be one and the same. 
Perhaps iron ically , the follow ing com m ent is expressive  of a
consideration which suggests the appropriateness of rejecting such an 
iden tification :
In many or even most cases, an object can have properties 
essen tia lly  w ithout having the property  o f ex istence  
essentially, w ithout being a necessary existent. (1974, 1 
nt. 3)
This requ ires a d istinc tion  betw een m etaphysica l and log ical 
necessity. Logical necessities hold independently of the existence of 
contingent existents. M etaphysical necessities, on the other hand, are 
a ttributable to entities of a sort which m ight not have existed, 
although this does not preclude them from being attributable to
necessary existents.
We can now turn to Leibnizian metaphysics for an illustration of this
point. There is a debate about the principle of the Identity  of
Indiscernibles as to whether it conveys a necessity, and, if so, as to
the nature of that necessity. Russell (1937a, Chapter V) argues that 
although the modal status that Leibniz himself wished to attribute to
the principle is unclear, it should be regarded as logically necessary
for the sake of congruence with Leibniz's system as a whole. Now
R ussell (1937a, 55) actually writes that the princip le  should be 
regarded as 'm etaphysically necessary' but it is clear that he intends 
the term  to designate logical necessity, since he depicts it as 
concerning that the opposite of which is self-contradictory and which 
contrasts with contingency (1937a, 65, 69). It is argued that since the 
Identity  of Indiscernibles derives from the principle of Sufficient 
Reason it is logically necessary. I contest this view.
Leibniz, like Russell thereafter, uses the term m etaphysical necessity' 
to designate truth in all possible worlds, i.e. logical necessity.
Î
former is the (legitimate) counterpart, rather than a literal translation, 
of the (illegitimate) latter.
Leibniz, P hilosophica l  Writ ings  (1973, 96-97, 108). The use of 
'm etaphysical necessity' in these passages coincides with the use of 
logical necessity' in New Essays  [1765](1996, 499). Cf. this fairly I
■
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Nevertheless, I contend that Leibniz’s philosophy employs the notion 
w hich I designate  by ’m etaphysical n ecessity ’, i.e . e ssen tia lis t 
necessity as pertinent to (at least) contingent beings. According to
Leibniz, God could not have chosen any alternative to a truth which is 
logically necessary. Since the principle of Sufficient Reason does not 
have this privileged status, in that God co u ld ,  although he does not, 
choose to breach it, the Identity of Indiscernibles cannot be said to 
hold as a matter of logical necessity. The latter principle is dependent 
upon the former: since the former is not logically necessary neither is 
the latter. (This, of course, is distinct from the issue of whether the 
latter follow s from  the form er as a m atter of logical necessity.) 
Sufficient Reason holds in the actual world: it is expressive of the 
essence of the actual world. Truths which hold in virtue of Sufficient 
Reason cannot be logical necessities. Rather, they express (what I call) 
m etaphysical necessity: they are true in virtue of the nature of the
i
actual world, but they are not logically necessary since some other 
w orld m ight have been c r e a t e d . ^ 8  There is reason, then, for the 
m ain tenance of a d istinction  betw een logical and m etaphysical 
necessity, quite apart from any commitment to the m etaphysics of 
essentialism: the distinction concerns the sense of essentialist claims, 
not their truth or falsity . We need the d istinction  in order to 
understand w hat the essentia list is really claim ing, regardless of 
______________________________________________________________________________________
Humean tenet in accordance with his use of 'metaphysically possible': 
'sugar could change into a switch' (1996, 412). Cf. Hume [1740](1938, 
14): 'whatever we c o n c e i v e  is possible, at least in a m etaphysical 
sense'. (The emphasis is Hume's. The quotation is m eant to illustrate 
the com parably wide uses to which 'm etaphysically possible ', and 
paraphrases thereof, are put by Hume and Leibniz, rather than any 
k in sh ip  betw een  th e ir v iew s of the re la tio n sh ip  betw een  
conceivability and possibility.) It is clear that the natures of entities in 
the actual world do not restric t that which L eibniz would call 
m etaphysically  possible.
18 Leibniz's use of 'metaphysical necessity' m ight be said to coincide 
with mine, in the sense that it relates to a de re im possibility , namely 
the im possibility for God to have created a world in breach of the 
p rincip le  of n o n co n trad ic tio n . (Hacking (1975, 336) notes that 
Leibniz keeps de re possibility separate from de dicto possibility, but 
[holds that] at the apex of creation the two concepts in tersect'.) 
Nevertheless, Leibniz uses the phrase to signify truth in all possible 
worlds, whereas I use it to signify the modality which is involved in 
the characterization  of the natures of con tingent ex istents. The 
d istinc tion  betw een m etaphysical and logical necessity  I defend 
compares with that adopted by Moravcsik (1990, 101-102).
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whether we endorse any kind of essentialist m etaphysics. Of course, 
someone, like Quine, who protests that essentialist attributions are 
unintelligible, will not find this to be of use. However, it is preferable 
to try to understand, rather than dismiss, such claims. My contention 
is that if the sense of such claims is to be adequately conveyed there 
is a requirement for a notion of necessity other than logical necessity. 
This does not constitu te  a com m itm ent to a rea lis t view  of 
m etaphysical necessity, although it does lay the Quinean critic of 
essentialism  open to the charge that he is ill-placed to refute that 
which he has precluded himself from understanding.
'"S
Irreducible Modality De Re and the Case for Realism 
I have maintained, and will seek to sustain, the claim  that there are 
notions of m etaphysical possibility and necessity d istinct from  the 
notions of logical possibility and necessity. My argument also has it 
tha t claim s involving the form er are neither reducib le  to nor 
explicable in terms of claims involving the latter. I will proceed to 
attem pt to defend realism  about a class of m etaphysical modality d e  
re  w hilst seeking to uphold neutrality on the issue of w hether 
m odality de dicto should be treated as a subspecies of modality de re.
There is a grammatical distinction between modal locutions de re and 
de dicto (and between de re and de dicto readings of the same 
sentence) which has, as Burge (1977, 339) and W iggins (1980, 107) 
ind ica te , been m ost p rom inently  d iscussed  in the A risto te lian  
tradition. The distinction is well-founded on the grounds of grammar
alone. Recognition that de re locutions do not reduce to de dicto 
locutions entails no metaphysical commitment, so the recognition of 
the d istinction  as gram m atically well-founded does not in itse lf 
constitute an assent to Aristotelian essentialism. The intelligibility of 
essentialist attributions is immune to Quinean attack in that, on the de  
re reading pertinent to their proper interpretation, such attributions 
do not pose the problems with respect to referential opacity which are 
at the heart of the Quinean com plain t.70 (S ince w hat Q uine
1 9  Burge (1970, 340) rightly emphasizes that the grammatical well- 
foundedness of the distinction is a quite separate issue from the 
metaphysical position of realism about modality de re. Cf. Sidelle 
(1989, 72), who regards the distinction as one of log ica l form ’, not 
m etap h y sics .
70 This is illustrated by Hacking (1975) and M ondadori (1995, 229-
j;:;
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[1953](1966, 174) calls 'A risto telian  essen tia lism ' involves only
s e n t e n t i a l  m odal operators it is not truly represen ta tive  of a 
metaphysical thesis which involves a commitment to real modality d e  
re.  Indeed, it fails even to represent the idea that m odality de re is 
intelligible. Even if Quine's account did provide for the logical form of 
essentialist theses, it would fail to establish that the use of that idiom 
commits us to realism  about essence.)
On the assumptions, which I will substantiate in the next chapter, that 
m odality  de re and de dicto are distinct, and that the former is not
reducible to the latter, I should henceforth be understood to refer to
the ontological issue when I use the word 'irreducib ility ' in the
current chapter. My concern is now to establish  that irreducible 
m odality de re is, following what I take to be the strongest defence of 
essentialism  currently available, namely W iggins (1980), a feature of 
the reality  with which an im portant class o f our concepts are
reciprocally  related. i r
-4
T hat there  is irred u c ib le  m etaphysica l m o d a lity  de re is a 
consequence of the theory of individuation defended in detail by 
W ig g in s .71 I will try to give a précis of his argument. The first two
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
234). Modal locutions de re containing terms with extensions exhibit 
no referential opacity. Phrases such as 'the number of planets', 'the 
price of wheat' and 'the colour of the sea' at best '"denote" a function 
in intension, an "individual concept'", writes Hacking (1975, 328). The 
problems of referential opacity attaching to modal locutions de dicto 
stem not from modality but 'from the fact that one is talking about a
dictum ' (1975, 327). D ella Rocca (1996b, 187) com m ents that
'essentialists may be said to regard modal contexts as extensional and 
not in tensional'. The com m ent is m isrepresentative; essen tia lism  
requires that de re modal contexts are extensional, not that de dicto 
m odal contexts are extensional.
71 This would appear to be a theory in which, in the terms of Fine 
(1994), a definitional approach to essence is shown to have modal 
consequences. Although Fine m entions the de re, in effect he takes 
talk of necessary truth to be exhaustive of modal accounts of essence. 
That shortcoming is encapsulated in his claim  (1994, 6) that 'any 
statem ent of necessity [is] necessarily true if it is true at all'. In
addition. Fine (1994, 14-15 nt. 2) misconstrues W iggins (1976): the 
point of the latter is to illustrate the de re form  m anifested  by
essential attributions and to show how a de re account does not suffer 
some of the problems associated with an account of essence in terms 
of necessary truth. Contra Fine, it is not  'to claim that the de re modal
i
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steps in the argument are as follows:
1. Identity is not relative —i.e., not-R; W iggins (1980, Chapter 
1).
2. Identity is sortally dependent but absolute — i.e., D; 
Wiggins (1980, Chapter 2).
In accordance with D , the sortal dependency of identity does not 
entail that there is a range of sortais from which we may more or less 
a rb itrarily  choose, thereby d e t e r m i n i n g  iden tity  re la tions. The 
contrary view, that identity is relative to the sortal concept employed, 
is the thesis of the relativ ist ('R  theorist') about iden tity . The 
absolutist, in contrast to the relativist, holds that identity relations are
not determined (merely) by our choice of sortal concepts: there is a
(non-exhaustive) class of sortais which are sanctioned by reality.
W iggins argues for the falsity of R and the truth of D on the basis that
R  consists in the denial of the principle of the Indiscernibility of 
Identicals ('Leibniz's Law') to which there is no convincing alternative; 
so, since R is unacceptable, D must be preferred. According to the 
aforem entioned principle, a cannot be the same f a s  & and yet not be 
the same g as Z? (where a and b stand for entities, f and g for sortal 
terms). More formally,
((Bf)((% is the same f as b)) =) ((g)(g(a) 3  a is the same g as b)).
This principle is denied by the R theorist and upheld by D theorists 
such as W iggins (1980, 18-23) and Lowe (1989, Chapter 4). The 
d is tin c tio n  betw een substance concepts and phased  so rta is is 
introduced in discussing some of the proposed cases in which the 
relativist maintains that a is the same f as 6 without being the same g 
as 6.77 The relativist may claim, for example, that the man is the same 
human being as the boy but not the same boy as the boy. Far from 
this being supportive of the relativist's position, however, it shows 
that boy ,  a phased (i.e., temporally restricted) sortal, does not have a
statem ent does not give the correct logical form of an essentialist 
a ttr ib u tio n ’.
77 W iggins (1980, 23-25). Other supposed cases of relative identity 
are d iscussed  (1980, 27-44) and a sum m ary of the confusions 
inherent in putative examples of relative identity is given (1980, 43).
'1
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proper role in an elucidation of identity: that role belongs to the 
(tem porally unrestricted) substance concept human being. Substance 
concepts are d istinct from  phased-sortals73 in that the former are 
crucial in providing fundamental answers to questions such as 'what
is x T .  They are tem porally unrestricted in that an object subsumed 
under such a concept falls under the concept throughout the course of 
its (i.e., the object's) existence.
The first two steps in the argument are established on the grounds 
that there is no convincing alternative to Leibniz 's Law, and that
purported cases of relative identity are shown to rest on confusion 
(and in some cases to provide covert support for absolutism).
According to D , 'if a is the same as 6, then it must also hold that a is 
the same s o m e t h i n g  as 6 ' (1980, 47); the e l u c i d a t i o n  [con trast 
reduction] of the identity "a~b"  depends on the kind of thing that a 
and b are' (1980, 48). So, a = 6z>3f {a is the same f as b).  This is 
developed as follows:
it is enough for everything to be som ething, and for
a= 6= )3 f(a  [is the same f as] b) to hold, if for all times t at
which a continuant a exists there is a g under which a falls 
at t\ or more perspicuously
D(i): (%)(t)[(% exists at f)z,(3g)(g(%) at f)].
W hat this guarantees is only a s u c c e s s i o n  of possibly 
different phased sortais for every continuant. (1980, 59)
In order to give due weight to the role of substance concepts as 
against phased sortais, the following principle is required:
D(ii): (%)(3g)(f)[(% exists at t)zD{g(x) at t)]. (1980, 59)74
This gives due expression to an entity's falling under a determinate 
sortal throughout the course of its existence (i.e., to its falling under a
73 The distinction is im plicit in Brody (1973, 351-355; 1980, 20-24, 
70-83) and Kirwan (1971, 54).
74 The case of Lot's wife, which will be discussed later, arises (1980, 
60, 66-67) as a purported counterexample to D (ii).
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substance concept, not a mere succession of phased sortais). Also, it 
relates to the distinction between those changes through which an 
entity can persist and those which constitute its passing a w a y . 7 5
So, there are correct answers to questions such as 'is a the same thing 
as 6? ' .  Our arrival at these answ ers is dependen t upon the 
em ploym ent of the co rrec t sortal concepts. The parad igm atic  
substance concepts re la te  to natural u n itie s ,76 since there are 
difficulties peculiar to other substance (or at least v ir tua l  substance) 
concepts relating, for example, to artifacts. It is not necessary for us to 
go into these difficulties here: for the sake of the establishm ent of our 
re la tive ly  m inim al thesis that there is a range of irreducib le  
m etaphysical m odality de re we will concern ourselves mostly with 
the paradigm atic substance concepts.
The th ird  m ajor step in the argum ent re la tes  to a fu rther 
development of D:
D(v): f is a substance concept only if f determines either a 
principle of a c t i v i t y ,  a principle of f u n c t i o n i n g  or a 
principle of operation  for members of its extension. (1980,
7 0 )
A natural kind term can refer if and only if there is some nomological 
grounding for what it is to be of that kind'; to be a thing of a 
particular kind is to exemplify its 'distinctive mode of activity' (1980, 
80). Being a thing falling under a given natural kind concept is what 
W iggins calls a 'deictic-nomological' matter. This captures the notions 
that being a thing of a given kind depends upon nom ological 
grounding in actuality and that the answers to questions such as 
w hether a given thing falls under the natural kind concept f, or 
whether any natural objects fall under a mooted natural kind term g, 
will be arrived at in the light of empirical considerations.
The fourth step elucidates the modal consequences of the theory of 
individuation outlined in steps one to three, and the connections 
betw een essentialism , conceptualism , and realism . In any instance, 
where the Aristotelian question 'what is x T  arises, the correct sortal
-a
75 This is expressed in the formulation D(iv) (1980, 68-69).
76 Cf. Clark (1975, 50).
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concept to employ in order to reach the correct answer is determined 
by the nature of the thing, not just by our minds, conventions, or what 
have you. There are limits placed on the range of conceivability where 
the entities subsumed under a natural kind concept are concerned. 
W hether or not one can conceive of a thing x being 0 will depend upon 
what X  actually is: V cannot assume just any value' (1980, 106). There 
will come a point in our conceiving when the value of 0 is such that 
we cannot conceive of the thing having the property assigned by 0 
because to do so would no longer be to be conceiving of that thing at 
all. For example, contra Armstrong (1989, 51), we cannot conceive of 
Russell's being a fried egg, since we do not have it at our disposal to 
regard human fr ied  egg as a sortal concept, there being no principle of 
persistence which could sanction such a mooted concept.77 On this 
notion of conceivability, a thing cannot be conceived such that it does 
not exemplify the distinctive mode of activity of the objects subsumed 
under the sortal concept under which the thing is itself subsumed. 
(This point relates to Aristotelian considerations about change which 
will soon be discussed.) That a thing cannot be so conceived is a modal 
fact about the thing, rather than some expression of a psychological 
inability on our part or an assertion about some limit to the powers of 
the human imagination or some restriction imposed by more or less 
a rb i t r a ry  c o n v e n t io n s .78 That the necessity  involved here is
77 Both Armstrong (1989) and van Fraassen (1977; 1978; 1980) are 
proponents of the view, described by Della Rocca (1996a, 4) as an 
'unpala tab le  version of an ti-essen tia lism ', that th ings have no 
essential traits. (Della Rocca says he knows of no proponents of the 
v iew .)
78 The import of this aspect of Wiggins's account apparently escapes 
Forbes (1985, 220-224) who erroneously characterizes W iggins's 
approach as advancing a 'quasi-psychologistic' view of the justification 
of modal concepts according to which 'the modal status of truths and 
falsehoods is ultim ately grounded upon human intellectual abilities' 
(1985, 220). These m atters are not even W iggins's concerns. For 
Wiggins, whether or not we can conceive of x  that it is 0 is determined 
in large part by the nature of x  itse lf. The re s tric tio n s  on 
conceivability relate to what it is possible to conceive o f  an entity; to 
how it is possible f o r  an entity to be conceived. They do not restrict 
the class of those propositions which it is possible, for the purposes of 
logic, to conceive t h a t  they are true. (The failure to distinguish 
between conceiving de re and conceiving de dicto colours Forbes's 
interpretation of Wiggins, and leads him to make it look as if modality 
de dicto is Wiggins's central concern.) I take up the point in the next 
ch ap te r.
I
29 Cf. W itt (1989, 107).
30 Cf. N.P. White (1971, 194-195) and W itt (1989, 120) on Aristotle 
and Ishiguro (1972, 67) on Leibniz. Also, cf. Hegel [1812-16](1969, 
546): 'W hat is actual can act; som ething m anifests its actuality
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m etaphysica l ra ther than log ical is illu stra ted  by its de ic tic- 
nom ological character. The bounds of conceivability are determ ined 
by the nature of the thing; by its principle of persistence. This 
principle of persistence relates to the characteristic activity of the 
thing, which is expressed in irreducibly de re m odal locu tions. 
Substance concepts relate to the real definitions of things. They are 
what W iggins calls 'extension-involving substantives' (1980, 233). The 
limits to the conceivability at issue concern metaphysical, not logical, 
necessity , precisely  because they are determ ined by the deictic- 
nom ological persistence principles of things. There should be no 
tem ptation to regard the modal restraint as epistemic here, since the 
entire account acknowledges that wherever an A ristotelian 'w hat is 
x T  question arises there is some known or unknown principle of 
persistence involved. Also, questions as to whether a mooted natural 
kind term will ultimately refer may not always be answered by the 
in troduction  of considerations relating  to actual experience and 
existing knowledge: future experience will often be crucial (1980, esp. 
82). W hat a thing can do and what it can or cannot endure, as well as 
what properties it can be conceived as having, are determined by its 
principle of persistence. The essentiality of a trait is such that 'the 
very existence o f  the bearer is unqualifiedly conditional upon the trait 
in question' (1980, 121).79 Since the grammatical form of locutions 
employing the modality pertinent to essentialist claims (at least about 
contingent existents) is de re, not de dicto, and logical necessity is d e  
d ic to ,  regardless of whether or not it is also de re, it follows that the 
modality at issue is non-logical. We are now in a position to see that 
de re m odality is not only gram m atically w ell-founded, intellig ible 
and accep tab le , but also that W iggins p rov ides an argum ent 
supportive of realist modal primitivism.
I
The crucial notion of a persistence princip le has its roots in 
A ristotelian m etaphysics and is strenuously em phasized by Leibniz. 
Hacking (1972) and Wiggins (1980, e.g, 80) both point to the notion, 
awarded much significance by Leibniz, of substance as an active 
principle of unity. This entails a notion of essence as dynamic: to be a 
thing of a particular kind is to m anifest its activ ity .3 0 Essence is
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m anifested by the actualization of the real pow ers/potentialities of 
o b je c ts .31 Aristotle's notion of the e rg o n  of a thing (e.g.: P h y s i c s ,  
194bl4, 202a24; M e ta p h y s ic s , 5 0 a 2 1 ) 3 2  is the source of this notion of 
essence as an active principle of unity. This notion of essence affords 
us som e in tu itive ly  unproblem atic ep istem ology: we are w ell-
acquainted with the characteristic modes of activity of a large range 
of natural kinds. These are known a posteriori,  albeit via conceptual 
m ediation: natural kind concepts and experience are not divorced. 
(Recall the account of substantive modal knowledge de re provided at 
2 .2 .)
On the view I have adopted, contrary to the views of the rigid 
actualist and the Lewisian possibilist, there is m odality in nature. 
There are irreducibly de re modal predicates properly attributable to 
natural objects: predicates relating , for exam ple, to d isposition ,
capacity and ability, which, writes Wiggins, fail to have any 'natural 
de dicto  transla tion ' (1980, 107). F urtherm ore , these concern
irreducibly modal features of the world. In the following paragraphs I 
will expand upon this realist view.
The notion of essence discussed so far is related to considerations 
about change which again go back to A risto tle . (N on-reductive 
analyses of different sorts of predication and of different sorts of 
change are the two main routes by means of which the Aristotelian 
tradition introduces and explains the category of substance.) From 
some unobjectionable distinctions between changes we can come to 
understand, and see the need for, the category of substance. First, we 
can distinguish between changes which are grounded in the thing and 
those which, although predicable of the thing, are p u r e l y  relational. 
For example, after C.J.F. Martin (1988, 51-52), at t  ^ Theaetetus is 
shorter than Socrates; at t 2  Theaetetus is ta lle r than Socrates. 
Although the change is relational, it is grounded in reality: the reality 
of Theaetetus's new height at t 2  which is the result of a process of
through that which it produces.'
31 A distinction can be drawn between power and potentiality on the 
basis that the exercise of the former requires an event, whereas that 
of the latter requires a process. Cf. Elizabeth Prior (1985, 101) and the 
distinction between abilities and capacities implicit in 2.2.
37 A rich account of this notion is provided by Clark (1975, esp. 14- 
27).
S|-'
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growth. However, given that the real change which has occurred is 
due to Theaetetus's growth, it does not follow that Socrates has not 
changed. At t 2 , but not at t^, it is true of Socrates that he is shorter 
than T heaetetus. N evertheless, Socrates has neither suffered nor 
initiated any real  change with respect to his being once taller and now 
shorter than T heaetetus.33 It is real change which is relevant to our 
d iscussion  (and, h isto rically , to the A risto telian  exam ination of 
change).
Among real changes we can distinguish, in A risto telian  term s, 
betw een those which constitu te  generations (com ings-to-be) and 
d estru c tio n s (passings-aw ay) and those w hich co n stitu te  m ere 
alterations in a persisting object. Where an already existing object is 
concerned, there are certain sorts of event which it could suffer, or in 
which it could participate, through which it would (and would be said 
to) persist. There are others which would constitute its destruction or 
replacem ent with som ething e l s e . 34 This A ristotelian distinction is 
em ployed by contem porary philosophers of A risto telian  influence 
who seek to establish the credibility of non-objectual modal realism. 
Like W iggins, Brody emphasizes the metaphysical irreducibility of a 
class of de re modality (e.g., 1973, 351). Brody (1973; 1980, Chapter 
4) endorses the Aristotelian distinction between two sorts of change. 
There are some changes through which an object can endure; there 
are others which are incompatible with the persistence of the object. 
The latter sort of change does not entail that there is com plete 
annihilation. Rather, that there are certain changes which a thing a of 
a kind f cannot suffer without ceasing to exist is compatible with the 
replacem ent of a with some thing(s) not of the kind f. In the case of 
the paradigm substance concepts, it is never a merely conventional or 
conceptual matter as to the sorts of changes through which a thing can 
persist: with regard to artifacts it is often not a merely conceptual or 
conventional matter. Brody illustrates this point by considering two 
event types which can happen to a tree: its losing a branch and its 
being burnt down. That it persists through the form er but not the 
latter is no matter of mere convention. Trees do not have the capacity
33 Geach (1969, 72), upon whose account M artin 's exam ple is 
predicated , labels these two forms of change 'real' and ' m e r e  
"Cambridge"".
34 The two sorts of change are distinguished by A risto tle, O n 
Generation and Corruption, 319b7-32.
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to persist through their being burnt down. In W iggins's terms, this is a 
deictic-nomological, as opposed to a merely conceptual, m a t t e r . 3 5
f 'v'I:
The anti-realist is likely to object that it is indeed true that a tree 
does not continue to exist, qua  tree, after being burnt down. The anti­
realist may then add that this is a merely conceptual matter, entirely 
determ ined by our arbitrary individuative practice. We divide the 
world up into kinds, but that is an affair in which only the operations 
of our conceptual framework are implicated, it is not about how the 
world is. The realist will reply that correct answers to questions of 
identity can be arrived at only through em ploym ent of the correct 
sortais: the selection of the appropriate sortal is dependent upon the 
nature of the thing. In fact, as will emerge, the realist may claim  that 
an an ti-realist conceptualist account of individuation and essence 
undermines the import and intelligibility of such questions.
Brody argues that given that there are some changes which a thing 
can endure and others which bring about its passing away, it follows 
that things have some of their properties essentially:
an object Oj has a property P j  essentially just in case 
has Pi  and would go out of existence if it lost it (1973, 354; 
1980, 81).
So, on Brody's account, any property the loss of which constitutes the 
passing away of a thing is an essential property. Kung (1977) protests 
th a t th is fo rm ulation  provides a necessary  but n o n -su ffic ien t
condition for a property's being essential to a t h i n g . 36 She argues that
____________________________
35 Cf. Newman (1992, 165).
36 Cf. S.M. Cohen (1978, 389). Brody (1980, 116-123) acknowledges 
the insufficiency of his original formulation. Marcus [1971](1993, 57) 
and T eller (1975, 236) fail to specify that the condition such a 
form ulation lays down is non-sufficient. Kung indicates that Marcus 
com m its the further error of equating essen tia l properties with 
properties which are necessary to all of their bearers. As against 
M arcus, not all things which are triangular are necessarily triangular; 
since being necessarily 0 is necessary to being essentially 0, being 
triangular is not essential to all things which happen to be triangular. 
(This is without prejudice to the question as to whether any triangular 
thing is so essentially. Also, it does not deny that being a triangle is 
necessary to all things which are triangles; triangles are not the only 
triangular things. There can be triangular helipads, but no helipad is a
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there are some properties such that their possessors would cease to 
exist were they to lose them, but which do not count as essential. To 
take one of her more plausible examples, she suggests (1977, 364) 
that if Jones ceases to be over eight yeais old then he ceases to exist, 
but being over eight years old is surely not essential to Jones.3? This 
points to an advantage in W iggins’s characterisation of essence over 
that offered in Brody's original formulation, since the very existence 
of Jones is not conditional upon his being, or ever reaching, an age 
greater than eight. A trait is essential to a thing, then, not merely if 
the thing would cease to exist if it were lost: a necessary — but non­
sufficient— condition upon a trait's being essential to an object is that 
the object could not have existed without the trait. A tree is distinct 
from the pile of ash which remains when it has been burnt down: the
tree  m an ifests a p rincip le  of activ ity  (e.g. in its b io log ica l 
development) which a pile of ash cannot exhibit. That principle of 
activity is not merely such that the tree ceases to exist if it is lost; it is 
such that the tree would not have existed w ithout it and it 
characterizes the organism  throughout the course of its existence, 
including the stages prior to adulthood during some of which we 
would not call it a tree at all.
S ince the fo rm  of e sse n tia lism  deriv ed  from  A ris to te lia n
..
triangle. The distinction between the necessity and the essentiality of 
a trait — the former is necessary, but not sufficient for the latter— has
a recent advocate in Fine (1994, 5).) Cohen (1978, 392) distinguishes 
betw een 'an a b s o l u t e l y  essential attribute...that is essential to any 
individual that has it at all' and attributes which are essential to some, 
but not all of their bearers. The denial of M arcus's claim  does not 
entail that no  essential attributes are absolutely essential, it merely 
asserts that some are not. Penelope M ackie (1994, 313) defines 
'essential sortal' such that 'A sortal concept S  is an essential sortal  if 
and only if the things that fall under S could not have existed without 
falling under S \  adding that 'I ignore the possibility that there might 
be a sortal such that some, but not all, of the things that fall under it 
fa ll under it  e sse n tia lly ...su c h  a p o ss ib ility  w ould  be an 
em barrassm ent to a sortal essen tia list.' This suggests that the 
attributes of a thing must be distinguished from the essential sortais 
under which it falls. This in turn accords well with the notion of 
essence urged by W itt (1989) and with W iggins's emphasis on the 
centrality of the distinction between predications in the category of 
substance and predications in the category of quality  or relation' 
(1980, 67).
37 Cf. Matthews (1990, 252-255).
1138considerations about change does not entail that there are names for
all essential properties, Brody concludes (1973, 354-355) that it is 
committed to the existence of irreducible modality de re. In order to 
exp licate  all m odality  de re in terms of m odality de dicto  it is 
necessary that all entities with necessary traits have names in the
language in which the purported explication is to take p l a c e . 38 Since
the essentialism  in question does not meet this condition it follows 
that m etaphysically  irreducib le  m odality de re is adm itted. This 
argum ent makes the unobjectionable assum ption that our language 
m ay be sem antically  im poverished, or our know ledge may be 
restric ted , such that there may be a thing in the world whose 
principle of persistence is unknown/unnamed, or that the thing itself 
may be unknown/unnamed. We might compare this observation with 
this rem ark of W iggins (1980, 141) about the sortal concepts we
em ploy:
what sortal concepts we bring to bear upon experience 
determines what we can find there —just as the size and 
mesh of a net determine, not what fish are in the sea, but 
which ones we shall catch.
iOn an anti-realist view of individuation, a thing’s distinctness is not due to how the world is. As against the rela tiv ism  which can 
contribute to this view, W iggins (1980, 60-61, 66-67) considers the 
case of Lot's w i f e . 39 How aie we to deal with this story, where God 
changes a woman into a pillar of salt? The suggestion that the same 
thing starts off with the principle of persistence for one thing and that 
this principle of persistence then ceases to pertain, being replaced by
------------------------------------------38 This consideration is raised as an objection to Plantinga's strategy 
of attem pting to explicate de re modalities in de dicto  terms by 
Cartwright (1968, 622). Cf. the criticism of Kripke offered by Wiggins 
(1974, 344-345). Plantinga (1969, 252-254) attem pts to answer the 
objection, but even if the problem could be resolved the result would 
lead  now here given the absence of exhaustive  n o n -a rb itra ry  
equivalence relations between de dicto and de re forms.
39 This is part of W iggins’s argumentative procedure against the R 
theorist' (i.e. the relativist about identity) who 'typically exaggerates 
the autonomy of thought in the singling out of objects of reference' 
(1980, 101). The anti-realist conceptualist may or may not be an R 
theorist’ (1980, 129). This conveys the point that, although anti-realist 
conceptualism  is fostered by R -theory , R -theorists do not have a 
monopoly on the position.
40 Let the conventionalist give up our actual practice. W iggins's D (ii)  
expresses the tenet that every three dim ensional continuant that 
exists falls under a determ inate sortal concept. W iggins comments 
(1980, 62) that:
the denial of D (ii) or the sacrifice of the substance 
assumption would entail the denial of truth or significance 
or possibly both to indefinitely many of our existing 
be liefs ...th ese  beliefs are fundam ental to our actual 
individuative practices. W hoever wants to give these up 
may do so. When he has done that (not merely said he 
will), we can take him as seriously as he takes himself.
-
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the principle of persistence for another thing, is un viable because it is 
contradictory. It is incom patible with such a change in persistence 
p rincip les th a t it is actually  the same th ing  th a t is under 
consideration: a human being cannot properly be said to fail to exhibit 
the persistence principle pertinent to human beings and yet to 
continue to exist. Wiggins sets out three other ways of describing the 
miraculous events in the biblical story:
(1 ) the identity of Lot's wife and the pillar of salt may 
be denied;
(2 ) a sortal pred icate  like 'woman p illa r ' m ay be 
invented to cover the identity and supplant the self­
contradictory descriptions we began with;
(3) the very coherence of the whole story may be challenged. 
(1980, 66)
The anti-essentialist will incline towards (2). In order for (2) to be 
applicable, the invention or selection of sortal concepts has to be 
detached from nature, becoming a matter solely of human convention 
or stipulation. The problem then is that all questions relating to the 
persistence of objects will be trivialized. Notions such as existence and 
persistence will them selves lose the im port w ith which they are 
ordinarily  regarded. The very supposition that the answer to the 
question 'w hat exists?' is determ ined solely by hum an invention 
undermines the seriousness of the question itself. The intelligibility of 
talk of existing and ceasing to exist may well require the rejection of
(2).40 The intelligibility of talk of a three dim ensional continuant's 
ceasing to exist requires that ceasing to exist be construed as ceasing 
to be a substance of a determinate kind:
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an individual a's having ceased to exist at f is a matter of 
nothing identical v/ith a belonging to the extension at t of 
the ultimate individuative kind (or to the extension at t of
any sufficiently high individuative kind) that is a's kind. 
(1980, 67)
The essential necessity of a trait arises at that point of 
unalterability  where the very existence o f  the bearer is 
unqualif iedly conditional  upon the trait in question. Here, 
at this point, a property is fixed to its bearer by virtue of 
being inherent in the individuation of it — inherent in the 
very possibility  of draw ing a spatio-tem poral boundary 
around it. The closer the source of the attribute to the 
singling out of the thing itself —the more it is bound up 
with the whole mode of articulating reality  to discover 
such an object in reality— the more exigent, obviously, is 
the necessity that, i f  there is to exist any such thing as the 
b e a r e r ,  it should have the feature in question. The de re 
'must' of causal inflexibility here passes over at a certain 
threshold into an inflexibility that is conceptual (though 
only loosely speaking logical). There is no reason why this 
should make the essentialistic de re attribute any less of a 
real attribute of the thing itself. (1980, 121)
I
To cease to exist is to cease to be a thing of a determinate kind. To be 
a thing of a determinate kind is to exhibit the persistence principle 
characteristic of things of that kind. It is substance concepts, rather 
than phased sortais which are relevant, since the it is the latter which 
relate to principles of persistence. It is not a m atter of mere invention 
or of nothing but conceptual considerations as to w hat counts as a 
principle of persistence; rather, it is a deictic-nom ological m atter. 
Principles of persistence relate to the de re m odalities p roperly  
a ttribu tab le  to things in the world. This can be illu stra ted  by 
consideration of artifacts, let alone the objects subsumed under the 
paradigm atic substance concepts. Hacking (1972, 147) considers a 
'bundle of contiguous qualities' composed from 'the bottom part of my 
pen, the inside of my thumb, and a bit of yellow paper' and given the 
name 'berk'. Berks cannot be substances. There are no persistence 
principles apposite to berks because berks cannot do anything or have
I
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anything done to them:
My pen and my berk differ. As a matter of fact, but not of 
logic, my pen, all by itself, can be throw n, heated, 
repaired, crushed, locked away, and wiped when wet. It 
can be posted, buried, and the like. It is hard to do many 
of these things to my berk, all by itself....Pens do all sorts 
of in teresting things and have all sorts of in teresting 
things done with them. Berks might be like that, but are 
not.
As fai as the Aristotelian question 'what is x T  is concerned, things are 
what they are in virtue of their principles of persistence. Principles of 
persistence are active in the sense that they concern what a thing can 
do or have done to it without ceasing to exist. Principles of persistence 
are thus m odal: they re la te  to the capacitie s/po ten tia lities  and
ab ilities/pow ers of things. Since these, and the p rincip les of 
persistence which underlie them, are discovered a posteriori ,  our 
individuative practice is not explicable in purely conceptualist terms. 
Our concepts do not create the abilities of things nor, accordingly, 
their principles of persistence, although they m ediate our knowledge 
of those abilities and persistence principles. W hether or not a putative 
sortal concept can be genuinely individuative w ill depend upon 
whether there is a corresponding persistence principle. Questions of 
identity  and individuation can only be genuine, and can only be 
settled, where entities exhibit de re modal principles of persistence. 
Hacking (1972, 148) writes:
aW hich bundles [of qualities] are substances? Only those bundles that are active, in the sense of having laws of 
their own. Laws provide the active principles of unity.
There is a tendency in much analytic philosophy to 
conceive th ing s  as given, and then to speculate on what 
laws they enter into. On the contrary, things are in the 
first instance recognized by regularities.
The regularities in question are those which concern what things can 
do and can have done to them; and, what they must do if they are to 
exist. These are not determ ined by pro jections of ours or by 
conceptual considerations alone, but by how things in the world are.
.1
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The actual is not non-modal, and should not be so characterized.
3.4 Anti-realism  IT. Against Anti-Realist Conceptualism
The conceptualism  to be contested is the full-blooded variety which 
contends that all m odality has purely in tensional/in ten tional status 
(i.e ., an ti-rea lis t conceptualism , not concep tualism  tout court) .  
Furtherm ore, since conceptualist reduction ism  has a lready been 
criticized, the conceptualism which is of current concern is of a sort 
which designates at least some modal notions as irreducible (e.g. it 
may hold that essence is a reducible notion, but that possibility is 
not). The aim then, is to mount an attack upon anti-realist modal 
p rim itiv ism .
W iggins (1980, 134-137) employs an objection against the anti-realist 
concep tua lis t. He d irects his attack against a co n v en tio n a lis t 
reconstruction of essence and modality de re. The scope of W iggins's 
objection may be extended to apply to some recent positions which 
foster anti-realism  about essence and m odality de re. C rucially , 
W iggins's objection may help to discredit the view that modality is not 
onto logically  grounded. The an ti-realist would have it that our 
convictions concerning de re modalities are to be fully accounted for 
by conventionalist or projectivist explanations; that no such modality 
is on to log ically  grounded. The problem  w ith the an ti-rea lis t's  
conviction is more likely to occur to the unabashed m etaphysician, 
than to the neo-em piricist or the specialist philosopher of language. 
The problem  identified by W iggins is that the anti-realist's account 
has to rely upon the notion of entities as bare paiticulars.^i According 
to van Fraassen (1978, 13-14),
At bottom, everything that can be said about the world 
can be said in purely  general sta tem en ts, w ithou t
■i. :m odalities. There is no t h is  ness  beyond s u c h n e s s , but 
every actual individual is individuated already by the 
properties it has in this world; hence can be denoted in 
principle by a definite description (in which the quantifier 
ranges over actual existents alone). At this bottom  level 
the only necessity we can countenance is purely logical or
41 On the connection between anti-essentialism and commitment to an 
ontology of bare particulars cf. Marcus [1971](1993, 64).
i47 Quoted by Wiggins (1980, 134).
43 Cf. Forbes (1985, 146), who comments that bare individuals 'are 
surely unintelligible'. Also, cf. the contentions of Lowe (1989, 3; cf. 4- 
5, 11-13, 38-39, 65), 'particular objects are only individiiable and 
identifiable as particulars of this or that so r t  or k i n d  (there are no 
"bare" particulars)...the notions of "individual" and "kind" are mutually 
dependent, with neither being in any sense more fundam ental than 
the other'.
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verbal necessity which, like God, is no respecter of 
persons. In this modality, whatever Peter can do, Paul can
do also.47
W iggins objects that van Fraassen's account is no respecter of identity:
it is unintelligible unless 'we can make sense of an entity that is 
nothing in paiticular' (1980, 135). The objection is, of course, that this 
notion of particulars as bare is not intelligible at all.43 This lack of 
in te llig ib ility  is made all the more apparent in the light of the 
A risto telian  considerations m entioned above. It seem s tha t a n y
fvariety of anti-realist prim itivism  about de re m odality would face the root problem identified by Wiggins, namely commitment to a bare 
particular ontology.
A n ti-e ssen tia lism  co llapses in to  incoherence . The a n ti- re a lis t  
conceptualist about essence has it that objects have properties but no 
essential properties. However, objects cannot have attributes but have 
none of their attributes essentially. This follows from  the logic of 
modal notions de re. For any object, if the object has a property then 
it m ust have had the ability to acquire the property. (By the lights of 
2.2, the foregoing is a necessary a priori  truth.) A bilities, although 
non-spatial, are not occult entities. Rather, they require grounding in 
their possessors. For any ability, there is some vehicle in its possessor 
which grounds the ability. In order to have acquired the property, the 
individual must have acquired, or have had, the vehicle. That is not to 
say that the vehicle is of the essence of the individual. Nevertheless, 
the possession of the vehicle itself requires the ability to have or to 
acquire the vehicle. All the abilities of a thing cannot be merely 
a c c id e n ta lly  had , since the absence of som e fu n d am en ta l 
capac ities/ab ilities  precludes a thing from  having any ab ilities: 
abilities have to be grounded. (All of these claims follow from claims 
proposed at 2.2 as necessary a priori  truths involving the de re modal 
notions.) So, objects cannot be such that they possess properties but
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lack essences. (This follows from the foregoing, and (j) of 2.2, i.e., the 
principle that that which accounts for a thing's possession of its 
fundam ental capacities is of its essence.) Thus, this form  of anti- 
essentialism  makes all particulars bare in the thoroughgoing sense 
that they are precluded from having any properties at all. To reject 
essence is to reject an ontology of non-bare individuals (and vice 
versa). Since the postulation of objects with no properties is absurd 
this form of anti-essentialism  reduces to absurdity.44
The postulation of bare particulars breaches the principle that only 
identifiable entities are genuine individuals.45 Since we have no way 
of identify ing  bare particulars46 they are not adm issible into any 
sound ontology. Indeed, bare particulars are precluded from  being 
identifiable since objects are identifiable, in even the m ost liberal 
sense, only in virtue of their having attributes47 and, as we have seen, 
m e ta p h y s ic a l m o d a litie s  de re are involved in iden tity  and 
individuation. Thus, being identifiable is incom patible with having no 
essential attributes. In addition, since such 'individuals' can neither be 
referred to nor described, they are ontologically inadm issible and 
ep istem o log ica lly  in access ib le .48 McGinn (1981, 152) lays down an 
'extra-linguistic ' condition on individuality: 'som ething is a genuine
44 The necessary condition on indiv iduality  p roposed, but not 
ju stified , by M cGinn (1981, 152), that 'som ething is a genuine 
individual only if...its properties partition (non-triv ially ) into the 
essential and the accidental', is vindicated by the foregoing argument, 
at least so far as concrete entities are concerned.
45 The principle follows from the principle, im plicit in Lowe (1994b, 
533), that the possession of 'determinate and non-arbitrary identity- 
conditions' is a necessary condition on objecthood. By the lights of the 
theory of de dicto necessity I adopt, these principles are necessary a 
p r i o r i  truths. They are true in virtue of the concepts o b j e c t  and 
individual.
46 Cf. Wiggins (1974, 353).
47 Cf. Wiggins (1980, 115).
48 Cf. Lowe (1989, 12):
the noun 'thing'...has no criterion of identity associated 
with it, is not a genuine sortal, and consequently cannot be 
used unam biguously  to p ick  out som e id en tifiab le  
individual either as an object of knowledge or as an object 
of reference.
Cf. the cases of 'individual' and 'particular'.
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individual only if it admits of proper identification short of exhaustive 
characterization'. Divers (1990, 71-76) applies this to Lev/isian worlds 
in order to show that they fail to constitute genuine individuals: they 
adm it of neither 'causally  dependent indexical iden tification ' nor 
'descriptive identification' (1990, 72, 73). Likewise, it applies to bare 
individuals. N either a m onistic bare noumenal world nor a world 
populated by a plurality of bare particulars can enter into causal 
relations, since to do so requires properties. Having properties is also 
n ecessa ry  fo r adm itting  of d esc rip tiv e  id e n tif ic a tio n . T hese 
considerations bring home W iggins's charge (1974, 352) that if 
anyone merits being accused of having a ridiculous conception of 
substance it is the anti-essentialist.
One an ti-rea lis t developm ent, the conven tionalism  proposed by 
Sidelle (1989), can reasonably be accused of falling prey to W iggins's 
objection to anti-realist conceptualism. This is important, since unlike 
m any o ther m odal an ti-rea lis ts , S idelle has a co n v en tio n a lis t 
reconstruction of necessity a posteriori  as his primary aim. Questions 
may be raised as to whether Sidelle's account can succeed, as he 
in tends, in explaining necessity a posteriori  via convention and 
analyticity. A very serious shortcoming of his account is that it 
construes essen tia list claim s as involving necessary  a posteriori  
truths. In addition, the account rests on contestable arguments about 
the intelligibility of real necessity. For example, it is argued (1989, 
117) that if the necessity involved in true essential attributions were 
real then it would rule out some states of affairs; it does not do this, so 
it is not real. In the light of the Aristotelian considerations on change 
considered above it should be clear that the soundness of this 
argument can easily be challenged. A further point relating directly to 
the realism /conceptualism  issue is as follow s. Sidelle accuses the 
realist of regarding the world as existing already individuated. But, 
contrary  to S ide lle ’s accusation, the rea lis t can recognize  that 
individuating is a human activity. This in turn need not entail that the 
world does not contain already discrete entities. The conventionalist's 
account is incoherent, though, because if individuation is, as the realist 
and the conventionalist can agree, an activity, then the activity has to 
have a basis resident in some object. Given that the individuating 
thing and the 'stu ff which is being individuated are not the same, and 
that the conven tionalis t account requires this non-iden tity , the 
conven tionalis t cannot insist that there are no already d iscrete
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entities prior to the individuating activity. Cf. Ayers (1974, 134): 'If 
there were no natural objects there would be no conventional objects 
either.' On the acceptance of Ayers's conditional, and the denial of its 
consequent, it follow s, by modus tollens,  that there are natural 
objects. The denial of the consequent of Ayers’s conditional can be 
accepted by both the rea lis t and the conven tionalist. S idelle 's 
conventionalism  goes so far as to assert that there are only 
conventional objects, or at least that there is only one non- 
conventional object, namely the (m ind-independent) world as it is 
p rior to the im position of our individuative apparatus. On the 
acceptance of Ayers's conditional — given that the natural objects 
referred to therein are meant to include individuating beings— such a 
m ilitant conventionalism  reduces to absurdity.
Sidelle 's account assum es that anti-conceptualist realism  and anti­
rea lis t conceptualism  are the only options in the philosophy of 
essence, individuation and modality de re (1989, e.g., ix, 2, 14-16, 87). 
So, Sidelle's account is framed in such a way that it leaves the most 
convincing form of realism  (i.e., conceptualist realism ) unconsidered 
and im m une to the neo-em piricist attack upon 'rea l' (con trast 
'nominal') essentialism which he seeks to mount. Connected to this, he 
attributes views to the realist — e.g., that the world exists as 'ready­
m a d e ',49 i.e., individuated prior to the exercise of human concepts— 
which the realist need not hold. It follows, then, that by attacking 
such views he does nothing to discredit realism, but at best one form 
of realism  (i.e., its implausible form: anti-conceptualist realism ). In 
fact, most of those who have recently sought to defend non-objectual 
m odal realism  have offered accounts which are at least consistent 
with what Wiggins calls 'sober conceptualism '.5 0
49 Putnam  [1982](1983, 211) appropriates the phrase from  Goodman 
(e.g., 1978, 94).
50 The most rigorous account being that of W iggins himself. McGinn 
(1981, esp. 157-158) adopts a conceptualist realism . I know of no 
comment of Kripke's which is inconsistent with sober conceptualism: 
con trast S idelle 's m isattribu tion  (1989, 15) of an ti-concep tua list 
realism to Kiipke on the basis of Kripke's supposition (1980, 124) that 
essences are discovered by natural scientists. (It should be clear from 
2.2 above, and from my discussion of Wiggins's views, that there is no 
conflict between the tenet that essence is discovered em pirically and 
a sober conceptualism . Indeed, I do not see how an ontology of 
essences for concrete objects could be epistem ologically sustained by
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The accounts of van Fraassen and Sidelle both result in an untenable 
and ep is tem o lo g ica lly  un respec tab le  bare p a rtic u la r  on to logy . 
Nevertheless, there is an important difference between their accounts. 
The nom inalist position adhered to by van Fraassen rests upon the 
assumption of an ontology of bare particulars in that it is anti-realist 
concep tualist about non-logical necessity  and essence but anti- 
conceptualist realist about individuation; 'every actual individual is 
individuated already by the properties it has in this world' (1978, 14), 
i .e ., independent of m odality  and conceptual considerations. As 
W iggins (1980, 136) notes, 'ideological' talk of necessity and essence is 
here taken to be posterior to pure ontology uncontam inated by such 
talk. The individuals posited by van Fraassen constitute an ontology of 
bare particulars because there are no properties which they m ust or 
must not have: this leads Wiggins (1980, 135) to characterize them as 
entities that are nothing in particular. (A nti-conceptualist realism  
about individuation need not be committed to an ontology of bare 
particu lars so long as it is not an ti-realist about essence and 
m etaphysical necessity .)
S idelle 's an ti-realism  is directed towards necessity , essence a n d  
in d iv id u a tio n .51 In fact much of his objection to realism is predicated 
upon his assumption that the realist posits a pre-individuated world 
(i.e., pre-' as in 'already'). As we have already noted, realism  need 
entail no such view. It is somewhat surprising that Sidelle takes this 
to be a crucial objection to realism, given that Sidelle (1989, 158) cites 
W iggins as an authority against the idea of a pre-individuated world. 
Nevertheless, although Sidelle's account does not rest on an ontology 
of bare particulars it does rest upon a bare paiticular ontology. This is
an ti-co n cep tu a lis t m eans.) H arré and M adden (1975) g ive a 
conceptualist realist account of causal modalities. An approach which 
appears to take the other route ('non-sober' realism , i.e. anti- 
conceptualist realism) is that of Ayers (1974). Some of the criticism
directed at conceptualism  by Ayers could threaten only anti-realist 
co n cep tu a lism , e .g ., (1974 , 116): 'A se rio u s  o b jec tio n  to
conceptualism ...is that the life-histories of natural things have to be 
discovered, often gradually and with difficulty, and so cannot be 
supposed to be determined by an observer’s conceptual scheme.’
51 A lthough Sidelle slides into an ti-concep tualist realism  about
individuation when he asks w hether 'm odality  is a real, m ind-
independent feature of the world, like wetness and dogs' (1989, 2).
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because the world (as distinct from entities) is taken to be entirely 
in d ep e n d en t of our in d iv id u a tiv e  p ra c tic e  and our m odal 
constructions. Sidelle, like W iggins, emphasizes that individuating is a 
human activity. His anti-realist conceptualism, in contrast to W iggins’s 
rea lis t conceptualism , entails that the world and this activity  are 
independent of one another. Unlike van Fraassen, Sidelle does not 
posit a pre-individuated world of bare particulars: in Sidelle's view 
the entities that exist are determ ined entirely  by our conceptual 
practice. But Sidelle does posit an unindividuated world independent 
of our conceptual scheme: he is not committed to a world of bare 
particulars, but he is committed to the world as a bare particular. 
According to Sidelle, ’we get essences...only from  our m ethods of 
carving up the world’ (1989, 19). Since our method of carving up that 
world is entirely a m atter of convention it follows that the world is 
prior to the delineation of entities within it. The raw m aterial upon 
which our conventions are brought to bear is the world. The world, 
then , as d is tin c t from  the aggregate of ind iv idua ted  en tities 
dependent upon our conceptual scheme, is a bare particu lar on 
S ide lle ’s account.52 As a consequence, he falls prey to an objection 
which is of the same broad form as that offered against van Fraassen 
by Wiggins. The thesis that the world is a bare particular is no more 
intelligible than the thesis that there is a world of bare particulars. 
The notion of a something which is nothing in particular is no more
52 Consider the comment (1989, 55 nt. 11) that
the conventionalist should, and should be happy to, say 
that what is primitively ostended is ’stuff, stuff look ing  of 
course, ju st as the world looks, but devoid of modal 
properties, identity conditions, and all that imports. For a 
slogan one might say that stuff is preobjectual....there is 
nothing m ysterious going on here — this is ju s t  the 
elaboration of the rejection of real necessity.
The objectual world then, is foisted upon the preobjectual world. The 
preobjectual world just is stuff that is nothing in particular. Sidelle’s 
position is quirky in that it posits a world entirely independent of our 
conceptual scheme but which, apparently, it is possible for us to know. 
Sidelle’s claim  that such a world c o u ld  be ostended is im plausible. 
Sidelle’s comments are instructive in that they illustrate the price at 
which the rejection of real necessity comes on what is apparently the 
only other anti-realist path besides the adoption of an ontology of 
bare particular.y.
Once these facts about that to which the realist need not be committed 
are acknowledged, the dialectic of Sidelle's discussion is undercut.
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respectable in the case of the world than in the case of a set of 
particulars held to be in the world. From a metaphysical point of view, 
bare  p a rtic u la r  on to log ies are p ro flig a te . F u rth e rm o re , any 
philosopher who is opposed to the idea that there are realms which it 
is entirely impossible for cognizing beings to know will deem such 
ontologies to be epistem ologically  unacceptable. Such ontologies 
violate the restrictions which Hume rightly sought to impose upon 
metaphysics, in that they postulate a realm entirely outwith the reach 
of our understanding. It is a virtue of the conceptualist rea list 
approach that it has no such consequence. The choice between the 
acceptance of a conceptualist realist essentialism and a bare particular 
ontology is at the fundamental core of the debate between (the best 
form  of) realism  and anti-realism about essence. Essentialism  m ust be 
favoured since the postulation of bare particulars is incoherent.
The realist about essence, modality and individuation is not compelled 
to hold that there is a pre-individuated world. The rea lis t can 
recognize that individuating is a human activ ity , w ithout being 
com m itted to the view that the world does not already contain 
discrete entities.
I'
Conceptualism  properly conceived m ust not entail that 
before we got for ourselves these concep ts , the ir 
e x te n s io n s  co u ld  no t e x is t  a u to n o m o u s ly , i .e . ,  
independently  of w hether or not the concepts w ere 
destined to be fashioned and their com pliants to be 
discovered. W iggins (1980, 139)
The an ti-rea lis t concep tualises account underm ines our ordinary  
distinction between artifacts and natural beings whose existence is 
not due to human invention. We take ourselves to be ontologically 
prior to the artifacts we bring into being, but not ontologically prior to 
the na tu ra l en titie s  we recogn ize . The best the a n ti-rea lis t 
conceptualist could hope to achieve would be the m aintenance of the 
claim that we are, or perceive ourselves to be, causally responsible for 
the existence of those entities ordinarily deemed to be artifacts in a
--.r ‘-iway in which we are not, or do not perceive ourselves to be, causally
■t=;
"il.
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responsible for the existence of those entities ord inarily  deemed 
n a t u r a l . 5 3  N evertheless, from  the point of view of fundam ental 
ontology, the conventionalist account would obliterate all differences 
between the ordinary classes of artifacts and natural entities. Both 
classes of entities, are, on the conventionalist picture, ontologically 
dependent upon us. This might be taken to reduce the conventionalist 
position to absurdity given that there are well-established difficulties 
concerning the persistence principles of artifacts as against natural 
objects which carry over into problem s about essen tia list claim s 
concerning the former but not the latter. That the difficulties attach to 
a rtifac ts  and not to natural kinds suggests that, con trary  to 
conven tionalism , there is a fundam ental on to log ical d istinc tion  
betw een artifac ts and natural kinds. B etter, then, to adopt a 
conceptualism  according to which,
although horses, leaves, sun and stars are not inventions 
or artifacts, still, in order to single out these things, we 
have to deploy...a conceptual scheme which has itself been 
fashioned or formed in such a way as to make it p o s s i b l e  
to single them out. Wiggins (1980, 139)
This conceptualist premiss richly illustrates the reciprocal relationship 
between reality and the sortal concepts we employ. Our concepts do 
not furnish them selves with extensions.54 In order for a natural kind 
concept to be fulfilled it has to be possible for reality to meet that 
concept. That possibility is written into reality prior to the exercise of 
our individuative apparatus, and prior to the existence of concept- 
using beings.55 Thus, when such a concept is met a modal fact about 
reality is revealed.
53 Cf. Sidelle (1989, 51-52).
54 Cf. Strawson (1966, 225). So, the anti-realist conceptualist claim  of 
van Fraassen (1978, 19) that 'we do not have the task of representing 
the world the way it is, but only the way it is thought o f  is quite 
ou trageous.
55 In contrast, concept-using beings are ontologically prior to artifacts. 
(Cf. the conviction of Lowe (1989, 1) that natural entities must enjoy 
some sort of ontological priority over both abstract and artefactual 
objects'.) To avoid begging the question against theism , we m ight 
amend the claim  in the text such that the possibility referred to is 
w ritten into reality  prior to the (m etaphorically speaking) e a r t h l y  
existence of concept-using beings.
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CHAPTER 4; MODALITY AND ANTI-METAPHYSICS
4.1 The Programme
In this chapter I will examine the modality involved in the logical 
positiv ists’ notion of verification in principle. I will argue that they 
conflated substantive modality and logical modality. If their notion of 
v e rifiab ility  em ploys the form er it is in co n sis ten t w ith an ti­
m etaphysics. If it employs the latter it will fail to grant cognitive 
m eaningfulness to a class of statements which do possess cognitive 
m ean ing .
4.2 De Re and De Dicto
The argum ent for modal realism  offered in the previous chapter 
employed a distinction —whilst seeking neither to pursue nor reject a 
divorce— between locutions de re and locutions de dicto. It was noted 
at the outset that this grammatical distinction, ^  to which all but the 
o b s tin a te  w ill a cc ed e ,2 by no m eans en ta ils  com m itm ent to
latter distinction can be admitted without inconsistency by the anti­
rea list about m odality de re. It is a historical contingency, but no 
surprise, that anti-realists have tended not to do so.
1 The view  tha t the d is tin c tio n  is g ram m atica l ra th e r  than 
metaphysical is defended at 3.3 above. I hold that the distinction can 
be recognized without non trivial metaphysical commitment. However, 
unlike W. Kneale (1962, 631), I do not take it that the distinction 
between m odalities de re and de dicto is at best gram m atical, ju st that 
the theorist who wishes to attach metaphysical weight to modality d e  
re does not establish a case for such an attachment merely by pointing 
to the distinction between modal locutions de re and de dicto. The
«2 Prominent among the obstinate are: Ayer (1946, 149) ’to say that a 
property p  is a defining property of a thing A is equivalent to saying 
that the sentence which is formed out of the symbol ”A" as subject and 
the symbol as predicate expresses an analytic proposition'; Ayer
(1976, esp. 24) there are only de dicto m odalities'; Quine (1980, 4, 
143-145, and esp. 151); Quine [1953](1966: 156-174, esp. 156-157), 
where m odalities are taken to function only as sem antical predicates 
(attachable to names of statem ents), statem ent operators (attachable 
to statem ents, not names of statements) and sentence operators (an 
expansion of the second grade, which allows the attachm ent of modal 
operators to open sentences —Tichy (1972, 90) and N.P. W hite (1986, 
492 nt. 3) erroneously take this to express d istinc tive ly  de re 
modality). As W iggins (1980, 107) notes, de re forms such as ’x can be 
0' and It is possible for x  to be 0 ’ (which pervade everyday language)
.  .
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essentialism. Consider the following comments made by Lamprecht:
This passage is rich with matter for the illustration of crucial elements
there is no point at which...em piricists are more adam ant 
than in their resolute denial of natural necessity. Necessity 
holds between or among propositions, they say, not among 
things....If necessity be a term applied solely to the logical 
bond between prem ise and conclusion, then necessity is 
not found in nature, and even the adverb 'necessarily '
would be a m isfit for metaphysical use. B ut...there is in 
common parlance another sense of necessity  in which 
necessity is constantly found in nature. The falling tree 
crushes the blades of grass. The grass can not resist the 
tree's impact. The tree m a k e s  the blades bend and lie 
prone. There is compulsion here. There is compulsion of 
that kind throughout nature....no member of the school of 
em piricists or any other, has the philosophical righ t to 
reject the facts indicated by a certain language because 
they do not themselves choose to use that language. And
that is what the empiricists have done. They have denied
the facts of coerciveness in nature's operations (that is, 
what m ight be called physical necessity) on the ground 
that natural connections are not like im plications among
propositions (that is, w hat m ight be ca lled  log ical 
necessity). [1961](1967, 109-110)
fall entirely outwith the scope of Quine's three grades. Ayer (1979, 
311) is somewhat ambiguous: 'No doubt there do [exist de re usages in 
English]'. Ayer says that he does not see, contra W iggins, how this 
admission commits him to a belief in natural necessity. But this rests 
upon a confusion: Wiggins does not contend that the grammatical point 
estab lishes the m etaphysical point, contrary  to A yer’s apparent 
assum ption. In addition, Ayer's comments are inconsistent with Ayer 
(1976, 24), where Ayer implies that the recognition of de re modal 
idioms commits one to essentialism. W. Kneale (1962, 624) indicates, 
after a rem ark of A belard, that the doctrine that every m odal 
statem ent was about the sense of another statement' was adhered to 
by some m edieval logicians, not including A belard him self, who 
apparently deemed only de re constructions to be authentically modal. 
The view attributed to Abelard by Kneale compares with that of A.R. 
W hite (1975, 171), notwithstanding White's accession to the view that 
'the m odals...are "referentially opaque'" (1975, 176).
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in our discussion. Lam precht rightly observes that em piricists have 
been (historically , not logically) led, through the rejection of real 
necessity, to a rejection of the very idiom in which we express that 
necessity. However, Lamprecht is at fault in a manner akin to those 
who expound the very view which is the subject of his critique, since 
he takes it that the everyday uses of the notion of natural necessity in 
the locutions we employ in attempting to depict the world around us 
establish that there are natural necessity-involving facts. If it is the 
intelligibility of the concepts and linguistic forms we employ which is 
of immediate concern, then the discussion ought to be realigned, such 
that the facts at issue concern usage, rather than the extra-m ental 
realm. What is then shown is that, in expressing our beliefs about the
world, we actually employ locutions which do make use of a notion of 
non-logical, yet objective, necessity. Some empiricists have denied this 
because they have erroneously taken it that the acknowledgm ent of 
this linguistic and conceptual point entails committal to a metaphysical 
standpoint they reject. Contrary to their view, a recognition that modal 
attribution de re features in our practice does not in itself involve us 
in the acceptance of such a metaphysic. The cynic m ight observe, 
though, that by the denial of the very in te llig ib ility  of m odal 
a ttr ib u tio n  de re and of the very em ploym ent of the notion  of 
objective non-logical necessity, the em piricist practices an unseemly 
form  of philosophical economy since such a denial precludes the 
em piricist from having to account for our de re m odalizing practice 
(via the very refusal to accept what are facts about our practice). Thus, 
the em piricist is saved from a formidable and bothersome task. I hope 
to estab lish  that despite  the adam ant re jec tions, by prom inent 
empiricists, of the very notion of necessity de re and modal attribution 
de re, the logical positiv ists were them selves re lian t on both. 
Lamprecht is right to indicate that many traditional empiricists profess 
to reject the notion and the idiom in question, but they, no more than 
contemporary empiricists of similar opinion, do not really refrain from 
employing that idiom. Such empiricists may not explicitly employ talk 
of necessity in nature, but they certainly help them selves to modal 
attribu tions de re. (So, their denial of facts which characterize our 
practice  is undercut by their own participation  in that practice. 
Consequently, they cannot shirk from the form idable and bothersome 
task already mentioned: they are bound to account for the notion of 
objective non-logical necessity and modal locutions de re. Since they 
reject essentialism they will have to do so along anti-realist lines. Thus
...................
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em piricism  is seen to be incom patible with the advocacy of the 
elim ination of m etaphysics.) Furtherm ore, some of their proposals 
concerning verifiability appear to require that there is necessity in 
nature: this takes us beyond merely linguistic and conceptual points 
and into realist m etaphysics. Before proceeding to exam ine m odal 
issues regarding the notion of verifiability in principle, it will be useful 
to restate and bolster the de re!de dicto distinction.
O pponents of m odality  de re, often m otivated by the m istaken 
suspicion that recognition of de re m odal locutions en tails the 
acceptance of real essence, have either attempted to reduce locutions 
de re to locutions de dicto or maintained that at best de re locutions 
will so reduce if they are to make any sense at all. Conversely, and 
ironically, some of those sympathetic to essentialism  have sought to 
allay the fears of those who abhor modality de re by attem pting to 
explicate it, and accordingly the notion of essence, in terms of modality 
de dicto.^ I have maintained that whether or not de dicto modality is 
reducible to modality de re — an issue concerning which I have sought 
to preserve neutrality— m odality de re is definitely not reducible to 
m odality de dicto. Also, in contrast to the approach just mentioned, I 
hold that modality de re is not just irreducible to modality de dicto, 
but is not even explicable in terms of m odality de dicto.  (I have 
associated  m etaphysical m odality with m odal locutions de re and,
  ________
3 The most prominent being Plantinga (1969; 1970; 1974, Chapter 3). 
Contrary to the charge levelled against him, on the basis of readings of 
the earlier works, by Marcus [1971](1993, 66), Tichy (1972, 88) and 
Burge (1977, 344), Plantinga eschews reduction of m odality de re to 
m odality de dicto, taking both to be primitive. Plantinga states (1969,
248) that he seeks to explain modality de re via m odality de dicto. 
Explanation of x  in terms of y does not amount to a reduction of x to y, 
as P lantinga recognizes. Plantinga (1969, 257) expresses m anifest 
hostility to the reductionist project, maintaining that de re and de dicto 
m odalities are reciprocally explicable and that this will serve to allay 
the worries of those who are comfortable with m odality de dicto but 
uncom fortable with modality de re. Although Plantinga’s aspiration is 
to provide definitional equivalences between modal discourses de re 
and de dicto, he recognizes that definitional equivalence is a necessary 
but non-sufficient condition for reduction: this is implicit in (1974, 42). 
(R eduction  requ ires asym m etry: cf. M um ford (1994, 422). The 
c o n cep tu a l  p r io r i t y  of modality de dicto over m odality de re is
required for a reduction of the latter to the former.) Fumerton (1986,
294 nt. 8) perpetuates the reductionist m isinterpretation.
■ 1
I
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perhaps im plicitly, logical m odality with modal locutions de dicto A 
Later, this latter association will be discussed in more detail.)
,K;
I endorse Hacking's view that the de relde dicto distinction may be 
explicated in terms of the contrast between the follow ing forms of 
locution:
(I). It is possible that p,  and 
(II). It is possible for A to x.
These two sorts of modal locution exhibit im portant differences.5 (I) 
displays a m anifest dictum, p ,  (II) does not: typically, the place of A is 
filled by an individual, x  by an activity. (II) does not entail (I). G.E. 
Moore (1962, 188, cf. 185) noted that examples like Tt is possible that 
I will go, but I won't' involve a sort o f  contradiction, whereas those 
such as It is possible for me to go, but I won't' do not. The lack of 
entailment from (II) to (I) is illustrated by the lack of entailm ent from 
It is possible for me to go' to It is possible that I will go'.<5 The lack of 
equivalence between (I) and (II) is illustrated by the fact that, on the 
usual assum ptions (with respect to the tru th-conditional nature of 
modal discourse and the truth-values of modal judgm ents), truth value 
does not survive attempted substitutions across the two types.2 
------------------------------------------
4 I do not suggest that all modal locutions de re relate specifically to 
m etaphysical m odality or that all modal locutions de dicto  relate 
specifically to logical modality. (The statement that it is necessary for 
me to serve a prison sentence does not seem to concern metaphysical 
necessity. Similarly, if it is said that it is possible that the judge will 
decide in my favour we can reasonably take it that the speaker is 
concerned with a possibility other than merely logical possibility.) In 
addition, my discussion avoids 'the assumption of surface synonymy 
betw een "is essentially" and de re occurrences of "is necessarily '" 
described, and rejected, by Marcus [1971](1990, 59-60). I do hold, 
however, that de re modal truths reflect the natures of entities, as my 
discussion of the epistemology of substantive m odality de re at 2.2 
above has hopefully made clear.
5 These differences are documented by Hacking (1975), whose account
1 follow  but not w ithout qualification, as w ill becom e clear. The 
distinction between the two forms of locution is also drawn by Ayers 
(1968, 13ff). The differences apply, mutatis mutandis,  to necessity- 
involving constructions.
6 On the lack of entailment from (II) to (I) cf. Hacking (1975, 323).
2 Burge (1977, 339-340) gives as examples 'The proposition that every 
man who steps on the moon steps on the moon, is necessary', which is
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Hacking (1967, 151-153; 1975, 323-325) notes that the two forms 
admit of different adjectives. A key difference is that (I), but not (II), 
adm its 'probable ', whereas (II), but not (I), adm its 'perm issib le '. 
H acking explicates the de relde dicto distinction in terms of the 
d istinction between (I) and (II), subject to the caveat that where 
'central de re' modality is concerned, 'the A denotes an individual 
thing or agent', whereas type (II) locutions which involve reference to 
kinds are de re 'only in an extended or Pickwickian sense' (1975, 326- 
327). However, by the lights of a de reide dicto distinction worthy of 
purely grammatical status this semantical consideration is irrelevant. I 
contend that the de reide dicto distinction is well-explicated in terms 
of the evident differences between (I) and (II). Thereafter, I propose, 
in accordance with Hacking's remark, that the centrally/non-centrally 
de re d is tin c tio n  is sem an tica l/m etaphysica l. H ack ing 's  cavea t 
notwithstanding, I see no problem in viewing species as res,  even if 
this extends the 'classical' sense of the term.8 Logical m odalities, which 
I take to be typically de dicto, may admit of de re exp ression .9 Tt is
true and 'Every man who steps on the moon is such that he necessarily 
steps on the moon' which is usually taken to be false. On this lack of 
equivalence cf. Bradley and Swartz (1979, 238).
 ^ Hacking (1975, 326) counsels that de re constructions may form only 
a subclass of the constructions exhibiting (II) on the grounds that 'in I t  
is possible fo r  the sperm whale to survive at least two more years 
before extinction.. .the sperm whale designates not an individual but a 
species, and classically this is no res'. Given that the de reide dicto 
distinction is exhaustive of the forms of modal constructions species 
have to be counted as res,  since they are not dicta.  In addition, central 
m odality de re may be viewed as concerning concrete objects, not just 
concrete individuals. (This allows propositions to feature in non- 
cen trally  de re constructions.) Since species are concrete entities 
reference to species can occur in centrally de re constructions. On the 
concreteness of species cf. Lowe (1994b, 531). There is reason then, to 
avoid any restriction dictating that central de re constructions are 
confined to those which feature names for Hacking's 'classical' res.  We 
m ight also note that it should not be laid down as a necessary 
condition for a construction’s being de re that it contains a genuine 
designator. W hether or not 'God' is a non-empty name, 'It is possible 
for God to intervene in nature' is a de re construction, by the lights of 
the syntactic de reide dicto distinction I adopt. W hether or not a 
construction is centrally  de re, i.e., whether it succeeds in saying 
anything about a genuine re s ,  is a sem antic /m etaphysical issue 
separate from the distinction adopted at the basis of my enquiry.
9 Cf. Hacking (1967, 156):
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logically possible that may be re-expressed, for example, as Tt is 
possible for the proposition that p  to x ', where x-ing is a function the 
perform ance of which is a distinguishing characteristic of logically  
possib le  p ropositions A 1 Note that in such de re form ulations (if that 
they be) reference to manifest dicta  is still evident.
Even if de dicto m odalities were sem antically  or m etaphysically  
reducible to de re modalities that would in no way undermine the d e  
refde dicto distinction. In such a circumstance, de dicto would be a
Conjecture  I: Every use of the word ‘possib le ’ in an 
utterance has associated with it at least one noun phrase 
and a verb phrase (perhaps unuttered) that can serve as 
the subject and predicate of a corresponding ‘possible fo r’ 
construction .
Also, cf. Ryle's talk of the 'logical powers' possessed by propositions 
(1959, 331).
I register my disagreement with the view of Gomberg (1978, e.g., 
393) that it is possible that /?' and 'it is not certain that -/?' are 
equivalent. Gomberg's discussion seems to me to be unduly stipulative, 
if not question-begging, on this point. In so far as he argues for his 
view it is on the basis of 'sentence deviance' (1978, 402). I see nothing 
deviant in constructions of the form (I) which em ploy 'logically  
possible '. Readers are free to exercise their own discretion in this 
m atter bu t I take it that Gom berg's suggestion is exceedingly  
im plausib le  given that ph ilosophers are apt to em ploy  such 
constructions and that these are the natural, or at least commonly 
supplied, non-form al counterparts for form al constructions in which 
senten tia l m odal operators feature. That ph ilosophers grant them  
employ is no proof of their lack of deviance, but Gomberg provides no 
technical argument to establish such deviance. The point stands that if 
the constructions were in tu i t ive ly  or n a tura l ly  regarded as deviant it 
would be m ost unlikely that they would feature as prom inently as 
they do in philosophical discussions.
11 Hacking (1967, 157) writes that
one could say the verb V d irec t ly  parallels the noun N  if
and only if something is an N  if and only if it V. The verb
i n d i r e c t l y  parallels the noun if something is an N  if and
only if we, or someone else, or something else V.
This suggests that there may be an alternative de re fo rm u la tion  
pertinent to logically possible propositions, involving the latter sort of 
occurrence and perhaps relating to our reasoning faculties.
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4.3 Empiricism, Verifiability, Modality
12 Cf. Wiggins (1980, 106).
13 Cf. Misak (1995, 2, 206 nt. 4) on Berkeley’s notion of conceivability.
subclass of de re, rather than being identifiable with it: de re m odality 
per se would remain irreducible. In characterizing a modal locution as 
de dicto,  then, I mean that it admits of unproblematic expression in 
terms of (I). If we accept that logical modalities can be expressed in d e  
re form we have to be careful as to how this claim is understood. Tt is 
logically possible that if you put the paper in the fire it will not burn’ 
may be expressible in the following de re form: (i) Tt is possible for 
the proposition that i f  you put the paper in the f ire it will not burn to 
x '. It is not re-expressible as (ii) Tt is possible for the paper to fail to 
burn when put in the fire*. Even if logical modalities can be expressed 
via de re constiuctions, as it seems they can, it is still dic ta  which are 
modally qualified, in contrast with cases such as (ii) in which modal 
expressions qualify simple or complex predicates. 12
Verification in Principle
To advance the dictum that what is empirically known, and 
what is meant, must be verifiable, and omit all examination i
of the wide range of significance that could attach to 
possib le  verifica tion ', would be to leave the w hole 
conception rather obscure. C.I. Lewis (1934, 137)13
I now turn to an examination of the modality involved in the notion of 
verifiab ility . It w ill becom e apparent that there is considerab le  
obscurity in the logical positivists' conceptions of this notion, which is 
far from  expurgated subsequent to examination. I contend, however, 
that, for the m ost part, their stated intention was that the relevant 
modal notion was logical possibility.
The log ical positiv is ts incorporated  a m odal e lem ent in to  the 
verification principle in order to avoid the undesirable consequences 
which would result from an excessively restrictive criterion specifying 
m eaningfulness solely in terms of actual verification . Thereafter,
Schlick  in troduced fu rther m odality  by p roposing  a d istinc tion  
betw een  (w hat becam e know n as) p rac tica l v e rif ia b ility  and %
I
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verifiability understood more w i d e l y  A  4  Thus, the class of non-analytic 
m eaningful statem ents was to include statem ents such as Schlick's 
example, 'there is a mountain of a height of 3000 meters on the other 
side of the moon'.
Ayer introduced the notion of verifiability as providing a necessary 
and sufficient condition for non-analytic meaningfulness:
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given 
person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the 
proposition which it purports to express —that is, if  he 
knows what observations would lead him, under certain 
conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject 
it as being false. (1946, 35)
He proceeded to specify that the relevant notion of verifiability was 
that of verifiability in principle, rather than practical verifiability. That 
which is practically verifiable is that which we have the means to 
verify: we could verify it 'if we took enough trouble' (1946, 36). So, a 
statem ent is practically verifiable if we have the technical methods 
and equipm ent at our disposal via the exercise of which its truth or 
falsity could be indicated, regardless of whether the relevant process 
has been or will be pursued. Practical verifiability raises the same 
question as verifiab ility  in principle regarding the nature o f the 
relevant modality. I will concentrate upon the latter notion.
There are some grounds for doubt about the nature of the notion of 
verifiability in principle and, as we will soon see, unanim ity on this 
m atter was not exhibited among logical positivists. My contention will 
be that the m odalities most widely reputed to have been involved in 
the notion of verifiability in principle are logical, and it is fair to say 
both that this was the m ost prevalent view am ong the logical 
positivists themselves and that it is the view which best accords with 
their philosophical programme. Before discussing this m atter further, 
some comments regarding the role of the notion of verifiability  in 
principle in the account of meaningfulness furnished by the logical 
positivists are in order.
Satisfaction of the formulation of verifiability in principle as set out by
14 Schlick [1932b](1959, esp. 88-89); Ayer (1946, 36).
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A yer (1946, 35) came to be regarded as neither necessary  nor 
sufficient for the m eaningfulness of a statem ent since there was a
desire  to grant em pirical significance to (particu larly  sc ien tific)
statem ents which could neither be justifiably asserted nor justifiab ly
denied directly on the basis of empirical observation.!5 The notion of 
verifiability in principle was not forsaken, it was qualified such that a 
statem ent was held to be em pirically significant if it was either 
d irectly  or indirectly  verifiable, Indirectly  verifiab le  statem ents 
were held to be 'relevant', or logically related, to statements directly
verifiable in principle. Ayer noted that his talk of 'relevance' was 
imprecise, and attempted to provide greater clarity by specifying that;
a statem ent is directly verifiable if it is either itself an 
observation-statem ent, or is such that in conjunction with 
one or more observation-statements it entails at least one 
observation-statem ent which is not deducible from  these
other p rem ises alone; and ...a  statem ent is ind irec tly  
verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions: first, that 
in conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or 
m ore d irec tly  v e rifiab le  sta tem ents w hich  are no t
deducible from these other premises alone; and, secondly, 
that these other prem ises do not include any statem ent 
that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable 
o f be ing  in d ep e n d en tly  e s ta b lish e d  as in d ire c tly
v e rif iab le ....!  can now refo rm ulate  the p rin c ip le  of 
v e rif ica tio n  as requ iring  of a l ite ra lly  m ean ing fu l 
statement, which is not analytic, that it should be either 
directly or indirectly  verifiable, in the foregoing sense.
(1946, 13)
Ayer was here attem pting to avoid the logical problem s, and the 
problem s regarding excessive and deficient restric tiveness, arising 
from  the in troduction of the notion of ind irect verifiab ility  and 
mentioned at 1.4. Regardless of those problems, an examination of the
modality involved in the notion of verification in principle goes to the
roots of the logical positivist approach to em pirical m eaningfulness. 
Ayer used the term '"observation-statem ent"...to designate a statem ent 
"which records an actual or possible observation"" (1946, 11). Hempel
15 As Ayer (1946, 13) and Hempel [1950](1959, 118-122) noted.
16 Ayer (1946, 11-13, esp. 13).
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[1950](1959, 110) intended the concept of an observation sentence ’to 
provide a precise interpretation' of the vague notion of verifiability in 
principle. However, the concept of an observation sentence leaves 
unresolved the issue of the type of possibility which is pertinent to 
v e rif ia b ility  in p r i n c i p l e .  17 This is a murky area in the logical 
positivists' writings: vital questions such as the aforem entioned were 
in frequently  raised. In addition, what critica l lite ra tu re  there is 
examining modal aspects of the logical positivists' philosophy tends to 
focus m ostly on issues relating to their attem pted reduction of 
dispositional attributions to conditional statem ents.i ^
I have already alluded to the absence of unanimity among the logical 
positivists concerning the sort of modality which was intended to be 
involved in the notion of possible verification. T heir program m e 
disqualifies the m etaphysical m odality with which we have been 
concerned from  pertinence. If such modality were to be detected in 
their philosophy it would have to be regarded as inadverten tly  
present, since an acceptance of such modality is entirely at odds with 
their positiv is t p ro ject of elim inating m etaphysics: we w ill see,
however, that verificationism  by no means entails positivism  and that, 
in fact, there is reason to doubt the consistency of their combination. 
Since the logical positivists recognized only logical m odalities we will 
be strongly inclined to say that their intended m odality was thus 
logical. However, m atters are rather more in tricate. F irstly , it is 
som ew hat am biguous as to what is im plied by saying that one 
recognizes only logical modalities. One might be saying that the only 
modal notions one will countenance —the only m odalities one will 
regard as intelligible— are the logical m o d a l i t i e s . ^9 On the other hand.
17 Hempel [1950](1959, 110 nt. 5, 111 nt. 6) thought it to be logical 
possibility, but the issue is not as straightforward as he appears to 
have believed. Despite his assertion [1950](1959, 111 nt. 6) that '[as] 
has frequently  been em phasized in em piricist lite ra tu re , the term  
"verifiability" is to indicate, of course, the conceivability, or better, the 
log ical possib ility  of evidence' the logical positiv is ts  were not
unanimous on this issue. Notably, as we shall see, Carnap construed
verifiability in terms of physical possibility.
18 E.g.: Hempel [1950](1959); B.C. Moore (1951); Poser (1988), his 
excessively wide application of the term 'logical positivism ' (to the 
early views of Russell and W ittgenstein) notwithstanding.
19 Obviously any such comment coming from a logical positivist could 
not mean 'the only necessity I regaid as real  is logical necessity'. The
recognition of this point leads to an apparent problem  for the anti-
t .
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one m ight be subscribing to the reductionist thesis that other modal 
notions, such as causal and physical necessity , are nothing but 
localized/qualified versions of the logical modalities which one regards 
as fundam ental.
That the former attitude was adhered to by Ayer is evidenced by the 
following comments made to Ted Honderich:
I regard necessity as a purely logical notion. I won't have 
metaphysical necessity, which people now are going in for, 
and which seems to be horrible. Or indeed causal necessity, 
which I'm afraid to say you are rather tempted by. I think 
I give myself an Alpha for trying to stamp out that absurd 
heresy. Honderich (1991, 224)
These comments express an attitude adhered to by Ayer throughout 
his career. Ayer states that the only modal notions he will countenance 
are those of logical necessity and possibility. Ayer appears to regard it 
as a violation of his empiricist commitments to use any modality other 
than logical modality. His comments preclude him from  attem pting to 
explicate non-logical modal notions such as causal and m etaphysical 
necessity in terms of logical modality (or from reducing the former to 
the latter): in word, but not deed, he rejects all talk involving non-
*
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logical m odalities.20
In contrast, Carnap has no com punction about talk  of physical 
possibility: in fact he describes the modality involved in verifiability in 
principle as physical possibility (1936, 423).21 Carnap disputes a view 
earlier proposed by Schlick that verifiability in principle relates to 
log ical p o ss ib ility .22 On Carnap's view is the laws of physics might
m etaphysical credentials of logical positivism. The logical positivist is 
comm itted to denying the meaningfulness of m etaphysical claim s and 
is thus precluded, as was well-recognized, from  either asserting or 
denying any m etaphysical claim. However, it seems quite clear that 
where logical m odalities — crucial to the entire workings of their 
ph ilosophical fram ew ork— were concerned the log ical positiv ists  
adhered to an anti-realist position, whereby logical m odalities were 
regarded as reducing to linguistic convention. Unlike W ittgenstein, the 
logical positivists were committed to (a kind of) sem antic realism  
about logical modalities: statements of logical m odality were held to 
reduce to linguistic convention. Their stance on the logical modalities 
was sem antically realist and ontologically anti-realist. W ittgenstein 
view ed logical discourse as (sem antically, not syntactically) non- 
assertoric throughout his career: for him, it had sim ilar status to 
m etaphysica l d iscourse (especially  to the p ro p o sitio n s ' of the 
Tractatus) .  Unlike W ittgenstein, the logical positivists failed to realize 
that their own philosophy was metaphysical. The claim  of Butchvarov 
(1970, 7) and Dummett (1992, 145), that it is an illusion to think that 
metaphysics can be abolished from philosophy, is borne out.
20 Despite his professed attitude he continued to help him self to such 
talk, as is evidenced by the profusion of modal locutions de re in this 
passage (1991, 10):
for there really to be a door there, or indeed any other 
physical object...that I could mention, it is not enough that 
it be visible to me. It has to be accessible to my sense of 
touch and it has to be accessible to other observers. It has 
to occupy a position in three-dim ensional space and to 
endure throughout a period of time. M oreover, if it is 
correctly identified as a door it has, at least potentially, to 
fulfil a certain function: it needs to be solid; there is a lim it 
to the sort of material of which it can be made. And similar 
considerations would apply to any other physical object 
that I had chosen for an example.
21 Carnap's contentions in this regard are overlooked by Hempel. 
Carnap (1937b, 37) also employs the notion of physical possibility.
22 The view appeal's in Schlick's 'Positivism and Realism ', [1932b(1959: 
82-107, 88-89). How ever, Carnap's reference (1936, 423) is to
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have been different' thus a meaningless piece of metaphysics? Is what 
is or is not synthetically meaningful to be determined by the (logically 
contingent) laws which happen to hold in the actual world? The 
answer to the latter question, at least, has to be negative. W here 
Carnap m entions physical possibility ' this cannot be understood to 
relate to a notion of physical necessity proper, since the em piricist 
allows that the physical laws which hold in the actual world are such 
that they m ight change, whereas that which is genuinely necessary is 
such that it does not admit of deviation. At best, the em piricist can 
recognize a notion of physical possibility such that physical possibility 
is nothing but logical consistency with a certain class of statements 
treated as physical laws holding in the actual w o r l d . 23 if  physical
'M eaning and Verification', [1936](1979: 456-481, 464), where Schlick 
repeats the claim: It m ust be emphasized that when we speak of
verifiability we mean logical  possibility of verification, and nothing but 
this.' Like Carnap, Schlick has no compunction about using talk of non- 
logical m odalities. Schlick [1932b](1959, 89) draws a sharp contrast 
between logical m odalities and empirical modalities, relating the latter 
to the laws of nature.
23 The acceptability of such a notion of physical possibility is dubious 
since physical possibility, granting that it concerns concrete entities, is 
best regarded as a species of de re modality. Accordingly, in the light 
of the de relde dicto distinction I have employed, it does not admit of 
explication in terms of logical modalities at all. Putnam (1990, 68) is 
among the many who depict laws of nature as 'physically necessary 
truths', while Bacon (1981, 134) claims that 'physical necessity follows 
from logical necessity', such that for any statement p ,  ïî  p  is logically 
necessary, then p  is physically necessary. This seems to be a mistake, 
like  the em piric ist in te rp re ta tion  of physical p o ss ib ility  as a 
qualification on logical possibility. On such a de dicto in terpretation, 
the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is physically necessary, since it is logically 
necessary. Bacon's view, like that of empiricists who employ a notion 
of physical possibility as qualified logical possibility, treats physical 
m odalities as operators on statements. Where an adverb relating to a 
discipline modifies a modal term this is usually taken to indicate that 
the modal notion at issue is concerned with that which is studied by 
the d isc ip line: cf. H acking (1975, 325). N either num bers nor
propositions are part of the study of physics. The depiction of physical 
m odalities as de dicto is, of course, a standard feature of em piricist 
accounts. One such example is Russell (1940, 170): "'The moon is made 
of green cheese" is syntactically possible, but not physically.' Although 
there is room  for doubt, this comment suggests that Russell takes 
physical im possibility to pertain to linguistic items. He seems to be 
denying that the statement in question is physically possible, rather 
than suggesting that statem ents are not the kinds of things which
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m odalities are recognized  they w ill be in te rp re ted  as log ical 
consequences of probabilistically construed natural laws, rather than 
as relating to necessity proper (i.e. that which does not adm it of 
d e v ia t io n ) .24 But this appears to be enough to underm ine Carnap's 
claim  that it is physical possibility which pertains to verifiability in 
principle. If the laws of physics could change (as they must be able to, 
on the positivist account, since they do not hold as a matter of logical 
necessity  and they cannot be said to convey any m etaphysical 
necessity , since that involves an essen tia lis t a ttribu tion  and is 
therefore unacceptable to the positivist) then it is no good to attempt 
to restric t m eaningfulness by means of physical m odalities. It is a 
strange account of m eaningfulness which d ic ta tes that a given 
statement may be meaningless now, but that it m ight be meaningful in 
future subsequent to a relevant change in the laws of physics. Besides, 
such a physical possibility-style verificationism  would appear to be at 
odds w ith  the s tric t analy tic /syn thetic  and concep tua l/em p irica l 
dichotom ies (to which Quine has directed much critical attention) in 
the central nervous system of logical positivism, wherein the realm  of 
necessity is confined to the former half of each dichotomy.
An example used by Schlick in his discussion of the modality involved 
in verifiab ility  in principle is the statem ent 'R ivers flow uphill', 
subsequen tly  called  'S j ' by C a r n a p . 25 Schlick's claim  is that the 
statem ent is verifiable because it is logically possible. Carnap claims 
that confirm ability relates to physical possibility. Carnap makes the 
obvious point that this claim does not constitute a denial of the claim 
that Sj is logically possible. More importantly, Carnap's claim  is not 
that the statement itself describes a physical possibility, but that the 
statem ent is confirm able 'because of the physical possibility  of the 
process of confirmation; it is possible to test and to confirm  Sj (or its 
negation ) by observations of rivers w ith the help  of survey 
instruments'. Carnap's account also appears not to resolve the issue of
admit of physical possibility and impossibility.
24 Cf. F isk  (1973, 27): 'n ecess itie s  re s tr ic t  a lte rn a tiv e s ...a
res tric tio n ...e ith e r closes down alternatives or it does not'. The 
positiv ist's notion of physical necessity is not genuinely restrictive 
since physical laws them selves are not taken to express something 
which genuinely closes down alternatives: as far as the em piricist is 
concerned, natural events are not precluded from breaching the laws 
of nature.
25 Schlick [19361(1979, 467); Carnap (1936, 423).
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the m odality involved in verification in princip le. On a sensible 
reading, where Carnap refers to the physical possibility of processes of 
verification  with the help of w hatever equipm ent is relevant, he
cannot be taken to be reverting  to the po in t w here p rac tical
verifiability  alone is taken to prescribe m eaningfulness. W here he
says, in the passage ju st quoted, that 'it is possible to test and to
confirm  S j ' citing this as the reason why is deem ed literally
significant, I take it that he does not mean that Sj is m eaningful 
because we presently have at our disposal the means to carry out the 
relevant process of confirmation. If we take it that Carnap does not
mean practical verifiability ' by 'physical possibility of confirm ation'
then he may be taken to mean 'confirm ability in p rincip le '.2 6 if, for 
Carnap, physical laws are to determ ine m eaningfulness then his 
account faces fu rther d ifficu lties . F irstly , the de term ination  of 
m eaningfulness is no longer an a priori  m atter, which sits very
uncom fortably with the programme of logical positivism . Secondly, 
the laws of physics are themselves subject to processes of empirical 
confirmation, as Carnap states, in respect of a scientific law, 'instead of 
verification, we may speak here of gradually increasing c o n f i r m a t io n  
of the law' (1936, 425). He notes that this is no different in the case of 
particular sentences. How can meaningfulness be, as Carnap suggests,
determ ined by considerations relating to physical m odalities when 
statem ents relating to those physical m odalities require processes of
confirm ation meeting the same modal restrictions on m eaningfulness 
as any other class of statements? (If physical m odalities are adhered 
to here then the road to holistic anti-positiv ism  appears to rise
quickly.) The laws of physics cannot serve as m odal conditions on
m eaningfulness if the determ ination of the m eaningfulness of those 
laws themselves requires that they are meaningful and that they hold. 
Carnap's view would appear to lead to the conclusion that a statement 
about the m eaningfulness of a given statem ent itse lf constitutes an 
em pirical hypothesis.2 7
26 On the basis of (1937b, 37), it is clear that Carnap recognises 
distinctions betw een practical, physical and logical possib ility  of 
confirm ation .
27 This is not the same as the view that the verification principle is 
itself an em pirical hypothesis. Despite all his protestations that the 
verification principle puts forth no hypotheses, and is not a theory, 
Schlick makes comments which appear to suggest this strategy, e.g., 
'the "experimental theory of meaning "...proposes to be nothing but a 
simple statement of the way in which meaning is a c tu a l ly  assigned to i
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Moreover, Carnap's claim that it is possible to test and confirm (or 
its negation) by observations of rivers with the help of survey 
instrum ents' may be reformulated as, 'It is physically possible for us
to verify S j'. The reform ulation is perfectly in accord with Carnap's 
statem ent, and both are paradigm atic ally de re. We see, then, that 
substantive, rather than merely logical, modality is at play: the claim 
and its reform ulation express beliefs about what is possible de re. 
Notions of the physical modalities which view them as qualified logical 
m odalities are unacceptable since physical m odality is de re, not d e  
dicto. The very framing of verifiability in principle in terms of physical 
m odalities employs modal locutions which are paradigm atically de re 
(and thus irreducible to modal locutions de dicto), as the quotation 
from Carnap illustrates.
Among the major characters in the logical positivist movement Carnap 
appears to be in a minority of one in stating that the m odality of
intended relevance to verifiability  is physical. The view that the 
relevant m odality was logical was prevalent, but substantive and 
m erely logical m odality may sometimes have been conflated: I will 
suggest that the accounts of Ayer and Schlick appear to display such a 
conflation (although they both intended the relevant m odality to be
logical).
U sing an exam ple gleaned from Schlick, and follow ing Schlick's
discussion, Ayer introduces the notion of verifiability in principle as 
follows:
No rocket has yet been invented which would enable me to
propositions' [1936](1979, 458-459). Carnap (1937b, 33) views the 
principle as a prescription, rather than an empirical or analytic truth. 
Here Carnap writes rather vaguely about 'the principle of empiricism '. 
We have previously noted that the verification principle is not entailed 
by the principle of empiricism. Nonetheless, in so far as we take the 
former to concern the criterion of meaningfulness and the latter as the 
epistemological position at the basis of that criterion, it is clear that 
Carnap is addressing himself to the former principle. That Carnap does 
not distinguish the two principles is consistent with his aspiration to 
restric t the language of philosophy to the form al mode: he would 
regard 'all non-analytic knowledge is em pirical' as a m aterial-m ode 
version of the criterion of meaningfulness.
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go and look at the farther side of the moon, so I am unable 
to decide the m atter [i.e. the truth-value of T h ere  are 
m ountains on the farther side of the moon'] by actual
observation. But I do know what observations would 
decide it for me, if, as is theoretically  conceivable ,  I were 
once in a position to make them. And therefore I say that 
the proposition is verifiable in principle, if not in practice, 
and is accordingly significant. (1946, 36, my emphasis)
Ayer's account suggests a distinction between what is 'theoretically  
conceivable’ and what is not. It will be recalled that the defence of
essentialism  proposed in the last chapter em ployed the notion of
conceivability in such a manner that there is a lim it to the predicates 
in terms of which an entity can be conceived, since some predicates 
are not com patible with the identity of the entity. This essentialist
notion of conceivability cannot be what Ayer intends to employ, but 
his account appears to rely upon it to some extent. Ayer is attempting 
to draw a line between what I would observe if I were appropriately
situated and what I could not observe under any circum stances. But 
the above passage introduces theoretical conceivability not at the level 
of what cognitive faculties a human being might have, but at the level
of the pertinence of the circum stances under which those faculties
would function appropriately to the affirmation or denial of a given 
statement. Ayer is clearly seeking to delim it the range of 'theoretical 
conceivability ' so that it is conceivability relative to our cognitive 
apparatus which is relevant. But from the point of view of logic our 
having the cognitive apparatus that we happen to have is contingent. 
Since it is not logically necessary for us to have these cognitive
faculties a theory which sets out to restric t the realm  of literal
meaningfulness to that which we can observe (given those faculties) is 
employing a substantive, rather than a merely logical, modality: thus, 
it is a metaphysical theory.
According to Ayer:
all propositions which have factual content are em pirical 
hypotheses...the function of an empirical hypothesis is to 
provide a rule for the anticipation of experience. And this 
means that every empirical hypothesis must be relevant to 
some actual, or possible, experience... (1946, 41)
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Possible experience for whom? If we take it that the sort of experience 
referred to is that which it is possible for human beings to have, then 
we aie dealing with a substantive de re m odality.
I distinguish between a ’strong’ and a 'weak' sense of the 
term 'verifiable',,,I explain this distinction by saying that 'a 
proposition is said to be verifiable in the strong sense of 
the term, if and only if its truth could be conclusively
established in experience', but that 'it is verifiable, in the 
weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it
probable'. Ayer (1946, 9)
We have already seen that Carnap employs the de re g ram m atical
form: in the quoted passage we see that Ayer also does so. The de re 
locutions he employs exhibit the form of the following: 'It is possible 
for experience to render p  p r o b a b le ' .28 But if Ayer is really as hostile 
to de re modality (both grammatical and m etaphysical) as he claimed 
th roughout his career he cannot be taken to m ean w hat the 
gram m atical form of his locution entails. Rather, his claim  m ust be 
reconstituted. The de re talk he actually uses is not equivalent to any 
de dicto talk, so we will have to speculate somewhat as to what Ayer 
really wishes to convey. Thus, we might recast 'it is verifiable, in the 
weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable' as 'it 
is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is logically  possible that
experience renders/w ill render it probable'. Unless the de re m odality 
featuring in Ayer's locution can be shown to be predicated upon logical 
possibility, Ayer is helping himself to the sorts of modal locutions to 
w hich, q u a  positiv ist, he is entirely  opposed because of their 
m etaphysical status: the only m odalities which are supposed to be 
recognized by positivists are those which are uninform ative about the 
world. I do not claim  that Ayer is making real essentialist claims, but 
that the use of de re m odal locutions con flic ts w ith  his an ti­
m etaphysical project at least so long as an account is not available
28 I acknowledge that, prima fac ie ,  the locution indicated does not 
involve central m odality de re, since 'experience' is not an agent, an 
individual or a species. However, in so far as it is my or our  experience 
which is at issue the locution is elliptical for one involving talk of what 
it is possible for me or us to experience. Such talk clearly involves 
central modality de re.
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whereby these locutions can be understood as em bodying nothing 
more than the modal notions of logical necessity and logical possibility 
which are (supposedly exclusively) countenanced by him .29 The logical 
positivists provided no such account and I have argued that no such 
account is possible. Although Ayer does not mention logical possibility 
specifically —the closest he comes is in his talk of what is 'theoretically 
conceivable'— we have seen that there is good reason why he must 
regard the intended modality pertaining to verification in principle as 
logical possibility.
Other writers, such as Hempel and Schlick, combined form ulations of 
the notion of verifiability in principle explicitly in terms of logical 
possibility with pervasive employment of de re modal talk.
Our concept of observation sentence is intended to provide 
a precise interpretation of the vague idea of a sentence 
asserting something that is in principle' ascertainable by 
d irect observation, even though it may happen to be 
actually  incapable  of being observed by m yself, perhaps 
also by my contem poraries, and possibly even by any 
hum an being who ever lived or w ill live . H em pel 
[1950](1959, 110, my emphasis)30
29 The qualification at least' serves as a reminder of a point previously 
mentioned; the logical positivists could not be non-m etaphysical in 
their philosophy since they had views about the m etaphysical status of 
the logical m odalities. At best, they might have sought to attain a 
m inim al metaphysics free from the employment of substantive modal 
notions. (Even the possibility of a minimally m etaphysical philosophy 
m ay be dubious, since ph ilosophers who eschew  substan tive  
m odalities or m odality tout court  have not managed, in practice, to 
eliminate substantive modal talk. According to Marcus [1971](1993, 55 
incl. nt. 8) and Wiggins (1979, 154-155 nt. 14) even Quine does not 
refrain from the use, respectively, of essentialist and de re modal talk.)
30 Hem pel's concept of an 'observation statem ent' is analogous to 
A yer's p rev iously  outlined concept of an 'ob serva tion -sen tence '. 
H em pel [1950](1959 , 110 nt. 5) expresses v e rif iab ility  (and 
confirm ability) in principle in terms of logically possible evidence'. 
Later, he comments: 'As has frequently been emphasized in em piricist 
lite ra tu re , the term  "verifiability" is to ind icate , of course, the 
conceivability , or better, the logical possibility  of evidence of an 
observational kind...' [1950](1959, 111 nt. 6). Cf. Stace's use of logical 
possibility talk in his specification of the 'Principle o f  Observable  
Kinds '  (1944, 218): 'A sentence, in order to be significant, must assert
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Hempel appears to be indicating that anything which is possibly —in an 
unrestric ted  sense, regardless of actual incapab ilities— subject to 
verification is meaningful. On the other hand, it appears that Hempel 
wishes to restrict meaningfulness, such that it is relative to the a c tu a l  
m odalities w hich perta in , regarding , for exam ple, our cognitive  
faculties and their relations with other aspects of the constitution of 
the actual world. This is suggested by his explication of his conception 
of an observation sentence;
A property or a relation of physical objects will be called 
an o b s e r v a b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  if, under su itab le  
circumstances, its presence or absence in a given instance 
can be ascertained through direct observation. Thus, the 
term s 'g reen ', 'so ft', liqu id ', 'longer than ', designate  
observable characteristics, while 'b ivalent', 'rad ioactive ', 
better electric conductor', and 'introvert' do not. Terms 
which designate observable characteristics will be called 
observation predicates.  Finally, by an observation sentence  
we shall understand any sentence which — correctly  or 
incorrectly— asserts of one or more specifically named 
objects that they have, or that they lack, some specified 
observable characteristic. [1950](1959, 109-110)
In all this talk of observability it seems that Hempel is desirous of 
m odal restrictions on meaningfulness relative to actual incapabilities. 
Hem pel appears to attem pt to prom ote the contradictory  aims of 
providing an account of m eaningfulness in term s of unrestricted  
possibility on the one hand, yet of restricting m eaningfulness relative 
to considerations as to what happens to be the case concerning our 
sensory apparatus, the actual constitution of the world, and their 
relations. The notion of 'logically possible evidence' em ployed by 
Hem pel [1950](1959, 111 nt. 5) manifests the disregard for modal 
discrim inations typical of the logical positivists and shared by many 
em piricists. The very phrase logically possible evidence' expresses 
much that was wrong in the logical positivists' attempts to provide a 
criterion of non-analytic meaning. It also sums up the contradiction at
or deny facts  which are o f  a kind such that it is logically possible  
directly to observe some facts which are instances o f  that class or 
kind...'. Also, cf. Hempel [1950](1959, 115 nt. 11).
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According to Schlick, 'verifiable certainly means nothing but "capable 
of being exhibited in the given'" [1932b](1959, 88). He adds:
the heart of the account of verifiability in principle attem pted by 
Hempel. The phrase 'logically possible evidence’ is messy. Does it relate 
to that which it is possible for us to observe, or to that which is 
logically possible, for example that it m ight have been the case that 
our cognitive faculties were other than those we in fact have (thus 
altering the range of observability)? It is evident that Hempel did not 
make up his mind on this issue: if the former is adopted then we have 
a de re attribution, the m etaphysical innocence of which m ust be 
illustrated. Such an account is exceedingly unlikely to be forthcoming.
:
fverifiability is used here in the sense of 'verifiability  in principle', for the meaning of a proposition is, of course, 
independent of w hether the conditions under which we 
find ourselves at a specified time allow or prevent the 
actual verification. There is not the least doubt that the 
proposition there is a mountain of the height of 3000 
meters on the other side of the moon' makes good sense, 
even though we lack the technical means of verifying it. 
And it would remain just as meaningful if one knew with 
certainty, on scientific grounds, that no man would ever 
reach the other side of the moon. The verification remains 
c o n c e iv a b le ' ,  we are always able to state what data we 
should have to experience in order to decide the truth or 
falsity  of the proposition; the verification is l o g i c a l l y  
possib le , w hatever be the case regarding its p ractical 
feasibility, and this alone concerns us.
-
On one reading, Schlick appears to operate with a revisionary notion of 
logical possibility as restricted relative to our cognitive faculties. That 
reading is dependent upon taking 'capable of being exhibited in the 
given' as conveying that which it is actually possible for us to 
experience. In accordance with this reading, Schlick is operating with a 
substantive modal notion. If this reading is rejected, as is advisable 
given the positiv ists ' anti-m etaphysical pretensions, Schlick is still 
guilty of employing de re modal locution, in the phrase ju s t quoted. 
This may just be slovenly talk on his part. It is plausible that it is just 
so, because Schlick distinguishes sharply between logical and empirical
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m odalities and states quite explicitly that the m odality pertaining to 
the notion of verifiability in principle is logical, not empirical:
One cannot...suppose that the d istinc tion  betw een the 
im possibility of verifying something in principle and the 
mere factual, em pirical im possibility is not clear, and is 
therefore sometimes difficult to draw; for the im possibility 
in principle  is logical impossibility which does not differ in 
degree from  em pirical possibility , but in very essence. 
W hat is em pirically im possible still rem ains conceivable, 
but w hat is logically  im possible is contradictory , and 
cannot therefore be thought at all. [1932b](1959, 89)
SThis is re itera ted  in 'M eaning and V erification ', w here Schlick distinguishes between two uses of possibility': 'em pirical possibility ', 
which is defined as compatibility with the laws of nature, and 'logical 
po ss ib ility ' w hich is defined as that w hich can be described  
[1936](1979, 462-464).31 'It must be emphasized', writes Schlick, that 
when we speak of verifiab ility  we mean l o g i c a l  poss ib ility  of 
verification, and nothing but this' [1936](1979, 464). Schlick proceeds 
to specify verifiability  as mere accordance with gram m atical rules, 
which he takes to be arbitrary [1936](1979, 466). (He erroneously 
opines [1936](1979, 467) that a construction is either gram m atically 
well-form ed or not, and that there is therefore an absolute difference 
between m eaningful and m eaningless constructions.32) The immediate 
consequence of such remarks is that the anti-m etaphysical credentials 
of verificationism  are radically undercut. There is nothing ill-form ed 
about many of the examples of metaphysical discourse m entioned by 
the logical positivists, e.g. 'the Absolute enters into, but is itself 
in cap ab le  of, evo lu tion  and p ro g re s s '.3 3 F u rth e rm o re , since  
m eaningfulness is unconstrained, on Schlick's account, by em pirical 
modalities, it appears that the way is left open for talk, for example, of
31 It is interesting to note Schlick's move from talk of two kinds of 
possibility (in the earlier paper) to talk (in this piece) of two uses of 
the word 'possibility '. This is relevant to some comm ents made by 
Hacking which will concern us later. (I do not imply that Schlick's 
articles are in contradiction.)
3 2 The correct view , that w ell-form edness adm its o f degree, is 
propounded by Chomsky (1965, 11, 148-153).
33 A remark 'taken at random' from F.H. Bradley's A ppearance  and  
Real i ty  by Ayer (1946, 36).
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a transcendental realm or a noumenal reality em pirically accessible to 
beings with cognitive faculties other than ours, or even to us, should 
our cognitive faculties change:
34 The lack of restrictiveness afforded by Schlick's conception of 
verifiability is evidenced by his admission [1936](1979, 470-471) that 
it  allow s ta lk  of personal survival a fte r death ; fu rtherm ore , 
'im m ortality...is an empirical hypothesis, because it possesses logical 
verifiability '. The lack of restrictiveness is further illustrated by his 
claim  that 'only logical possibility of verification is required [not 
em pirical possibility]. And verification without a "mind" is logically 
possible’ [1936](1979, 481).
35 Cf. Schlick’s use of the notions of capability and ability [1938](1979, 
288, 292).
I
There are...m any questions which can never be answered 
by human beings. But the im possibility of finding the 
answer may be of two different kinds. If it is m erely 
empirical in the sense defined, if it is due to the chance 
circum stances to which our human existence is confined, 
there may be reason to lament our fate and the weakness 
of our physical and mental powers, but the problem could 
never be said to be absolutely insoluble, and there would 
always be some hope, at least for future generations. For 
the em pirical circum stances may alter, hum an fac ilities 
m ay develop , and even the law s o f n a tu re  m ay 
change...[1936](1979, 466)34
.Schlick employs de re modal locutions here .35 His last sentence may be 
slightly paraphrased to render this even more evident, such that It is 
possible for empirical circumstances to alter, it is possible for human 
facilities to develop and it is even possible for the laws of nature to 
change'. Schlick is definitely making modal predications about the 
w o r l d .  This is incom patible with the positiv ist agenda whereby 
necessity  and possib ility  have their sole residence in lingu istic  
convention. It is also incompatible with the anti-m etaphysical project. 
The positiv ist may attem pt to get off the hook by indicating, for 
exam ple, that em pirical possibility is ju s t that which is logically 
consistent with the laws of nature. However, quite apart from the 
other problems associated with such a response (and indicated above), 
given the lack of equivalence between the forms It is possible that p ' 
and It is possible for A to x \  that response will not do — assuming, that
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is, that logical modalities are not paradigmatically de re. (I will defend 
that assumption in the next section.)
The form of my dialectic so far in this chapter has been as follows. 
There is some confusion over the nature of the m odality involved in 
the notion of verifiability in principle. The stated intention of m ost 
positivists was that logical modality pertained. I agreed that this is as 
it should be, since substantive modalities are at odds with their anti­
m etaphysical (and, of course, anti-essentialist) intentions. I set about 
illustrating how de re modal locutions were employed nonetheless, and 
I attributed this to modal confusion on the part of the positivists. 
Substantive modal talk pervades positivist writings: it is at the heart 
of their attempts to explain the notion of verifiability in principle. I 
have repeatedly  em phasized that the de retde dicto  d istinction is 
gram m atical rather than m etaphysical. Nevertheless the onus is upon 
the philosopher who employs de re modal constructions to provide an 
account of the metaphysical status of such talk. If one seeks to banish 
metaphysics one is required to exorcise all de re modal talk from one’s 
philosophical armoury, since it is no good helping oneself to such talk 
on the basis that some anti-realist account of it can be provided. That 
is no good because one precludes oneself from  either asserting or 
denying any m etaphysical claim . If one seeks to re je c t real 
m etaphysical m odality de re one must either avoid all such talk or, if 
one is prepared to allow the retention of metaphysics, provide a viable 
anti-realist account of such modality. The relevant requirem ents went 
unmet by the logical positivists.
If verification in principle rests upon substantive possibility  de re, 
v e rifica tion ism  is incom patib le  with an ti-essen tia lism  and an ti­
metaphysics. W hat is possible for us, or for beings with our cognitive 
faculties, to verify cannot be explicated in terms of logical possibility. 
Cognitive faculties involve substantive m odality de re, so the attempt 
to restrict meaningfulness by relativising it to our cognitive faculties 
involves substantive m odality de re. Our cognitive faculties pertinent 
to empirical verification relate to that which it is possible for us to 
observe: they are abilities inherent in us. I know of no plausible 
reduction of the abilities of a thing (a de re notion) to talk of logical 
possibility (a de dicto notion).36
36 Dummett (1976, 110-111, 114, 116-117, 136) and Misak (1995, 56) 
illu s tra te  the cen tra lity  of hum an capacitie s and ab ilitie s  to
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If, on the other hand, logical possibility is what is relevant, then the 
restrictions on cognitive meaningfulness would be such that what is to 
count as a literally meaningful statement would relate to that which it 
is logically possible that beings with our cognitive faculties would 
verify. Let us take modal attribution de re as a paradigm atic example
verificationism . (Indeed the notion of ability is central to Dummett's 
very formulation of the task of a theory of meaning as the pursuit of *a 
theoretical representation of a practical ability' (1976, 69, cf. 70-73), 
i.e., the ability to use a language.) In the absence of a viable anti­
rea lism  about m odality  de re, M isak’s claim  (1995, xi) that 
verificationism  and realism  are in conflict is open to doubt, although 
work is no doubt required in order to substantiate that doubt. Given 
Dum m ett's own conception of verification in terms of actual human 
capacities' (1976, 136), and his characterization of decidability, as it 
bears upon the acceptance or rejection of the principle of bivalence for 
a class of statements, as relative to our  powers (1976, 102), it appears 
that his position is misrepresented by Appiah (1985, 29), who claims 
that 'verifiability has to do with logical possibility...as Dummett's talk 
of verification "in principle" indicates'. (We have already seen that it is 
by no means clear that talk of verification in principle is a reliable 
indicator that logical possibility is taken to be central to verifiability. 
Cf. Dum m ett (1976, 99-100), although I disagree that realist views 
require a generous, i.e., epistemically unrestricted, interpretation of 'in 
principle possible' as it occurs in 'a...regulative principle [K] governing 
the notion of truth: If a statem ent is true it m ust be in principle 
possible to know that it is true .) Edgington (1985, 36) comments that a 
conception of verifiability in terms of logical possibility constitutes 'a 
vacuous restriction on truth '. She gives a broad characterization of 
verificationism as acceptance of the principle K, that If "p" is true then 
it is possible to know that p', adding that she does not see that K 'even 
expresses a "broadly em piricist temper", at least until we have some 
restrictions upon the endowments of possible knowers' (1986, 36-37). 
The comment raises a paradox at the heart of verificationism. In order 
to render epistemically constrained notions of truth and meaning facts 
about human faculties must be brought to bear. These facts, however, 
contravene the traditional em piricist commitment, often taken to be 
essential to empiricism, that there are no m odalities in nature, since 
faculties relate to metaphysical modality de re. The claim that realism 
and verifica tion ism  are in conflict is often pred icated  upon a 
tran scen d en ta lis t characteriza tion  of realism  w hich concep tua lis t 
realists reject. (One of the misfortunes of contem porary realism /anti­
realism  debates is that the characterizations of realism  which have 
gained  sw ay are those advanced by w rite rs  o f a n ti- re a lis t 
predilection.) Given the good prospects of a conceptualist realism  (e.g., 
W iggins (1980); Divers (1990); Peacocke (1997)) the realist can admit 
an element of anthropocentrism into the notion of truth.
37 Cf. Peacocke (1993, e s p . 197).
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of m etaphysical discourse. Setting aside the logical problem s relating 
to indirect verifiability , I concede to the positiv ist that it is not 
logically possible, concerning a statement of substantive m odality d e  
re ,  for the statem ent to be verified by us. I make this concession 
because it is entailed by the approach to logical modalities inherent in 
the epistemology adopted at 2.2. A statement of substantive modality 
de re that is known is dependent upon an a priori  m odal m ajor 
premiss. Necessary truths are true in virtue of their conceptual content 
and are such that, fundam entally, they do not adm it of em pirical 
justification. Given that they have purely conceptual status in respect 
both of m etaphysics and of epistemology, no em pirical data counts 
towards their fundamental justification. (I do not deny that such data 
can count tow ards justify ing  the beliefs of particu lar th inkers.) 
Knowledge of the relevant concepts themselves yields the knowledge 
that the relevant truths do not admit of empirical justification.37 From 
my concession to the logical positiv ists it does not follow  that 
statem ents involving essentia list a ttribution/substantive m odality  d e  
re  are cognitively m eaningless. In fact it is via analysis of their 
cognitive content that it is recognized that they are neither analytic 
nor em pirically verifiable. Such statements are known neither through 
relations of ideas, nor through empirical observation. Rather, they are 
hybrids: their truth is inferred from a necessary m ajor premiss and an 
em pirical m inor prem iss. They possess both em pirical and non- 
em pirical content. It is not logically possible that their truth can be 
secured merely by empirical means: this is an a priori  truth which 
derives from an understanding of the non-em pirical content involved, 
by the lights of the epistemology for substantive modality de re I have 
supported (at 2.2).
Contem porary em piricists who recognize the naivety  of the an ti­
metaphysical project but who renounce essentialism  still face the acute 
problem of having either to reject de re modal locutions or to provide 
a viable anti-realist account of such modality. The latter strategy has 
been attem pted, but the anti-essentialist is faced with the formidable 
problem that the most commonly followed path, the attempt to reduce 
m odality  de re to modality de dicto, is illegitim ate. M oreover, the 
illeg itim acy of that path arises from  considerations of a logico- 
gram m atical nature, not via m etaphysics. A nti-realist strategies tend I
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to admit modalities only as, at best, operators on dicta:  we have seen 
this in the case of elim inativism  and projectivism . I have previously 
com m ented that, given the logico-gram m atical considerations ju s t 
mentioned, this is a formidable obstacle in the way of the development 
of a workable projective account of non-logical modalities.
A Note on van Fraassen^ 8
An exam ple of a contem porary em piricist who em ploys the de re 
modal form, yet wishes to retain traditional hostility to essentialism , is 
van Fraassen. He comments that
empiricism requires theories only to give a true account o f  
what is observable, counting further postulated structure 
as a means to that end. In addition, em piricists have 
always eschewed the reification of possibility (or its dual, 
necessity ). P ossib ility  and necessity  they re legate  to 
relations among ideas, or among words, as devices to 
facilitate the description of what is actual. (1980, 3)
He acknowledges (1980, 217 nt. 6) that he helps h im self to de re 
m odal talk. This is illustrated by his claim that 'w hat counts as an 
observab le  phenom enon is a function  of w hat the ep istem ic  
community is {...observable  is observab le-to -us) '  (1980, 19). He holds 
(1980, 198-199) that de re modal attributions can be explained as 
follows:
m odality appears in science only in that the language 
naturally used once a theory has been accepted, is modal
38 I have said my piece against the more thorough elements of anti­
rea list conceptualism  which characterize van Fraassen 's views and 
W iggins has done enough to illustrate the centrality of modality de re
to the very singling-out of entities. My prim ary concern here is to
illustrate van Fraassen's own heavy dependence upon the de re modal 
idiom, his (in my view inadequate) attempt to account for that idiom, 
and the parallels between the position in which I claim  he is in with 
regard to m odality de re and the case of the logical positivists as 
described above. W ith some threat of indulging in hyperbole, my 
claim s in both cases m ight be taken to suggest that ju s t as, in 
D um m ett's  w ords, the 'am bition  to abo lish  m etaphysics was
positivism 's greatest illusion' (1992, 145), so the ambition to abolish
essen tia lism  is the g reatest illusion  p ers is ten t in contem porary  
em piric ism .
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language....W e do not say that the burning of copper at 
room tem perature and pressure has no counterpart in any 
model of our physics; we simply say that it is impossible.
Once the theory is accepted...it guides our language use in a 
certain way. The language we speak at that point has a 
logical structure which derives from  the theories we 
accep t.39
However, this fails to answer the point that talk of the ’observable’ and 
the ’empirically attestable* cannot itself be explained in such a manner. 
The lim its of our experience are radically under-determ ined by the 
scientific theories we happen to accept; if that were not the case then
experience could never be recalc itran t with theory. Indeed, van
Fraassen him self regards 'what is observable as a theory-independent 
question. It is a function of facts about us qua  organisms in the world' 
(1980, 57-58). Thus, he is precluded from explaining-away all de re 
modal talk along the anti-realist lines he seeks to develop, since a type 
of de re modal attribution crucial to his philosophy is precluded from 
having its locus (solely) in the model' (1980, 202).40 in addition, even 
supposing that there could be an entirely  extra-m odal em pirical 
theory, any modalizing habits which might ensue upon the acceptance 
of such a theory could not legitimately be described as having a 'logical 
structure which derives from  the theories we accept'. R ather, the 
logical structure of particular de re modal attributions derives from 
general principles governing the modal notions employed therein. The 
logical structure of neither the principles nor the attributions derives 
from  the empirical theories we accept. The logico-gram m atical form of 
de re constructions cannot be explained by appeal to our acceptance of 
non-m odal em pirical theories. The best van Fraassen can hope for, 
therefore, is some purely psychologistic account of our employment of 
such constructions.
Observability relates to what it is possible fo r  us to observe. This 
modality is clearly de re, yet the notion of observability-for-us is at
39 Cf. (1980, 202): The locus of possibility is the model...the language 
we talk has its structure determined by the major theories we accept.'
40 However, he comments (1980, 217 nt. 8) that the scientific theories 
we accept are a determining factor for the set of features of the human 
organism counted among the limitations to which we refer in using the 
term "observable ". This appeal's, in contrast to (1980, 57-58), to be an 
epistem ological, rather than a metaphysical, point.
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the heart of em piricist philosophy, both in its positiv ist and in its 
contem porary incarnations. In the absence of a viable ontological 
reduction of m odality de re, this foundation stone of em piricism  is 
incom patible with the post-Cartesian em piricists’ continued insistence 
that there is no m odality in nature and that the only in telligible 
notions of objective modality aie, at best, the de dicto notions of logical 
necessity and possibility (and perhaps relativized versions thereof) / 1
4.4 Logical Possibility as Typically De Dicto
In the preceding section I attem pted to characterize the m odality 
in tended by the logical positiv ists to feature  in the notion of 
verifiability in principle. I claimed that the logical positivists mostly 
intended logical possibility to be the relevant m odality. However, it 
should be clear from  the com m ents I m ade in rendering  this 
characterization that there was ambiguity in their accounts because, I 
have been contending, they conflated substantive modal talk and talk 
of merely logical possibility. I have been suggesting that they did not 
have the right to help themselves to such substantive modal talk, since 
they professed to reject essentialism . (Although the use of such talk 
does not in itself commit one to essentialism, if one rejects essentialism 
then one is bound either to reject such talk or to provide a viable anti­
rea lis t reconstruction  of such talk. The la tter path is obviously 
metaphysical.) The logical positivists did so, it seems, because they did 
not recognize that substantive modal talk for what it was: they thought 
they were sticking to their empiricist guns and employing only logical 
m odalities, with any other modalities being seen as m ere subsidiaries 
of logical modalities. This failure may have been born from disregard 
for the broadly Aristotelian tradition from whence the elucidation of 
discrete sorts of modal locution came. In order to justify the direction 
of the polemic I have mounted so far it is necessary to go into some 
more detail regarding the notion of logical possibility.
Much of what I have written has rested upon the idea that the logical 
m odalities are best construed as de dicto, rather than de re. I claim 
that even if the notions of logical possibility and necessity can be
41 This is illustrated by the centrality of appeal to observability-for-us 
in the definition of empiricism given by van Fraassen (1980, 202-203), 
despite the fact that, according to that form ulation, the em piricist 
professes to reject the idea that there is modality in nature.
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rendered in terms of modal locutions de re, they are not typical cases, 
since the res  referred to will be linguistic and/or abstract entities, 
which are res  only in an extended sense, the word usually being 
understood to relate only to concrete (spatial/tem poral) e n titie s /2  A 
statement of logical possibility such as Tt is logically possible that p '  
may be rendered into the de re form: 'It is possible for p to x' (where x 
relates to the perform ance of some function apposite to logically 
possible dicta).  As we have seen, by refusing to rule out the possibility 
that logical modalities may be rendered de re, one does not thereby 
comm it oneself to the view that what are modally qualified in such 
cases are anything other that dicta. Essentialist claims about contingent 
existents are not explicable via necessary propositions since such 
c la im s, p ro p e rly  co n stru ed , are p a ra d ig m a tic a lly  de re and 
paradigm atically  de re modal attributions do not reduce to modality de  
dicto. ' i f
Ï
Hacking on Logical Possibilitv
Hacking (1975) claims not only that logical possibility can be de re, but 
that it is de re 'sometimes or always' (1975, 333). In essence, his 
argument is as follows:
1. Logical possibilities are most appropriately expressed in 
the subjunctive mood.
2. Locutions in the subjunctive mood are of the {de re) 
form (II).
Therefore, logical possibility is sometimes or always de re.
A lthough I reject the argum ent, the conclusion is not, in itself, 
inconsistent with the views I support herein, since I claim  only that 
logical possibility is paradigmatically de dicto, without prejudice to the 
issue of whether it is sometimes or always de re. N o n e th e less , 
Hacking's argum ent is intended to suggest that logical possibility is 
paradigm atically de re. That suggestion is both at odds with my project 
and, for reasons given below, objectionable in itself. It should be noted 
that, although characterizing logical possibility as paradigm atically d e
42 Three conceptions of abstractness aie outlined by Lowe (1995, 513- 
514), the first of which I employ in the text above. The correlative 
conception of concreteness is employed by Lowe (1994b, 531). Cf. the 
elucidation of the concrete/abstract distinction offered by Hoffm an Ï
and Rosenkrantz (1994, 182-187, esp. 184-185).
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re. Hacking (1975, 335) comments that:
it would be fatuous to contend that just because of my 
grammar, we m ust reject any concept of de dicto  logical 
possibility....W e are at liberty to say that a statement which 
does not entail a contradiction is logically possible, and we 
are free to utter the sentence It is logically possible that p  
in the indicative mood, to express that fact.
My view differs from Hacking's in that I take the de dicto idiom to be 
parad igm atica lly , ra the r than m erely perm issib ly , im p lica ted  in 
statem ents of logical possibility. Furtherm ore, Hacking (1975, 333) 
provides 'It is logically possible fo r  A to x' as illustrative of de re 
logical possibility. This differs from my analysis in the follow ing 
resp ec ts . G ranting  the g ram m atical accep tab ility  o f H ack ing 's 
construc tion , I deny that log ical p o ss ib ilities  d irec tly  concern 
agents/individuals and activities. At best, if logical possibilities were to 
be depicted in terms of us and our cognitive operations, dicta  would be 
manifested in the relevant constructions and the relevant verbs would 
indirectly parallel the noun phrases which pick out those d ic ta .  In 
addition , I hold that the word 'logical' drops out o f (Il)-s ty le  
constructions which are truly expressive of logical possibility and that 
d ic ta  are m anifested in the (Il)-style constructions where the verb 
directly parallels the noun. Accordingly, the construction provided by 
Hacking is inconsistent with the semantics for logical possibility claims: 
in fact, I doubt that it could be provided with semantically intelligible 
in stances.
Hacking's claims (1975, 332-333) are built upon ’appeal to authority': 
he has it that Moore 'said logical possibilities should be expressed in 
the subjunctive mood'. Moore provides the following as exam ples of 
logical possibilities:
It's possible that I should have been seeing exactly what I
am seeing, [and] yet should have had no eyes.
I m igh t  have been seeing what I am [and] had no eyes.
It's possible that every dog that has ever lived should have 
climbed a tree. (1962, 187)
The first and the third of Moore's examples might be read as of the
■4:
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form (I), It is possible that p ' . This would place in question Hacking's 
supposition that if logical possibility is expressed in the subjunctive 
then it is of the form (II), Tt is possible for A to x'. If we read Moore's 
examples as of the form (II) then they will lack equivalence to the 
corresponding' (I) readings, since we have already established, on the 
basis of the views of Moore and Hacking themselves, that (I) and (II) 
are non -equ iva len t form s. T hat M oore’s exam ples em ploy the 
subjunctive does not show that logical possib ilities should be so 
expressed nor that they are or should be typically so expressed. That 
they admit of expression in the subjunctive does not show that they 
are of the form (II). I have already expressed my view that although 
logical possibilities may adm it of de re form ulation there are good 
reasons for preferring to express them via (the de dicto  form) (I), not 
least of which is the fact that no res  (unless that notion is stretched 
quite rem arkably) is picked out in logical possibility statem ents, and 
that even if we do view dicta  as res, the fact remains that no concrete 
res  seemingly referred to in a (I)-style logical possibility form ulation 
is picked out.43 So, Hacking's claim that logical possibility is typically 
de re does not appear to be particularly well-founded, and we have 
ample reason to regard it as false, or at least inutile. However, Hacking 
has a separate reason for viewing logical possibility as typically de re 
which rests upon his reading of Kiipke.
Rigid Designation and Logical Possibilitv
H acking reports that having reached the conclusion that logical 
possibility  is typically de re he thought that it would be m et with 
incredulity by others, however:
Then Kripke...changed everything. There is now a viable 
explication of de re logical modalities. On my account of 0~ 
ly possible , it is logically possible for A to x if there is 
nothing of a logical sort that absolutely prevents A from x- 
ing. A fter Kripke we are able to say w hat it is for 
something of a logical sort absolutely to prevent A from x- 
ing. It has long been known, I think, that it is something to 
do with criteria for individuating A : if they are such that x- 
ing would preclude the individuation of an individual as A,
%
43 I adopt the broadly Fregean position, supported below, that words 
w hich ord inarily  function as genuine nam es lose their ordinary 
references when they feature in modal constructions de dicto.
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then it is not possible for A to x. (1975, 333)
These com m ents conflict with the tenet that concrete objects and
logical objects are distinct; whatever logic studies, it certainly does not
study concreta. That is a tenet which we should not relinquish. 
Moreover, it should already be clear, on the basis of comments integral
to my prior defence of non-objectual m odal realism , that I am
precluded from agreeing with Hacking's comments here, and can only 
regard them as deviant and unhelpful. I have already explicated sortal 
essentialism  in terms of m etaphysical modality de re, in contrast with 
logical modality. I have taken the latter to be typically de dicto  and I 
hold that it is entirely inappropriate to the explication of essentialist 
m etaphysica l theses concerning concrete en titie s. In respec t of 
Hacking’s comments quoted above, I hold that where A is a concrete 
entity there is typically no restriction of a lo g ic a l  sort preventing A 
from x-ing .
Hacking contends that when we compare
it is logically possible fo r  Elizabeth II to have had parents 
other than George VI and his wife Elizabeth  and It is 
logically possible fo r  the present Queen o f  England to have 
had  paren ts  o ther than George VI and  his w ife  
Elizabeth...according to Kripke, if she is born of the persons 
stated, then my first statement about Elizabeth II is false, 
and the second is true. (1975, 333-334)
Hacking holds this view on the basis that 'E lizabeth IT designates 
rigidly, whereas 'the present Queen of England' designates non-rigidly. 
However, the fact (granting that it is one) that 'Elizabeth IT designates 
rig id ly  entails that those very words, w herever they occur, are 
fulfilling a referential role only if the standard explication of rigidity in 
terms of referential stability in modal contexts of the form (I) works. 
In my view that condition goes unmet. Putnam (1990, 62) claims that: 
'W hen terms are used rigidly, logical possibility becom es dependent 
upon empirical facts.' However, it is a mistake to specify rigidity in 
term s of modal contexts of the form (I): m odal idiom s are not 
exhaustively  de dicto. Modal contexts of the form (II) are typically 
extensional. Rigidity, linked as it is to essence, ought to be specified in 
terms of referential stability in respect of constructions pertaining to
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m etaphysical m odality de re. This does not constitute a revision of 
K ripke s fundam ental insigh t concerning referen tia l stab ility , but 
rather a rejection of the move from the claim  that, e.g., 'A ristotle' 
e x h ib its  re fe re n tia l s ta b ility  th rough  w h atev er c o u n te rfac tu a l 
suppositions consistent with his identity we make about Aristotle, to 
the claim  that 'A ristotle' exhibits referential stability  in a ll  m odal 
contexts. In considering what Aristotle might have been or done our 
concern is with substantive possibility de re; with poss ib il i t ie s  f o r  
A ris to tle .  Kripke's move rests upon his failure to rigorously respect the 
de re/de dicto  d istinction  and his a ttendant tendency to depict 
essences and de re abilities in terms of necessary and possible truths. 
R eferential stability through de re modal contexts does not require 
referen tia l stab ility  through de dicto m odal contexts. Given that 
suppositions about what was possible for Aristotle concern the former, 
Kiipke's move is mistaken. The considerations via which he introduces 
the notion of rigid designation sanction only de re m odal stability. 
Accordingly, the characterization of rigidity in term s of referential 
stability in all modal contexts is mistaken. If Kripkean considerations 
about possibilities for Aristotle are intended to sanction a notion of 
rigidity as referential stability in all modal contexts they fail to do so. 
If  the notion of rig idity  is predicated upon possib ilities for the 
ordinary referents of proper names then it does not require referential 
stability in all modal contexts but only in de re modal contexts. I take 
it that the latter scenario best accords with K ripke's fundam ental 
insight and that the move to talk of referential stability in all modal 
contexts is m istaken. I deny that rigidity is relevant to the logical
m odalities because (i) I take such m odalities to be de dicto  and 
thereby referentially  opaque; and, (ii) I take reference to concrete 
entities to be entirely irrelevant to the question as to what is to count 
as logically possible. (My position is thus in total disagreem ent with 
Putnam 's view.) The notion of rigid designation can be m aintained 
independently of restrictions on logical possibility by realizing that it 
requires only de re modal stability. Hacking's interpretation rests on 
the hidden, and im plausible, prem iss that if  a word ordinarily  
functions as a rigid designator it always fulfils a referential r o l e . 44 In
44 I take my view to be advantageous in that it does not allow 
m etaphysical necessities pertaining to concreta  to res tric t logical 
possibilities. It perm its the retention by possible worlds talk of its 
expressive functions relating to (unrestricted) logical m odalities. It also 
allows us to adhere to an explication (although not, of course, a
I
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pain of tautological triviality, an expression designates an object in the 
concrete realm only when it picks out res. Logical possibility , being 
typically de dicto, not, as Hacking supposes, de re, is such that when 
words appear in statem ents of logical possib ility , even if they 
ordinarily designate res (and even if they do so rigidly), they lose their 
ordinary  referen ts. A statem ent of logical possib ility  m akes no 
predication concerning concrete reality, so there is no reference to that 
re a lity .45 My claim that words which ordinarily name lose their (usual) 
referents in modal locutions de dicto is after the fashion of the Fregean
reduction) of logical m odalities in terms of contradiction, whereas if 
this was to be admitted on Hacking's account then that would involve 
an unacceptable, and, I do not doubt, unworkable, revision of the 
standard notion of contradiction. It will be apparent that my view is 
entirely at odds with Putnam's one-time suggestion (1975, 233) that 
'Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is H^O, 
nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn't H 2 O. In 
particular, if a "logically possible" statement is one that holds in some 
"logically possible world", it isn't logically possible that water isn't H 2 O.' 
On my account a metaphysical impossibility such as the impossibility 
(granting that it is one) of water being anything other than H 2 O does 
not translate into the (spurious) logical im possibility m entioned by 
Putnam. Putnam has more recently written (1990, 69) that a criterion 
of substance-identity that handles Twin Earth cases' will not 'extend 
handily  to "possib le w orlds'" , since substance-iden tity  involves 
logically contingent laws of nature. This motivates the comments that 
'the question, "What is the necessary and sufficient condition for being 
water in all possible worlds?" makes no sense...this means that I now 
reject "metaphysical necessity"' (1990, 70). Given Putnam 's change of 
view, the rejection of metaphysical necessity is not necessary: what is 
necessary is the rejection of the idea that all m etaphysical necessities 
hold in all logically possible worlds. Accordingly, in contrast to Putnam 
(1990, 56-57, 71), physical necessity is classifiable as a species of 
m etaphysical necessity, since the latter encom passes considerations 
concerning the natures of contingent existents.
45 According to Read (1995, 109): genuine names pick out an item in 
the actual world and maintain that reference in any m odal context'. 
That, how ever, would underm ine the standard notion of logical 
possibility. In defending his 'moderate realism ' about possible worlds 
Read (1995, 106-117) fails to d istinguish  betw een log ical and
m e tap h y s ic a l m o d a litie s . F u rth er, he d e sc rib es  (1995 , 109)
'necessarily, Cicero is Tully' as a 'de re modal truth'. This last is a 
typically Kiipke an, although well-entrenched, error: its lineage laces 
the history of modern em piricism , from whence it is inherited by 
contem porary essentialists.
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c la im /6  rightly described as no 'mere dodge' by Dummett [1967](1978, 
105; cf. 1973, 90-91, 190, 266), that expressions which refer in 
ordinary (i.e., transparent) contexts lose their referents in opaque 
contexts, referring instead to their senses.^?
The postulation of senses is not, contra R.M. Martin (1987, 185), an a d  
h o c  m anoeuvre designed to cope with opaque contexts. Rather, as 
Dum m ett suggests, the distinction between sense and reference is 
indispensable to the m aintenance of a distinction between grasp of 
meaning and knowledge of truth-value. A theory which is equipped 
with the distinction is, in turn, equipped to handle opaque contexts. 
Dum m ett (1973, 90) comments that to postulate sense m erely as a
46 As Angelelli (1967, 63) indicates, Frege himself had little interest in 
the modalities, but this historical point is no obstacle to an application 
of the Fregean claim  to the modal case. Frege [1879](1980, 4-5) 
displays crudity in his brief comments on possibility, e.g., in that he 
presents "'a chill may result in death’" as a case in which 'a proposition 
is presented as possible'.
47 Although Frege held that sentences containing non-referring terms 
such as 'the present king of France' lacked truth-value he did not deny 
that they had sense. Thus, only in extensional contexts is the lack of 
truth-value of a constituent sentence deemed, by Fregean lights, to 
render the complex sentence in which it features neither true nor 
false. It should be noted that the employment of a broadly Fregean 
notion of sense entails no universally platonistic commitment, since it 
can be held that there are senses which are ontologically dependent 
upon language-users. We ought not to balk at the suggestion that, 
accord ing ly , som e broadly  log ical necessities are on to log ically  
dependent upon us. Cf. Hymers (1996, 604): 'concepts have no 
existence outside cognitive practices [so analytic truths have] no 
existence outside such practices either'. If there had been no notion of 
m aniage, there would have been no concept bache lo r ,  but it is broadly 
logically necessary that bachelors are unmarried men. To say that it is 
true in all possible worlds is ju st to say, in this case, that it is
constitutive of the very concepts at issue that bachelors are unmarried 
men. The truth of the claim  that bachelors are unm arried men is 
secured by the very concepts them selves. In accordance with the
d istin c tio n  betw een on to log ically  dependent ab strac ta  and pure
abstracta (Dummett (1973, 509-510); Divers (1990, 253)) only the 
latter are abstracta as traditionally, i.e., platonistically, conceived, since 
the latter but not the form er are not ontologically dependent upon 
concreta. Contra R.M. Martin (1987, 183-185), the postulation of sense 
does not involve us in subjectivism; the thesis of the objectivity of
sense is no more problematic than the thesis of the public nature of 
m ean ing .
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means of coping with opacity would be to postulate sense on a poorly- 
reasoned basis: but the sense/reference distinction is sanctioned, and 
indeed shown to be needed, by independent considerations, i.e. those 
pertaining in extensional contexts (1973, 91, 143). That the distinction 
equips us to cope with opacity is one of its virtues, not its predominant 
rationale. My claim  that words which ordinarily  name lose their 
(usual) references in modal locutions de dicto involves no breach of 
compositionality: it accords with the Fregean principle that the 'sense 
of a complex sentence is...composed of the senses of its constituents' 
(Dummett, 1973, 153).
I follow Dummett (1973, 268-269) in eschewing the Fregean notion of 
indirect sense. Accordingly, an expression in an opaque context retains 
its ordinary sense and that sense becomes its reference. Thus, opaque 
contex ts breach the Fregean princip le  tha t the re fe ren t of an 
expression is never a constituent of the meaning of a complex sentence 
in which it features.48 This is apposite to the modal case, since, for a 
class of analytic necessities (i.e. those the knowledge of which requires 
neither proof nor calculation), grasp of meaning and grasp of truth- 
value co incide.49 (Analyticity does not require non-inform ativeness. 
Once this is realized there is no need to claim, as does Hymers (1996, 
604), that we do not know the truth value of Goldbach's conjecture
48 The Fregean principle goes unheeded by Jubien (1993, 23 and 
pa ss im ),  who identifies the notion of reference  with that of (Russellian) 
p repositional c o n s t i t u e n c y , i.e., the idea — adopted by Fine (1995, 
276)— that the ordinary referents of terms are constituents of the 
propositions in which the terms occur. The latter view is of the kind 
which the Fregean sense/reference distinction is designed specifically 
to avoid. Thus, what Jubien christens the Fallacy of Reference' in fact 
designates two separate theses which, far from being identical, are not 
necessarily in harmony.
49 The view, rejected by Wiggins (1974, 339) that 'if two words have 
each, by our own making, the same sense then we m ust know that 
they have the same sense' does not follow from my view: rather, when 
we know what each of two such words means we will have a case of 
analytic knowledge. Analyticity concerns not words — any word might 
have had a different m eaning— but meanings. (Given my general 
philosophical indebtedness to W iggins I note, for the record, that I 
disagree with the anti-Frege an approach to genuine proper names he 
adopts at (1974, 338-339). His position is seemingly predicated upon 
the supposition that the retention of Fregean sense for proper names 
leads to anti-Kripkean descriptivism. I agree with Dum m ett (1973, 97- 
98) that descriptivism is unessential to a Fregean view.)
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because we do not fully understand its meaning in the absence of
proof. Rather, Goldbach's conjecture is a case in which grasp of
meaning is insufficient for knowledge of truth-value.60)
Since the notion of rigid designation is related to that of essence, it is 
explicable only in terms of constancy in de re modal contexts, not in 
terms of retention of reference in a ll  modal contexts, since r i g i d  
designators (often, i.e. at least where their ordinary referents are
concreta) lose their references in sentential modal c o n t e x t s . The 
philosopher who thinks this outrageous or in tu itively  unappealing 
should consider the cost of its rejection, namely the acceptance of an 
unduly restrictive and philosophically inutile revision of the notion of 
logical possibility. (In addition, some of the philosophical views which 
m otivate  the re jection  of the position  I adopt are inheren tly  
unattractive: they contain excessively extehsionalist elem ents which 
involve the seeming repudiation of the sense/reference distinction.)
Hacking (1975, 333) holds that in the domain of the "logical", Kiipke's 
scheme enables us to treat nonrigid designators as ranging over a set 
of "stipulated" individuals'. That is why, according to Hacking, it is true 
that it is logically possible fo r  the present Queen o f  England to have 
had parents other than George VI and his wife Elizabeth. My account, 
however, admits the truth of it is (logically) possible that Elizabeth II 
is not the daughter o f  George VI and his wife Elizabeth. It admits that 
truth even i f  we take it that Elizabeth II is the actual biological 
product we believe her to be, since logical possibility is not pertinent 
to concrete entities.
Hacking may have been misled into thinking that Kripke is offering a 
new notion of 'de re logical possibility'62 by some comments which 
Kripke actually makes. The comments I have in m ind include the 
following examples:
60 I am indebted to Bob Hale for pointing out a previous deficiency in 
my discussion of the relationship between grasp of meaning and grasp 
of truth-value in the analytic case.
6 1 Burge (1977, esp. 347) is suggestive of an exception to this 
princip le , in that the presence of some — specifically  indexical— 
elements in a construction which displays the de dicto syntactic form 
entails that it involves paradigmatic predication de re.
6 2 Hacking (1975, 334) m entions 'central de re K ripkean logical 
possib ility '.
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;: '‘l
characteristic theoretical identifications like 'H eat is the 
m otion of m olecu les', are not con tingen t tru ths but 
necessary truths, and here of course I don 't mean ju st 
physically necessary, but necessary in the highest degree 
— whatever that means. (Physical necessity, m ig h t  turn out 
to be necessity in the highest degree. But that's a question 
I don't wish to prejudge. At least for this sort of example, it 
m ight be that when som ething's physically necessary, it 
always is necessary tout court.) (1980, 99)
The third lecture [of Naming and Necessity] suggests that a 
good deal of what contem porary philosophy regards as 
m ere physical necessity is actually necessary tout court.
(1980, 164)
N ecessity  in the highest degree' is usually taken to be logical 
necessity, i.e., truth in all possible worlds. This may lead Kiipke's 
readers to suppose that he takes the logical m odalities to concern 
concrete entities (and thus to be centrally de re). K iipke's account is 
ambiguous on this point and the ambiguity allows interpretations like 
tha t o f H acking to get off the ground. H ow ever, H acking 's 
interpretation can be refuted and Kripke's account can be tidied up. 
Since Kripke comments that non-logical necessity may be necessity in 
the highest degree he may be read as implying that logical possibility 
is restricted by true statements of metaphysical necessity de r^.53 My 
earlier suggestion that m etaphysical and logical m odalities can and 
should be distinguished is at odds with such a tenet. I will now try to 
show that a similar distinction is in fact employed by Kripke, but that 
it is not consistently — or at least not always clearly— applied by him, 
this latter fact enabling Hacking's account to have some basis in what 
Kripke actually writes. It will be recalled that one of the considerations 
with which I attempted to justify my distinction between logical and 
m etaphysical m odalities was that logically necessary truths contrast 
with statements of metaphysical necessity de re in that the former are
63 My account has been perm eated with the distinction, drawn by 
W iggins (e.g., 1980, 110, 214), between a necessarily true statem ent 
and a true statement of metaphysical necessity de re. If incorporated 
into Kripke's account this important and neglected distinction banishes 
much confusion.
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taken to hold independently of considerations as to what exists (or, at 
the very least, as to what exists contingently). Logical necessity can be 
explicated in terms of truth in all possible worlds. W here metaphysical 
necessity is concerned this need not be the case, because the relevant 
objects can be such that they need not exist. Kripke (1980, 102) claims 
that "’Hesperus" and "Phosphorous", when used as names, are rigid 
designators. They refer in every possible world to the planet Venus'. 
One might suspect that Kripke is here in danger of identifying logical 
and metaphysical modalities, but he is more careful, stating that when 
I say "Hesperus is Phosphorous" is necessarily true, I of course do not 
deny that situations m ight have obtained in which there was no 
Hesperus and no Phosphorous' (1980, 109).6 4
The possibility is thus open that there aie worlds in which 'Hesperus is 
Phosphorus' is not true, since there are worlds in which Venus does 
not ex ist. This is consisten t with the considera tions regard ing  
contingency and existence which I recruited in my drive for a 
d is tin c tio n  betw een log ical and m etaphysical m odalities . O ther 
im portant issues are outstanding, however, and they will be addressed 
after the following digression.
Digression: Univocity and Strength
An issue which has lingered covertly in my considerations of the 
d ifferences betw een logical and m etaphysical m odality  is that of 
whether 'necessity' and possibility' are univocal (i.e. whether each has 
a single sense). A separate, although som etim es undiscrim inated 
i s  s u e , 65 is that of whether all necessity is of one strength, or whether 
objective non-logical necessity is somehow weaker or less binding than 
logical necessity. I regard the latter issue as more interesting than the 
former, as much for the rhetorical role it has played in the im plicit 
debate between empiricists and Aristotelian realists as for its intrinsic 
philosophical merits. I suspect that much that has been w ritten about 
it has largely missed the boat, resting on a failure by disputants on 
both sides to sepaiate distinct issues regarding logical force on the one 
hand and m etaphysics on the other. In this respect, the disputants 
have truly been talking at cross-purposes, the em piricists aiming to 
establish the superior strength of the notion of logical necessity over
I
54 He does not wish to involve himself in questions relating to the 
truth-value and modal status of the assertion in such situations.
66 The two issues are conflated by Fisk (1973, 27-28).
:
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Those who take it that non-logical m odalities function as sentential 
operators d istinguish  betw een, for exam ple, ep istem ic possib ility
i
any (purported) notion of m etaphysical necessity, the A risto telians 
aiming to establish that, where a m etaphysical necessity holds, its 
binding force, from  a metaphysical point o f  view, is no less than is the
case in respect of any other sort of necessity. One suspects that both
sides have viewed them selves as challenging the other, but with 
neither fully realizing what the other is actually proposing. If we
distinguish  betw een the logical force of m odal n o t i o n s  and the
ontological force of the m oda litie s ,  we can accept that there is a sense 
in which logical necessity is the strongest necessity and that this need 
not conflict with the essentialist claim that (there is another sense in 
which) metaphysical necessity is at least as strong as logical necessity. 
I will explain this in due course; first let us consider the univocity 
thesis .
Modal notions come in species. The univocity thesis is not incompatible 
with this idea, because from the premiss that 'necessity' has a single 
sense it does not follow that the notion of necessity comes in only one 
s p e c i e s . 66 In this, matters are no different from the case of the word 
'mammal'. The possibility of qualifying a word in order to render and 
distinguish specific (derivative, technical or sem i-technical) senses of 
the word (e.g., as in the cases of 'terrestria l m am m al', 'aquatic 
m am m al', 'logical necessity ' and 'm etaphysical necessity ') does not 
preclude that word from having a single overarching sense. So, even if 
the univocity thesis holds it poses no threat to the distinction I make 
betw een logical and m etaphysical necessity q u a  notions: each is a 
subject-specific qualification of the general notion of a restriction or 
compulsion which does not admit of deviation. There is no entailm ent 
re la tion  (in either direction) between any decision regarding the 
univocity thesis and any position regarding the issue of strength.
'I::
■3 ;
66 Cf. Hacking (1967, 159-162, 164). According to Fisk (1973, 26): 
'Physical and logical necessity are distinguished not by distinguishing 
two species of necessity but by distinguishing the physical from  the 
logical truths to which the necessity applies.' However, his account 
rests upon his erroneous explication of physical necessity as of the 
form (I) —i.e., 'it is necessary that p'~— despite his description, here and 
elsew here, of physical necessity as de re. He fails adequately to 
d istingu ish  necessarily  true statem ents and true sta tem ents of 
physical necessity.
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(which relates to ignorance of the truth-value of a statem ent) and
o b je c t i v e  notions of possibility, such as logical, m etaphysical and 
physical possib ility , in the follow ing m a n n e r /?  It is held (e.g.: 
M cFetridge (1990, 136-137); Hale (1996, 93-95)) that the objective 
possibility that p , but not the epistemic possibility that p ,  entails the
logical possibility that p . (For example, on a classical account, our
ignorance of the truth or falsity of Goldbach’s conjecture does not 
entail that it is logically possible that it is false: that is what is at 
issue.) One way in which objective non-logical necessity  is then
understood to be weaker than logical necessity is as follows: whatever 
is logically necessary is non-logically necessary, whereas whatever is 
non-logically necessary need not be logically n e c e s s a r y . 58 in relation 
to physical necessity Bacon (1981, 134) expresses this as: 'physical 
necessity follows from logical necessity, but not vice versa'. Such a
57 I embrace the distinction, but I believe this cannot be the correct 
way to draw it, since this way distorts the logico-grammatical form of 
the non-logical modalities.
58 Cf. M cF etridge  (1990, 136-137): 'O n c e rta in  trad itio n a l
as sumptions... if it is logically necessary that p , then it is necessary that 
p  in any other use of the notion of necessity there may be (physically, 
practically etc.)  But...the converse need not be the case.' Also, cf. Hale 
(1996, 94-95). On such accounts, the notion of strength is explicated 
such that if the necessityi of a proposition always entails that the 
proposition  is necessary 2  without the converse being the case, then 
n e ce ss ity  1 is stronger than necessity 2 - In accordance with his adoption 
of this explication of the notion of strength —i.e., in this context, logical 
force— Hale (1996, 95) comments that friends of the notion of 
m etaphysical necessity 'are committed, at the very least' to denying 
that logical necessity is the strongest necessity. It will be apparent, 
from my vehement denial of the appropriateness of the de dicto  form 
to (at least) a large class of metaphysical necessities, that I am not that 
kind of friend and that I take Hale's claim to be incorrect. In light of 
my account of m etaphysical necessity, I neither assert nor deny the 
claim  attributed by Hale to the friend of metaphysical necessity, since 
both courses involve the distortion of the true form  of de re modal 
claim s (which I take to relate to typical instances of m etaphysical 
necessities and possibilities). Hale's claim is incorrect for the further 
reason tha t the defender of m etaphysical necessity  need not be 
committed to the denial of the thesis that the logical force of logical 
necessity is greater than that of metaphysical necessity if, as I will 
indicate below, that thesis can be explicated independently of the 
method adopted by M cFetridge and Hale with its attendant distortion 
of the form  of m odal attributions involving objective non-logical 
m odalities .
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view has already been rejected on the grounds that physical necessity, 
q u a  species of m etaphysical necessity de re, does not adm it of 
explication in terms of the de dicto  form ( I ) / 9  i n  a more recent 
account, which has affinities with Bacon's view, the late Ian McFetridge 
sought to establish not only that there is no necessity stronger than , 
logical necessity, but that logical necessity is the strongest necessity. It 
is clear that it is logical force which is his concern, rather than the 
strength  of the ontological com pulsions w hich m ight attend the 
ob jec tive  m odalities . M cFetridge (1990, 136-137) ou tlines the
'trad itiona l assum ption ' that, where objective m odal notions are 
concerned, if it is logically necessary that p ,  then it is necessary that p  
in any other use of the notion of necessity there may be (physically, 
practically , etc.). But...something could be e.g. physically  necessary 
w ithout being logically necessary.'
M cFetridge displays an attitude sim ilar to that of those obstinate 
empiricists who refuse to recognize any role for m odalities except that 
of functioning as operators on dicta .^^  Since the objective m odalities
s
M cFetridge seeks to defend this traditional assum ption. However, we
have already noted that it cannot do the job of showing that logical
necessity  is the strongest necessity , because not all notions of
possibility and necessity can be portrayed via the use of sentential
m odal operators. The case of m etaphysical necessity de re rem ains
entirely unaccounted for in an account such as that of M cFetridge
because, as the essentialist who is duly cognizant of the de retde dicto 
«distinction and thereby of the logico-gram m atical form of essentialist 
claim s will realize, at least a large class of such m odality cannot
function in the manner required by McFetridge's account. According to 
M cFetridge (1990, 137), 'if the person [who has made a claim  of the 
form "Necessarily, p"] will accept no non-epistemic sense in which it is 
possible that not-p, his...claim  did involve the s tro n g e s t  necessity i.e. 
(on the traditional assumption) "logical" necessity.’
In relation to this claim  two points should be observed. F irstly, (at 
least a large class of) essentialist claims em ploying the notion of 
m etaphysical necessity  are not of the form 'N ecessarily, p '.  Here
I
------------------------------------------
59 It is ironic, given Fisk's desire to defend realism about modality d e  
re, that Fisk (1973, e.g., 25-28) commits the same error as Bacon.
60 Consider this remark:
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are not exhausted by those which admit of unproblem atic de dicto 
expression, some of them  drop out of (proper) consideration  in 
M cFetridge's argum ent. Secondly, even granting that all objective 
necessity is de dicto, there is an obvious gap in M cFetridge's argument: 
the conclusion that there is a strongest  notion of necessity does not 
follow from his argument. At best, as Hale (1996, 98) observes, the
argument shows only that there is no notion of necessity stronger than 
logical necessity.
Even if there is an objective sense in which it is possible that a true
statem ent of m etaphysical necessity is false, it does not follow that
m etaphysical necessity is weaker, in point of ontological compulsion, 
than the necessity corresponding to the relevant possibility. Since the 
argument that McFetridge offers is concerned with the logical force of 
notions of necessity , rather than with their strength in point of 
ontological com pulsion, this point may be regarded as of dubious
merits. However, part of the import of the point is that it indicates the 
lack of observance, in M cFetridge's argum ent, of any distinction 
betw een a necessarily  true statem ent and a true sta tem ent of 
metaphysical necessity. Also, in so far as that argument can be seen as 
an attempt to rebuff the essentialist, it is worth pointing out that, were 
an essentialist to claim  that metaphysical necessity is absolute, the
claim  being made might be a metaphysical claim, rather than a claim
about the logical force of modal notions. Kripke is a realist about
m etaphysical necessity, and where he claim s that it is (perhaps)
necessity  in the highest degree he may be view ed as m aking a 
metaphysical claim about that real necessity (which may be seen as a 
rebuke to orthodox views of Humean descent), not a claim  about the 
logical force of a notion of necessity. It is unfortunate, though, that 
Kiipke describes 'theoretical identifications like "Heat is the motion of
There might be views which held that there were at least 
two notions of necessity, only one of which was involved in 
ascriptions of validity, and which were incom m ensurable 
in strength: some propositions  possess the 'logical' notion of 
necessity but lack the other one, while others possess this 
latter notion of necessity but are not logically necessary. 
M cFetridge (1990, 137-138, my emphasis)
The idea, upheld by the cogent essentialist, that there is a kind of 
objective necessity  which is such that it is no t possessed  by 
propositions at all is overlooked.
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m olecules'" as 'not contingent truths but necessary truths' (1980, 99) 
since this conflates true statem ents of m etaphysical necessity  and 
necessarily true statements; a conflation which I take to be contrary to 
the spirit of K iipke's essentialism  and inconsistent with any cogent 
essen tia lism ,
W iggins claim s that the constraints on conceiving de re (set out at 
1980, 106) embodied in his essentialism concern
a necessity that is not in the narrow sense logical necessity.
But its s t r e n g t h  (contrast certainty) is equal to that of 
logical necessity. For once the theoretically fundam ental 
sortal property f  is fixed upon and its extension comes to 
light, it is not for thought to renege even hypothetically 
upon the determination of how a thing falling within that 
extension has to be in order to [be] an f ([to] belong to f).
That would weaken thought's grip of its object. If f 
determines an ultimate sort...then there is nothing else that 
a particular entity falling inside the sort could oblige the 
conventionalist by acquiescing to become instead. To be,  
for such a thing just is to comply with this ultimate or near
ultimate concept f. (1980, 146)
This seems to me to be a c lea r  case in which the s tre n g th  in question 
concerns the ontological compulsion involved in real necessity de re, 
rather than the comparative logical force of logical and non-logical 
m odalities. This is manifested by the deictic-nom ological background 
of W iggins's claims, and by his emphasis on being and the extensional. 
W ere the friend of metaphysical necessity to claim  that such necessity 
is at least as strong, in this (ontological) sense, as any other necessity, 
then that claim would be very different from any claim about strength 
in the (logical force) sense which concerns M cFetridge and Hale. 
Furtherm ore, no stance on the latter issue threatens the ontological 
claim .
Another way in which notions of objective non-logical necessity are 
understood to be weaker than the notion of logical necessity relates to 
the explication of modal notions via the possible worlds device. Since 
the class of logically possible worlds is held to be more inclusive than
the class of metaphysically or physically possible worlds, it is held that
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logical possibility  is weaker than these other m odal notions, and 
accordingly that logical necessity is stronger than m etaphysical or 
physica l necessity  since log ical necessitie s , un like  non -log ica l 
necessities, pertain in all possible worlds. U nlike the explication, 
adhered to by Bacon, McFetridge and Hale, of strength in terms of the 
’traditional assumption', I take this to constitute a convincing heuristic 
by which the notion of logical necessity can be shown to be stronger, in 
point of logical force, than all other objective notions of necessity. 
W hat does not follow, however, is that the ontological compulsion 
involved in real m etaphysical necessities is any w eaker than that 
involved in logical necessities; the former may even be stronger, in 
this sense, than the latter.6 1 .1
':û:
Real m etaphysical necessities de re hold in virtue of the natures of 
entities in the actual world. That such necessities do not hold in all 
logically possible worlds should cause the essentialist no chagrin. True 
statem ents of m etaphysical modality de re, unlike true statements of 
log ical m odality , are typically  r e la t i v e  to the natures of actual 
e n t i t i e s . 62 it  is indeed the case that (at least a large class of) 
m etaphysical necessities are relative in the sense that there is an 
objective notion of possibility in light of which it is possible that 
statem ents of those necessities are false. The denial of a true 
sta tem en t of m etaphysica l necessity  m ay co n stitu te  a log ica l 
possibility, as I will attempt to show later in this chapter. So, although
there is an intelligible sense in which logical necessity is stronger than
m etaphysical or physical necessity , it does not follow  that this
61 The lack of entailment from the logical force point to the ontological 
point is all the more pertinent given that the possible worlds device is 
not genuinely explicative of the m etaphysics  of modality.
62 a is (m etap h y sica lly ) n ecessa rily  F  if  and only if every 
metaphysically possible world is such that if a exists then « is F . This 
points to the w ell-w orn d istinction  (m entioned at 3.3) betw een 
necessity  and essentiality , since many necessities w hich hold of 
individuals, sometimes called 'trivially essential', are such that they 
are not aptly explained in terms of the individual's nature. It is 
necessary for Socrates to be such that either he is eating or he is not
eating, but this, many essentialists take it, is not a truth deriving from
the specific nature exemplified by Socrates. Rather, its truth derives 
from an a priori truth concerning the notion of objecthood, such that it 
is impossible for objects to exhibit contradictory properties. That is one
reason why I write that metaphysical m odalities de re are ty p ic a l ly ,  
rather than always, relative to natures.
<53 This is despite K iipke [1971](1977, 67). The tendency will be
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conclusion carries with it any m etaphysical weight:  it does not show 
that the relevant non-logical necessity is in fact less o n t o lo g i c a l l y  
b in d in g  than logical necessity. For the essentialist, other possible 
worlds need not always reflect real possibilities. The possible worlds 
device is intended to be expressive of m etaphysical, physical, and 
especially logical modalities. But, as we have seen, logical possibilities 
are not substantive and only substantive possibilities are real in the 
sense of relating to concrete entities; which is not, of course, to dispute 
the objective status attributed to logical possibility. The essentialist, 
then, can suggest that logical necessity is no stronger (in the 
m etaphysical sense) than metaphysical necessity de re, since logically 
possible worlds are not real in the sense that substantive metaphysical 
possibilities are real. (M ost of those who employ the possible worlds 
device do so, in any case, because of its expressive power and heuristic 
utility, particularly in relation to logical modality, rather than through 
any m etaphysical commitment.)
Kiipke. M etaphvsical Necessitv. Possible Worlds
I distinguished, at 3.3, between metaphysical and logical m odalities, 
the latter of which, but not the former, I take to be unrestricted. (The 
distinction was illustrated using the case of the m odal status of 
Leibniz's principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles within his system.) 
In accordance with the account I offer, not all possible worlds express 
real metaphysical possibility: possible worlds talk is wider in that it is 
expressive of merely logical possibility. The possible worlds device will 
fail to secure many of the benefits widely purported to accrue to its 
employment if it is precluded from handling logical m odalities, since it 
is primarily intended to provide an extensional semantics for discourse 
involving sentential modal operators.
K iipke (1980, 35) classifies the notion of necessity as m etaphysical 
and the notion of the a priori  as epistem ological. There is some 
obscurity as to whether Kripke intends to describe all necessity as 
metaphysical, or whether he is referring only to necessity de re. This is 
com pounded by w hat W iggins (1974, e.g, 328) has called  the 
'm etalinguistic ' trappings of Kripke s account of necessity de re: for 
example, Kripke goes on to speak, apparently without heed to the d e  
re lde  dicta  distinction, of this m etaphysical notion of necessity as 
relating to the truth or falsity of s t a t e m e n t s I hold that Kripke's
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account is consistent with mine in that he regards m etaphysical and 
logical modalities as distinct. I also contend, however, that although 
this commitment is central to the spirit of Kripke's essentialism , it is 
something which he fails to honour: in this he is no different from 
m any of his essen tia list contem poraries and s u c c e s s o r s .T h e r e  is 
additional ambiguity in Kripke's account relating to the role of possible 
worlds talk. This ambiguity is, in my view, contributory to the genesis 
of interpretations such as that offered by Hacking (1975, esp. 333- 
335). Having shown that Kripke does indeed endorse a distinction 
between logical and m etaphysical modalities I w ill suggest that the 
ambiguity as to the function of possible worlds talk can and should be 
c larified .
I have already commented that Kiipke regards not all necessary truths 
as logical necessities, on the basis that Kripke regards 'H esperus is 
Phosphorus* as necessary but does not take it to be true in all possible 
worlds. Although Kripke writes of non-logical necessary truths, we can, 
following Wiggins, more aptly say that objective non-logical necessities 
are expressed by true statem ents of m etaphysical necessity de re, 
rather than necessary truths. Although Kripke seems, in some sense, to 
favour the view that logical and metaphysical necessities are equally 
b inding , he regards not all m etaphysical necessities as logical 
n e c e ss itie s .65 He does not explicate a notion of de re logical possibility 
at all and he recognizes that logical modalities are typically de dicto. 
So, Hacking's belief that Kripke proposes a de re revision of the 
standard notion of logical possibility is unjustified. Although Kripke 
recognizes a distinction between logical necessity and the necessity 
which features in modal attributions about contingent existents, he
illu stra ted  forthw ith . The critic ism  applies w hether or no t the 
'm etaphysical notion' of necessity relates to all necessity or solely to 
necessity de re as pertinent to concreta,
64 My claim concerning the spirit of Kiipke s essentialism  is supported 
by com m ents he him self makes, e.g., [1971](1977, 69), where he 
recognizes that cases of modality de re concern objects, not statements, 
although, as I have comm ented at 2.2. above, the le tte r of his 
form ulations in which de re necessity is held to feature misrepresents 
its form.
65 As is evidenced by his admonition that the necessity which features 
in m odal attributions concerning contingent existents be interpreted 
'weakly' [1971](1977, 68). Nevertheless, the notion of weak necessity 
advanced therein is m isbegotten, since it attaches to statem ents and 
cannot, therefore, properly be expressive of such attributions.
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might have been more careful so as to fully preserve and respect the 
distinction. (One such respect —his depiction of metaphysical necessity 
de re in terms of ’necessary truth'— has already been observed.)
Possible worlds talk is held to be valuable in virtue of its expressive 
utility. (We need not hold that this is an advantage which possible 
worlds talk has over other modal talk. Like Kiipke, we can view it as 
h e u ris tic a lly  u se fu l, w ith o u t deem ing  p o ss ib le  w orld s ta lk  
philosophically or expressively superior to m odal discourse free of 
such talk. I will proceed to suggest that possible worlds talk has 
expressive capabilities which outstrip, and if we are not careful, 
undercut, essentialist theses.) For the modal prim itivist, the value of 
possible worlds talk is prim arily heuristic. Such talk is intended, 
among other things, to express logical modalities. It is here, however, 
where certain rather dangerous ambiguities arise in Kripke s account. 
Kripke (1980, 15) writes:
if one wishes to avoid the W e l ta n g s t  and ph ilosophical 
confusions that many philosophers have associated with 
the 'worlds' terminology...'possible state (or history) of the 
w orld', or 'counterfactual situation' m ight be better. One 
should even remind oneself that the 'worlds' term inology 
can often be replaced by modal talk — It is possible that...'
The alternative term inologies which Kripke suggests are of dubious 
m erits. For, example, a statement of merely logical possibility can be 
such that it could not be, or even have been, true of the actual world at 
all. Logical possibility  statements make no predications concerning 
concrete entities: rather, their content is purely conceptual. For this 
reason, 'possible state (or history) of the world' terminology will fail to 
equal the expressive (and sem antic) power allegedly attaching to 
worldly term inology, since the former will fail to encom pass (true) 
statem ents of merely logical possibility. There are logically possible 
statem ents which could not feature in true descriptions of possible 
states or histories of the actual w o r l d . 66 A cco rd in g ly , K ripke 's
66 Cf. Burgess (1996, 25):
possibility in the 'metaphysical' sense of what (is or isn 't 
but) poten tia lly  could have been the case is not to be 
analyzed as or conflated with possibility in the 'logical'
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suggestion (1980, 18; cf. 20, 48 nt. 15) that possible worlds are total 
'ways the world m ight have been', or state histories of the e n t i r e  
world' is unacceptable, since if it is taken up then possible worlds 
term inology cannot express merely logical m odalities, i.e. the very 
m odalities which m otivate their introduction. Sim ilarly , there are 
logical possib ilities which are not translatable into 'counterfactual 
situation ' term inology so long as the 'counterfactual situations' are 
taken to concern ways this entity and/or the world  m ight have been. 
M cFetridge (1990, 135-154) argues for the indispensability  of the 
notion of logical necessity on the basis that it is integral to the whole 
project of reasoning from suppositions: it will already be clear, on the 
basis of prev ious com m ents, that these suppositions w ill be 
suppositions that p. I suggest that the value of logical possibility is
4.5 Logical Possibility: Its Nature and Value
very closely related. The notion of logical possibility allows us to make 
suppositions which are wildly contrary-to-fact. Thus we can reason 
from suppositions of the form (I) ('It is possible that p ')  which do not 
qualify as ways the world might have been at all (and which do not 
describe any concrete entities at all). In this sense, logical possibility is 
truly unrestricted. The next section outlines the links betw een the 
permissiveness of the notion of logical possibility and its value.
,S'
I
a
Strictlv and Broadlv Logical Possibilitv
A distinction may be made between logical m odalities narrowly and 
broadly  conce ived .67 Thereby, strict logical possibility involves the 
absence of formal contradiction. Broadly logical possibility , in turn, 
arises from the meanings of non-logical terms, rather than ju s t the 
logical constants.68 Both conceptions involve meaning: the distinction 
arises from the locus of the meaning at issue in each case.69 There is
sense of what it is not logically or analytically se lf­
contradictory to assert or assume actually is the case.
67 Cf. Haack (1978, 173); Hale (1996, 94).
68 On my account, this precludes neither broadly logical impossibilities 
not reducible to contradictions nor logical necessities not reducible to 
logical truths.
69 Cf. Wiggins (1979, 156 nt. 27);
logical truth is...forced upon us by the m eanings of the 
logical constants. By this criterion not even 'all bachelors
2 0 2
no strict formal contradiction involved in a supposition to the effect 
that bachelors may be m arried. The meanings of noun phrases are 
irrelevant to strictly logical modalities. In accordance with the integral 
role of logical modalities in the practice of reasoning from suppositions, 
log ical possib ility  is unrestric ted  in that even broadly  log ical 
im possibilities may be supposed by the reasoner. A reasoner may not 
always know the meanings of non-logical terms. Of course, I do not 
suggest that the fact that a statement or proposition may be supposed 
shows it to be a strict logical possibility, since premisses which aie in 
form al contradiction can be supposed in the practice of theoretical 
reasoning, as in the case of the method of reductio ad absurdum J  ^
Logical Possibilitv and Meaning
S trictly  logical possib ility  is m ore liberal than broadly  logical 
possib ility . I am m otivated to attach some im portance to the 
distinction partly by a desire to avoid the conflation of substantive and 
m erely  lo g ica l m odalities . Such confla tion  m igh t a rise  from  
extensionalist views of meaning, as embodied, for example, in Putnam 
(1975: 215-271).71 Given the recognition that the m eanings of non-
logical term s have a determ ining influence upon broadly logical 
modalities, the danger is that the extensionalist will be tempted to let 
ex ten sio n a l fac to rs im pinge upon the d e te rm in a tio n  of those 
m odalities. As we have seen, Putnam (1975, 233; contrast 1983, 63- 
64) has succumbed to this temptation, as have other philosophers of 
essen tia lis t p e r s u a s i o n . 72 i  do not retract my commitment that logical
 —     ----
are unmarried' qualifies. Because logical necessity in the 
useful and strict sense is exigent, the species of possibility 
which is its dual is hopelessly permissive.
The distinction is implicit in Quine (1980, 20-24); cf. Romanos (1983, 
109). As should already be clear, Plantinga's excessive conception (e.g., 
1974, V, 1-2), m istakenly intended to include the necessity pertaining 
to essential attributions, of broadly logical necessity' is rejected on my 
account.
70 Cf. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers o f  Man  [1785](1941, 
261), cited by Rinaldi (1967, 91).
71 Putnam  (1975, 227) comments that '"meanings" ju s t ain 't in the 
head '.  As should be clear from my approach to logical m odalities, the 
extensionalist has no m onopoly on the thesis of the objectivity of 
m ean ing ,
72 According to Seddon (1972, 483):
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m odalities, broadly or narrowly conceived, are non substantive. I urge 
that the intensions of ordinary names for concrete objects, but not 
their extensions, bear upon the determ ination of broadly logical 
m o d a litie s .73 This is consistent with the conceptualist realist approach 
to essence and m odality de re that I adopt. So far as concerns the 
logical m odalities, facts about the natures of concrete en tities and 
deictic-nom ological restrain ts upon conceiving o f  such entities are 
irrelevant. So far as concerns the m odalities, reference to concrete 
natures bears only upon the objective non-logical m odalities. Allowing 
extensional factors to impinge upon logical possibility, I will suggest, 
undermines the utility of the notion.
Given that only intensional meaning is admissible as a determ inant of 
broadly logical modalities, it may be suggested that there is no need to 
place much emphasis on the distinction between strictly and broadly 
log ical m odalities. The ex tensionalist has been w arded off: the
threatened conflation of substantive and m erely logical m odalities is 
no longer immanent. However, the distinction has additional value in 
that it accords well with the considerations relating to reasoning from 
suppositions to which I have alluded. It allows for situations in which 
a reasoner may lack the relevant epistemic background pertaining to 
broadly logical modalities (i.e. the reasoner may lack knowledge of the 
relevan t intensions: this accords with the Fregean thesis of the
objectivity of sense). Benardete (1962, 346 nt. 3) suggests that there
'is no contradiction, in the strict formal logical sense, in asserting that 
some ideas are  made of tin, yet that freedom from  self-contradiction 
does not suffice to make the thing logically possib le '.74 H ow ever,
One move is to argue that although the statement that 'A
bar of iron floats on w ater' is not exp lic itly  se lf­
contradictory, it is implicitly so, for we are saying that a 
m ineral with a specific gravity of less than one (i.e. it 
floats), has a specific gravity in the range 7.3-7.8 (i.e. it is 
iron), and this is a contradiction, and is therefore logically 
im possib le.
This move is adopted by Rasmussen (1977; 1983). I take the contrary 
view, deeming matters concerning real definition entirely irrelevant to 
considerations regarding the logical modalities.
Cf. Strawson (1966, 225).
74 Interestingly, and in contrast, a similar example, 'the sound of a
trombone is blue', was offered by Russell (1940, 170) as 'perhaps' a 
logical possibility. Such examples, called 'selection errors' by syntactic
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B enardete 's claim  is at best arbitrary, if not question-begging. If a 
construction is grammatically well-formed and declarative, i.e., if we 
are really dealing with a statement, and if that statement embodies no 
formal contradiction, then it is logically possible in the strict sense. In 
view of the objective status of logical modality it is not surprising that 
log ical im possib ilities  may escape detection  and can even be
b e liev e d .75
Logical Possibilitv: Elimination. Revision. Conservation 
Entrenched abuses of the notion of logical possibility  and purported 
difficulties concerning its definition or its discernm ent have led some 
philosophers to regard it with some suspicion. V arious positions, 
including revision of the notion and denial that logical possibility is 
any kind of possib ility  at all, have been adopted. O ccasionally  
philosophers have appeared to advocate the elim ination of the notion. 
I believe that such positions have arisen through the tendencies to too 
closely associate the very notion with the aforem entioned abuses and 
to view m etaphysical considerations concerning substantive possibility 
as a threat to the notion of logical possibility w ithout bearing in mind 
the question as to what that notion is actually f o r .  The tendency to 
revise the notion in light of one's metaphysics is also m anifested in 
w ork which is not motivated by suspicion of the notion. We have 
already seen this is the case of Putnam, who (at one time) allowed 
(purported) facts about the natures of actual existents such as water to 
delim it logical possibility . Sim ilarly, P lantinga (1974, v, 1-2 and 
p a ss im )  proposes a notion of broadly logical necessity’, intended to be 
implicated in the expression of substantive modal attributions de r e j ^
theorists after Chomsky (e.g., 1965), are described by W olfram (1989, 
33) as occurring where the wrong sort of property or activity is 
p red icated  of the subject'. T hat descrip tion  is suggestive  that 
substantive m etaphysical considerations have some sway here. There 
is a m arked difference between selection errors and unquestionably 
ill-form ed constructions (such as W olfram’s example, 'Cats blows the 
wind' (1989, 32)), in that the former, but not the latter, clearly admit 
of internal negation. I see no reason for deem ing selection errors 
either logically im possible or meaningless: I adm it them  as logical 
possibilities. Cf. Hodges (1977, 154) who deems them false.
75 Cf. Collins (1967, 53).
76 Cf. Plantinga (1970, 475), 'a possible world is a state of affairs that 
could have obtained if it does not. Here "could have" expresses, 
broadly speaking, logical or metaphysical possibility’. It is not clear 
that Plantinga takes 'logical' and 'metaphysical' to mark any distinction
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without ever asking what the notion of logical possibility is actually 
for, and without addressing the legitimacy or otherwise of his own 
usage. I view Plantinga's proposal as both revisionary and, like his 
attem pt to explicate essence and modality de re in terms of modality 
de dicto, m isguided. I will briefly survey and criticize the views I 
reject. This will serve to substantiate my own position, which I take to 
be c o n se rv a tiv e .77 (Philosophers whose in te res ts  are p rim arily  
metaphysical ought to bear in mind the question as to the value of the 
notion of logical possibility so as not to be m isled into providing a 
distorted account of its nature or adopting an unduly hostile attitude 
towards the notion.)
E lim inativ ism  about logical necessity is not viable so neither is 
elim inativism  about logical possibility. It is worth noting that many 
accounts critical of the notion of logical possibility make no mention of 
its correlative. I take this to substantiate my suggestion that such 
accounts have tended to allow their own m etaphysical comm itm ents 
with regard to real possibility, and their attendant anti-em piricism , to 
cloud their philosophical judgment: surely, one who seeks to revise or 
banish logical possibility has either to revise by the same lights, or to 
deny the centrality to the notion of deductive consequence and the 
whole practice of philosophy of, its correlative. N either course is 
ten ab le .
A ntipathy to the reckless applications to which em piricists have 
attem pted to pu t the notion of logical possib ility  has led an ti­
empiricists to reckless views on that notion. For example. Cook (1994, 
155) depicts the idea of "logical possibility"' as som ething which 
burdens us' if  we adopt 'the Humean view of causation’. Given the 
indispensability  of logical necessity we can hardly agree that its
here. On my account, many states of affairs which could not have 
obtained nonetheless constitute logical possibilities.
77 I take it that the notions of logical necessity and logical possibility 
are not pre-philosophical. It may be suggested that there is no 
historically continuous notion of logical possibility at play, but various 
shifts from one notion of logical possibility to another: cf. Hacking 
(1975, 334-335). In so far as a core notion of logical necessity has 
persisted  since ancient tim es this suggestion can be regarded as 
harmless to the case I will present. That there is such a core notion is 
suggested by M cFetridge (1990, 136) after Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 
2 4 b l9 -2 2 .
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correlative is burdensome. The point is, rather, that the notion has 
been abused and that we must recapture clarity by rending the notion 
free of the legacy of that abuse. It is the abuse which is burdensome 
and which is up for elimination, not the notion.78 Cook charges that 
'the idea of "logical possibility "...leads... to a peculiar view of the way in 
which philosophy is to construct and deal with examples', i.e. that the 
notion has a detrim ental effect upon philosophical m ethodology. The 
d istinc tion  I have defended betw een conceiv ing  o f  (de re) and 
conceiving that {de dicto), affords the view that the 'leading' about 
which Cook is concerned comes about through historical accident, and 
through confusion, rather than being internal to the very notion of 
logical possibility. By the lights of the distinction, merely logically 
possib ilities have significant bearing on neither our epistem ology 
w here m atters a p o s te r io r i  are concerned nor our substantive  
m etap h y sic s .
I
Some philosophers (Rinaldi (1967, esp. 97); Seddon (1972, esp. 481); 
cf.: Toulmin (1958, 169-172); Mason (1988, 11)) have claim ed that 
'logical possibility' is a misnomer which fosters confusion. According to 
Seddon (1972, 481),
we all know that it is not  possible for a bar of iron to float 
on w ater...if we insist that it is nonetheless l o g i c a l l y  
possible, we invite the comment that we are using the 
word 'possible' in a very odd way, and that we will need 
good reasons for such a striking departure from  ordinary 
usage. I doubt that good reasons are forthcoming.
My account of logical possibility is already equipped to deal with 
Seddon's remarks since it maintains that it is n o t  the case that it is 
logically possible fo r  a bar o f  iron to float on water since this conflates 
m odality  de re and de dicto. When logical possibility is used, as is
appropriate, to qualify a d ic tu m ,  the difficulties alluded to by Seddon
------------------------------------------78 Mason (1988, 11) writes that the notion of logical possibility 'has 
some uses...but in most circumstances it is a notion which (as Hume
would say) we should commit to the flames'. This is an injudicious
conunent, since a notion is either up for elimination or not. The point is 
to discrim inate between the legitimate and illegitim ate a p p lica t io n s  of 
the notion. I t is the latter which m ust be expunged from  our
philosophical practice, not the notion itself. This is in line with the
tenor of Mason's discussion.
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are avoided. This involves no deviant use of the word 'possible'. In 
addition, the notion of logical possibility is technical; there is no reason 
why it should comply with ordinary usage'. Once we have a clear view 
of how the notion of logical possibility should properly serve us the 
difficulties which Seddon purports to present are entirely avoided. As 
long as it is clear, as I have recommended, that logical possibility talk 
is not about genuinely possible states of affairs (i.e. ways the world 
could be), there is no need to be so extreme. We need only bear in 
m ind that logical possib ility  qualifies d i c t a  ra ther than concrete 
entities. Logical possibility is a variety of possibility, it is just that it is 
distinct from concrete possibility: there is no misnomer involved.
On my account, both empiricists and essentialists have been guilty of 
fa ilin g  p ro p erly  to observe dem arcations betw een  log ic  and 
m etaphysics w here m odalities are c o n c e r n e d . 79 i have sought to 
m aintain a clear distinction, certainly in practice, and I hope also in 
th eo ry , be tw een  m erely  lo g ic a l m o d a litie s  and su b s ta n tiv e  
m etaphysical modalities. I claim  that 'confusion results from using "it 
is logically possible that " in reference to beings in rerum natura' 
(Rasm ussen (1983, 537)): unlike Rasm ussen, I take this to be a 
sufficient condition for c o n f u s i o n . 80
Rasmussen's actual, and in my view subversive, intention is to use the 
word 'logical' in reference to the natures (essences) of concrete objects. 
Thus, he seeks to restrict logical possibility in a manner akin to that 
displayed by Hacking's Kripke. As we have seen, a sim ilar view is 
entailed by some of Putnam's work, and is im plicit in Plantinga's 
category, intended to encompass essentialist m odalities for concreta, 
and taken up by D avies (1981, 187-201), o f 'b road ly  logical
possibility '. My account conserves logical possibility, abandoning the
  ----------------------------79 Compare the case of the attendant failures to afford due recognition 
to the de relde dicto distinction and to the form of essentialist claims.
80 Rasmussen's weaker claim is that
,confusion results from using 'it is logically possible that' in 
reference to beings in rerum natura, solid iron bars, cats, 
etc., but retaining a sense to the term 'logical' that confines 
the object of analysis to the [nominal] definition of the 
entities in question and not their respective natures. (1983,
5 3 7 )
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pretension  that logical possib ilities involve reference to concrete 
en tities; R asm ussen, Putnam , and P lantinga seek to uphold the 
pretension and revise logical possibility.81
W e can d is tingu ish  betw een the e x te n s io n a l/rea l-e ssen tia l and 
intensional/nom inal-essential aspects of concepts, which leaves room 
for the claim that logical possibilities relate at best to the latter. An 
essentialist view of concepts need not restrict logical possibilities in so 
far as we distinguish between de re and de dicto  conceiving. On the 
account I have offered, after W iggins, it is inconceivable for a solid 
iron bar to float on water, since an entity which can float on water 
does not have the persistence principle of a solid iron bar. Any 
conceiving going on can therefore not be conceiving o f  an iron bar. 
Nonetheless the logical possibility of the statem ent that an iron bar 
floats on water is in no way undercut. The restriction on conceiving de  
re  is in virtue of m etaphysical necessity de re: there is no such 
restriction on conceiving de dicto. Claims about the natures of concreta 
are not founded upon de dicto, or logical, necessities.82 The accounts of 
Rasm ussen, Putnam and Plantinga show no awareness that there is 
logical room for the position I adopt (according to which, e.g., it is
:;.W
81 It is with good reason that I tar Plantinga and Putnam with the 
sam e b rush  as th e ir less-renow ned  con tem porary : a ll th ree  
philosophers give accounts of logical m odality and m odality de re 
which allow extensional factors pertaining to real essences to impinge 
upon the logical m odalities. In a rem ark rem iniscent of Putnam ’s 
extensionalism , Rasm ussen (1983, 533) com plains that ’appeals to 
"meaning"...do not constitute some special access to what is and is not 
logically  possible for beings in rerum natura'. W hat this indicates, 
however, is the inappropriateness of the idea that logical possibility 
does so relate to concrete entities, rather than the need to revise the 
notion of logical possibility, relativising it to substantive considerations 
concerning the natures of real existents in the concrete realm. I take 
Rasm ussen’s view to be the most misguided of the three, e.g., since, 
unlike Putnam  and Plantinga, his account of concepts and logical 
possibility at least fails to exp la in  how we can reason using concepts 
which lack extension and perhaps fails to a llo w  for this. Rasmussen's 
rem ark (1983, 515) that 'concepts...are inherently relational and are 
necessarily of or about something other than them selves', conjoined 
with his thoroughgoing extensionalism, suggests that only that which is 
instantiated can feature in our reasoning.
82 Rasmussen (e.g., 1977, 117, 120, 122) is yet another example of a 
philosopher who takes true essentialist attributions about concreta to 
involve necessary truths. i:
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impossible for iron bars to float on water but logically possible that 
iron bars float on water8 3). My account, unlike those I brand 
revisionary, respects the utility and the formal and a priori nature of 
the logical modalities.
The cogen t essen tia lis t, how ever, observes the de relde dicto  
d istinc tion , and the d istinc tion  betw een log ical m odalities and
4.6 Closing Remark: Empiricism and Essentialism
Despite their desire to eliminate metaphysics, the logical positivists did 
not banish substantive m odal talk from  their ph ilosophy . Like 
em piricists before and since, they conflated the notions of logical 
p o ssib ility  and substantive possib ility , thus ne ither successfu lly  
banishing objective non-logical modalities nor properly respecting the 
useful notion of logical possibility. Some of those who responded to the 
em piricist abuse of logical possibility proposed their own revisions of 
the notion, others adopted e lim inativ ist view s. Such view s are 
untenable and the motivation behind their adoption is underm ined by 
clarifying the nature and utility of the notion of logical possibility, thus 
making sure that it is restricted to its proper role.
D espite  the rejection  of positiv ism  and the vogue for broadly 
A risto telian  realism  which took place, the confla tion  of logical 
m odalities and m etaphysical modalities de re was very apparent in the 
writings of many of those, including some of the m ost prominent, who 
adopted essentialist views. This was due to a lack of rigour concerning 
the observance of the de relde dicto distinction and attendant matters.
I83 Machan, (1969, 40-42) complains about Hospers's claim (1967, 173), 
that it is logically possible for a solid iron bar to float on water. 
Contrary to Machan’s apparent supposition, however, it does not follow 
from  the rejection of Hospers’s claim that the proposition that an iron 
bar can float on water is not logically possible. Machan (1969; 1970) 
provides a disastrously revisionary account which relativ izes logical 
possibility  to epistemic considerations — although I am in sympathy 
w ith the im plication (1970, 246) that the incorporation of certain 
indexical elements in logical possibility claims is illegitim ate. His key 
argum ents are unsound: e.g., he fails (1969, 41; 1970, 248-249) to 
respect the distinction (e.g., A.R. White (1975, 84)) between n écess ita s  
consequen tiae  and nécessitas consequentis. To his discredit, Rasmussen 
(1977, 119-120; 1983, 537-538) uncritically accepts some of M achan’s 
m isguided suggestions.
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m etaphysical m odalities de re. The cogent essentialist, in addition, is 
w ell-p laced  to preserve and respect the core notions of logical 
possibility  and necessity. This is a great advantage if the logical 
modalities are, as McFetridge has suggested, and I have agreed, crucial 
to the whole practice of reasoning from suppositions.
O pponents of classical em piricism , such as Kant84 and H egel,8 5 
distinguished between merely logical possibility and real possibility, 
observing that logical possibility is, in Hegelian terms, an abstraction 
from the ontological process, rather than a feature thereof.86 So grand.
84 C ritique o f  Pure R eason  [1 7 8 1 /1 7 8 7 ](1 9 3 3 ) , A 2 2 3 /B 2 7 0 ,
A244/B302, A596/B624 nt., cf. A220/B268. K ant, perhaps as an
im p lic it re jo inder to Hum e, repeatedly  em phasizes tha t log ical 
possibility is necessary but not sufficient for possibility in existence. 
As K orner (1955, 89-90) and W alsh (1975, 148) indicate, Kant's 
'Postulates of Em pirical Thought' (A218/B265-266) em ploy objective 
non-log ical m odalities. K ant (A227/B279) w rites that 'the third 
postulate...concerns m aterial necessity in existence, and not m erely 
formal and logical necessity in the connection of concepts'.
85 The Science o f  Logic, Bk II, Ft 3, Ch. 2, 'Actuality' [1812-16](1969, 
541-553). Useful comment occurs in Burbidge (1992, 39-51), Harris 
(1983, 189-212), Houlgate (1995), Johnson (1988, 142-145) and Mure 
(1950, 132-143). Hegel provides a threefold classification of modality: 
formal, real and absolute. Both real and (Hegelian) absolute necessity 
are, by my lights, notions of m etaphysical m odality de re. Real
necessity is an aspect of the contingently actual: what contingently is 
renders many formal possibilities m erely  formal, i.e., it precludes their 
actualization. All possibility  exists for Hegel, but some as 'o n ly  
possibility ' [1812-16](1969, 544), i.e., only as 'p resen t to thought' 
(Burbidge (1992, 41)). Absolute necessity, 'the determ ination of the 
parts by the principle of organization of the whole' (Harris (1983, 
207)), is the teleological dynamic of actuality the end of which, for
Hegel, is freedom. (This unity of necessity and freedom compares with
the A risto telian  conception of the human e r g o n  as p r o a i r e s i s , an 
account of which is provided by Clark (1975, esp. 21-29).)
86 Harris (1983, 193) comments:
The logically possib le...is an extrem ely thin and rather 
fu tile  conception. Everything, as Hegel points out, is 
logically  possible so long as one abstracts from  all 
conditions of actuality....a hippogryph is logically possible 
only if we abstract from physiology. Physiologically a horse 
with the torso of a man in place of its neck and with a 
human head is altogether impossible and is actually self­
con trad ic to ry .
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and so derided, a m etaphysician as Hegel was opposed to the 
conflation of logical possibility and real possibility; yet those who
sought to eliminate metaphysics were blinded to a distinction which, in 
comparison with many aspects of the apparatus of modern philosophy, 
is far from  being sophisticated or obscure. It is ironic, given their 
insistence that there are no modalities in nature, that it is empiricists
who have been guilty of obscuring the distinction. Real possibility
cannot easily be forsaken, as is evidenced by the inappropriate role in 
which empiricists have sought to cast logical possibility, as a surrogate 
for the former notion. The irony is all the more pronounced in the case 
of a philosophy which called itself 'logical'. It is unfortunate that the 
conflation has been perpetuated by neo-essentialists still under the
spell of em piricism , since it is detrim ental to m etaphysics and the 
philosophy of logic and it obstructs the path to a sound modal 
epistemology, especially for modality de re.
The po in t is, however, that Hegel's notion of form al possib ility  
intrinsically involves abstraction from actuality; In the sense of this
form al possibility everything is possible that is not self-contradictory' 
(H egel [1812”16](1969, 543)). The very no tion  in troduces the
abstraction , w ithout need for any further act of abstraction . Cf.
B urbidge's com m ent (1992, 43) that the form al m odalities are
independent of content'.
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